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INTRODUCTION
Modem prosecutors have enormous authority in every phase of a criminal
case, from the start of an investigation through the sentencing of a defendant
after conviction. The source of that authority is the discretion the criminal
justice system vests in prosecutors to decide whether to initiate an
investigation, which charges to file, when to file such charges, and whether
to offer a plea bargain or request leniency.' Under the current sentencing
regime for federal cases, the prosecutor, not the trial judge exercises primary
control over the sentence a particular defendant will receive.2 Not
surprisingly, some prosecutors have abused this authority, or at least
exercised it in a fashion that calls into question the fairness of their conduct.
When prosecutors abuse their broad authority, the vexing questions are
whether such prosecutorial misconduct violated a defendant's constitutional
rights, and, if so, what remedy to afford.3 The relief granted for prosecutorial
1. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally
rests entirely in his discretion."); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 717, 718 (1996) ("In the past thirty years... power has increasingly come to rest in
the office of the prosecutor. Developments in the areas of charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing
have made the prosecutor the preeminent actor in the system."); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good
Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 851, 862 (1995) ("The prosecutor's charging discretion is, for the most part, unreviewable.');
James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (1981)
('There is a broad and rather casual acceptance of the fact that prosecutors often exercise greater
control over the administration of criminal justice than do other officials.").
2. In enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1994)), Congress adopted a system of uniform Sentencing
Guidelines to eliminate disparity in punishment for violations of federal criminal statutes. The
Sentencing Guidelines provide a determinate range of incarceration depending on the type of offense
and degree of harm caused. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA3, comment.
(backg'd) (1997). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, judicial discretion to affix a sentence has been
substantially curtailed and federal prosecutors determine the range of punishment through the selection
of the charge that will be filed against the defendant. See United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010,
1013 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is by now apodictic that the sentencing guidelines effectively stunt the wide
discretion which district judges formerly enjoyed in criminal sentencing.').
3. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[E]ven assuming that
[the prosecutor] did act unethically, we question the prudence of remedying that misconduct through
dismissal of a valid indictment."); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1982)
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). In dissenting from the en banc court upholding a conviction as part of the
ABSCAM investigation, Circuit Judge Aldisert stated:
To the Department of Justice, its operation was a taste of honey; to me, it emanates a fetid odor
whose putrescence threatens to spoil basic concepts of fairness and justice that I hold dear. That
the FBI has earned high praise for its performance in the traditional discharge of its duties should
not immunize the secret police tactics employed in its ABSCAM operation from appropriate and
vigorous condemnation.
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misconduct should redress the harm suffered by the defendant rather than
merely send the government a message about the impropriety of its conduct
Contact between individuals and the police, such as an arrest, search, or
interrogation, are discrete events; therefore, any violation of the defendant's
rights under the Fourth or Fifth Amendments will usually arise directly from
that contact. A prosecutor, on the other hand, deals with a defendant, and
more importantly, the defendant's attorney, on a routine basis throughout a
criminal proceeding. There are, at least quantitatively, a greater number of
constitutional rights associated with the adjudicative phase of a criminal
proceeding than with the investigative phase, and the parameters within
which a violation can take place are much broader. Moreover, a
constitutional violation by the prosecutor can occur without any direct
contact with the defendant or his counsel, and it may be the culmination of a
series of events rather than the product of a discrete act.
The motives and intent of police officers are irrelevant to the Fourth
Amendment issue of whether probable cause supported a search or seizure.4
The Supreme Court, however, refers with some regularity to the prosecutor's
intent as one factor in determining whether prosecutorial misconduct violated
a defendant's rights. Unlike other areas of criminal procedure, in which the
Court focuses on the defendant's knowledge of a right and expectation of
privacy, the intent of the government's lawyer-the prosecutor-is often
considered in determining whether there was a constitutional violation
arising from prosecutorial misconduct
One reason an assessment of intent may be attractive as a standard for
reviewing the conduct of prosecutors, as opposed to the conduct of police, is
the apparent ease with which a court can gather evidence of a prosecutor's
motives. Because the prosecutor appears routinely before the court, a judge
may believe that she need do little more than question the prosecutor to
determine intent. In addition, the vast majority of crimes require proof of the
defendant's state of mind, so courts generally are comfortable assessing a
person's mental state.5 Yet the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which largely
govern the manner in which the prosecutor conducts a criminal proceeding,
do not require an assessment of the reasonableness of the government's
4. See United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").
5. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667,675 (1982). The Kennedy court stated:
[A] standard that examines the intent of the prosecutor, though certainly not free from practical
difficulties, is a manageable standard to apply. It merely calls for the court to make a finding of
fact. Inferring the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances is a
familiar process in our criminal justice system.
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actions, as does the Fourth Amendment's proscription on "unreasonable
searches and seizures."6 It therefore seems incongruous to remove subjective
intent from the Fourth Amendment's protection but incorporate it into the
determination of whether conduct violated the unqualified constitutional
protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. Moreover, while the
exclusionary rule provides an exclusive remedy for Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations that occur during a police investigation, there is no
singular remedy available to redress the harm caused by prosecutorial
violations of a defendant's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has
noted that "[t]he remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to denying the
prosecution the fruits of its transgression."7 Unfortunately, it is more difficult
to identify the fiuits of prosecutorial misconduct than illegally seized
evidence or a statement derived from an improper interrogation.
Even ascertaining a prosecutor's actual intent would not fully resolve the
issue of whether prosecutorial misconduct violated a defendant's
constitutional rights. When a court applies the label of "prosecutorial
misconduct" to describe what has occurred, it raises the question of what
remedy the court should grant to redress the harm to the defendant But even
if the misconduct did not cause harm, the court's assessment of prosecutorial
intent remains. If prosecutorial intent is relevant to the analysis of whether a
constitutional violation occurred, then to the extent a prosecutor acts with the
requisite improper purpose, the natural impulse is to punish the perpetrator
for acting on that bad intent, much like in an ordinary criminal case.8
Focusing on the prosecutor's intent, however, means that a court may feel
compelled to grant a remedy even if the misconduct did not cause an
identifiable harm to the defendant by undermining the fairness of the
proceeding or sufficiency of the evidence.
The constitutional intent analysis may include the issue of whether the
6. The Fourth Amendment provides that a person's house, papers, and effects be held secure
"against unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. CONST. amend. IV, while the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections are stated in absolute terms, such as "[n]o person shall" and "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions." U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. For example, a search with an invalid warrant that violates
the Fourth Amendment will not result in the exclusion of evidence if the government agents acted in
objective good faith. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). However, there is no
analogous exception for violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
7. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366 (1981); see also United States v. Lin Lyn
Trading, Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[rMhe district court did not adequately explain
why less extreme sanctions [than dismissal of the indictment] would not suffice to protect the
defendants' rights. Under these circumstances, suppression of all evidence.., would appear to be an
adequate remedy.").
8. See Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) ("A relation between some
mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar
exculpatory, 'But I didn't mean to.'").
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prosecutor's improper purpose or motive should trigger some remedy to
discourage such misconduct in the future. Unlike a criminal prosecution,
which imposes society's moral condemnation on a person,9 punishing a
prosecutor by granting the defendant relief, such as excluding evidence or
dismissing charges, does not necessarily vindicate the interests of the
community. Instead, it may produce a windfall for the defendant 10 A remedy
granted solely to deter future prosecutorial misconduct can lead to
incongruous results, such as the dismissal of charges when it is likely that the
defendant is guilty of the crime, or reversal of a conviction when the
proceeding was otherwise fair. Nevertheless, finding improper intent without
meting out punishment gives the impression that the courts are powerless in
the face of prosecutorial misuse of authority.
This Article analyzes the Supreme Court's determination of whether
prosecutorial misconduct violated a defendant's rights, as well as the related
issue of what constitutional remedies are available to redress the prosecutor's
violation. The issues are connected because the Court frequently refers to
prosecutorial intent as a facet of its misconduct analysis. Consideration of
intent raises the question of whether a court should grant a remedy to deter
future instances of misconduct even if the defendant did not suffer any
specific harm. Once a court finds that a prosecutor acted with improper
9. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
405 (1958) ("[A crime] is not simply any conduct to which a legislature chooses to attach a 'criminal'
penalty. It is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community."); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming
Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 733, 741 (1998) ("In a word, punishment, unlike civil
sanctions, condemns.").
10. In United States v. Acosta, 526 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit reviewed a district
court's dismissal of an indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct. The court stated:
Taking them as they are recited in the opinion of the District Court, the tactics of government
agents and prosecutors invited a swift and stem response. The question, however, is whether the
response was correct. Carefully weighing the trial record, did the conduct require that the
convictions be nullified? Should the action have been directed toward the prosecutors and
government agents rather than taking the form of a fortuitous escape for the convicted felons?
Defendants are entitled to take advantage of any error which prejudices their case but they are not
entitled to a reward for such conduct unless it could have had at lest some impact on the verdict
and thus redounded to their prejudice.
Id. at 674. See also United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Even if all the
misconduct could be considered, it is difficult to identify the prejudice to the defendants....
[D]ismissing the indictment is simply an unwarranted 'windfall' to the defendants."); Walter W.
Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965, 977-78 (1984) ('Since
reversing cases is such a dysfunctional way to impose sanctions for unethical conduct, one cannot help
but wonder why appellate courts, with their inherent power over discipline, have not structured more
formidable and sanction-specific remedies."). Professor Kades defines a windfall as "economic gains
independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that society wishes to reward," a broad
definition that incorporates benefits conferred on criminal defendants and not just private actors. Eric
Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1490 (1999).
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intent the temptation is to punish the wrongdoer, even if that means granting
relief to a defendant not directly harmed by the misconduct.
Subjective intent is irrelevant in a search and seizure case to determining
whether governmental conduct violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights and, therefore, has no bearing on the remedy granted in such a case.
11
Similarly, violations of a defendant's constitutional rights that do not involve
a structural error in the proceedings require a harmless error analysis. If the
government can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not
contribute to the conviction, then the court may not grant a remedy despite
the violation.12 Therefore, the Constitution does not provide a remedy to
deter future prosecutorial misconduct, absent a finding of harm to the
defendant
By referring to intent as a facet of the constitutional analysis, however,
the Supreme Court puts the judiciary in a quandary. Intentional misconduct
that did not violate a specific constitutional right, or was not sufficiently
harmful to warrant granting relief, means that the court is powerless to
counteract the wrongdoing of the prosecutor or perhaps to deter future
impropriety. The temptation ofjudges is to invoke a constitutional remedy to
punish the government, regardless of whether the defendant is entitled to
such relief. The intent standard distracts from the analysis of whether the
prosecutor violated the defendant's constitutional rights. This Article posits
that the Supreme Court's references to intent are misleading because, with
one exception, the prosecutor's subjective intent was effectively irrelevant to
the constitutional analysis. Yet, by retaining intent as an element, lower
courts are improperly led to focus more on deterring prosecutorial
misconduct than on determining whether the defendant's rights were violated
and whether the violation resulted in any harm. Having made the effort to
ascertain prosecutorial intent, courts may seek to express their authority by
rebuking the government for acting improperly.
Actual intent should be-and largely is-irrelevant to the constitutional
analysis of whether a prosecutor's conduct violated a defendant's rights. This
Article analyzes prosecutorial acts that violate a defendant's constitutional
rights and how the Supreme Court has almost entirely eliminated inquiry into
subjective intent, with one significant exception in the area of peremptory
challenges. The Article maintains that reliance on actual intent is misguided
I1. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,
138 (1978) (stating that searches are evaluated "under a standard of objective reasonableness without
regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved").
12. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967).
[VCOL. 77:713
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because it can elevate punishing a prosecutor to deter future misconduct
above granting a constitutional remedy to correct harm to a defendant.
Moreover, in the one instance in which the Court sanctions judicial inquiry
into prosecutorial motives, the exercise of peremptory challenges, the result
has been to create an impression of injustice. The Article concludes that,
rather than misinterpreting constitutional protections to permit relief as a
deterrent to future prosecutorial misconduct, courts should employ non-
constitutional means to police the conduct of prosecutors.
Part I of this Article considers generally the problem of ascertaining the
intent of a prosecutor and discusses specifically the ethical precepts of the
legal profession that impose on a prosecutor the apparently irreconcilable
duties to act both as an advocate and as a "minister of justice." Part II begins
the detailed analysis of prosecutorial misconduct that can violate a
defendant's constitutional rights by examining the decision to prosecute a
case. This Part starts with an examination of the prosecutor's authority to
negotiate a plea bargain and then considers the standards governing a
prosecutor's permissible motivations to pursue charges. Those areas raise
questions regarding the role of subjective intent, whether the prosecutor was
improperly vindictive or used improper criteria for selection of the defendant,
to determine if filing criminal charges violated a defendant's constitutional
rights. The Court's references to the prosecutor's intent as an element of the
analysis does not reflect the reality of the tests it adopts that make judicial
inquiry into actual motives irrelevant
Part III of the Article reviews the prosecution's treatment of evidence that
will or should be available to the defendant at trial. Part III begins with an
examination of the Supreme Court's expansion of due process to require the
government to disclose exculpatory evidence and contemplates the instances
in which the government must preserve evidence or pursue a prosecution
with sufficient dispatch to avoid the loss of such evidence. The Article
focuses here on the relevance of the prosecutor's knowledge to determine
whether the conduct violated a defendant's due process rights.
Part IV focuses on peremptory challenges, the one area in which the
Court sanctions judicial inquiry into a prosecutor's actual motive. In Batson
v. Kentucky,13 the Court required judges to ask advocates why they exercised
a peremptory challenge when it appeared to be based on the race of the juror.
While Batson's goal of eliminating the effect of discriminatory conduct in
the selection of juries is laudable, this Article argues that the Batson court's
approach does more harm than good because it permits attorneys to be less
13. 476 U.S. 79(1986).
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than honest in explaining their reasons in challenging a particular juror. The
Batson inquiry results in a denigration of the judicial process when courts
accept responses that "strain credulity., 14
Part V of this Article considers the relationship between prosecutorial
misconduct at trial and the constitutional protection against double jeopardy,
focusing on a test for double jeopardy that appears to make prosecutorial
intent the primary element Part V argues that this test makes the prosecutor's
actual motives irrelevant
Part VI of this Article addresses generally the topic of remedy, and argues
that extending the Double Jeopardy Clause as a means of deterring
prosecutorial misconduct is not only improper, but harms the judicial system
by encouraging judges to demand, without any clear constitutional basis for
doing so, that prosecutors describe their motives.
I. PROSECUTORIAL INTENT AND "Do JUSTICE"
In Berger v. United States,15 the Supreme Court asserted that the
government's interest in a criminal prosecution "is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done," and that it is therefore a prosecutor's
duty "to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction [even] as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one."16 This duty of prosecutors described in Berger furnishes the basis for
courts to assert that when the government crosses the line between proper
and improper methods, what has taken place is "prosecutorial misconduct"
That label can be attached to as broad an array of acts as the prosecutor has
authority to perform because the admonition to ensure justice" shadows
every endeavor of the prosecutor. Since Berger, courts have applied the
prosecutorial misconduct designation almost reflexively, as a shorthand
method of describing whether the government attorney acted outside the
bounds of acceptable advocacy.
When a court labels acts as prosecutorial misconduct, it occasionally does
so in a blistering opinion that calls prosecutors to task for their failings. For
example, in United States v. Kojayan,17 the Ninth Circuit berated a
14. United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1162 (3d Cir. 1989) (Higginbotham, J,
concurring). Judge Higginbotham went on to note that in "any individual case on appeal, even a flimsy
explanation may appear marginally adequate and be sustained. However, this cumulative record causes
me to pause and wonder whether the principles enunciated in Batson are being undermined by excuses
that have all form and no substance." Id.
15. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
16. Id. at 88.
17. 8 F.3d 1315(9th Cir. 1993).
[VOL. 77:713
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prosecutor who failed to disclose to defense counsel the truth about the
availability of a key witness, and who then compounded the error by
asserting on appeal that the government had not misled either opposing
counsel or the trial court."8 In Demlanjuk v. Petrovsky,'9 the Sixth Circuit
found prosecutorial misconduct when government attorneys recklessly
disregarded their duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant facing
loss of citizenship and deportation for allegedly participating in the murder of
Jews during World War II.'° In Wang v. Reno, ' the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's issuance of an injunction against the deportation of a
foreign witness who testified in an American judicial proceeding at the
government's behest and faced likely execution if forced to return to his
native country.22 The appellate court castigated the deportation effort as "a
course of governmental misconduct in which United States officials and
prosecutors callously violated Wang's Fifth Amendment due process
rights. ' 3
Given the assortment of interactions between prosecutors, defendants, and
defense counsel, it should not be surprising that the term "prosecutorial
misconduct" does not describe any particular type of act or category of
violation. Courts review most prosecutorial misconduct claims under a
harmless error standard, which requires that a defendant identify prejudice
traceable to the violation.2 In considering such a claim, therefore, a court
18. Id. at 1322-23 ("Most disappointing of all, perhaps, is the government's failure to
acknowledge that the prosecutor's misconduct was far more than a single slip of the tongue, more than
a temporary misstep.... [The government] shows no appreciation of the seriousness of the
misconduct, no hint of contrition.").
19. 10 F.3d 338(6th Cir. 1993).
20. Id. at 339. The court found prosecutorial misconduct because the "attitude of the
[government] attorneys toward disclosing information to Demjanjuk's counsel was not consistent with
the government's obligation to work for justice rather than for a result that favors its attorneys'
preconceived ideas of what the outcome of legal proceedings should be." Id at 349-50. Demjanjuk
was a civil immigration proceeding, but the court analyzed the government's actions as if they had
occurred in the context of a criminal proceeding. The Sixth Circuit may have taken this approach to a
civil proceeding because of the strong likelihood, eventually borne out, that Demjanjuk would be
subject to criminal prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction.
21. 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996).
22. Seeid.at821.
23. Id. at 813. In finding a Fifth Amendment violation, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the district
court's conclusion that the government's actions "shock the conscience of the Court." Id.
24. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1988) ("[W]here the error
is harmless, concerns about the 'integrity of the [judicial] process' will carry less weight, and that a
court may not disregard the doctrine of harmless error simply 'in order to chastize what the court
view[s] as prosecutorial overreaching."' (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983)).
In federal prosecutions, any errors in the proceeding that do not affect "substantial rights" are
disregarded. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). Most constitutional errors are also reviewed to determine whether
the defendant has been prejudiced under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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need not precisely define prosecutorial misconduct because a finding of
misconduct usually does not trigger relief unless the prosecutor's acts
undermined the fairness of the proceeding or confidence in the jury's verdict.
Courts can affix a prosecutorial misconduct label on the government's
actions without concern that their determination will result in overturning a
conviction or requiring the dismissal of charges.25 Branding behavior as
misconduct is, therefore, almost cost-free. The label itself has no content,
however, in much the same way that Berger's paean does not provide any
assistance in determining whether a defendant's rights have been violated. A
court must therefore determine when a prosecutor's misconduct should result
in granting a defendant some remedy when the defendant's constitutional
rights have not been violated.
A. Ascertaining Prosecutorial Intent
When the Supreme Court refers to intent as a standard by which to assess
the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct, the question of whether courts are
to consider the actual, subjective motives or knowledge of the prosecutor still
remains. Unfortunately, as Professor Reiss noted, consideration of
prosecutorial intent "is not the result of any overarching theory concerning
the role of intent in the constitutional regulation of prosecutorial conduct-at
least not one that has been articulated by the courts.
26
The Supreme Court could empower judges to ask prosecutors why they
chose a particular course of action, but such an inquiry is unlikely to yield
reliable information concerning possible violation of a defendant's rights. If a
constitutional determination of prosecutorial misconduct required the
offending party to admit to the violation, or at least to disclose an improper
motive for acting, then few if any such violations would be found.
References to a prosecutor's intent are misleading because the Court
largely avoids giving lower courts the authority to inquire into a prosecutor's
actual motives, while at the same time asserting that an evaluation of intent is
an important facet of the constitutional equation. Rather than relying on an
assessment of the prosecutor's subjective intent, the Court has approached
the issue of intent as an element of prosecutorial misconduct in two different
§ 27.6 (2d ed. 1992) (summarizing various harmless error standards).
25. The Eleventh Circuit echoed a lament of appellate courts, stating that "[w]e ... find
ourselves in a situation with which we are all too familiar a prosecutor has engaged in misconduct at
trial, but no reversible error has been shown." United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11 th Cir.
1998).
26. Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1365, 1366 (1987).
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ways.
The Court's first approach employs a completely objective standard, by
which courts are to infer the improper intent from the conduct and statements
of prosecutors, but are not to compel prosecutors to respond to any judicial
inquiry into their subjective motives. The Court's second approach imposes a
high standard for finding a constitutional violation, one that will subject the
prosecutor to questioning regarding his motives only in cases of the most
blatant misconduct. Such an inquiry will be largely duplicative of the
available evidence because the violation will be so clear. The exception to
this approach is Batson v. Kentucky,27 which empowers judges to require
prosecutors, and defense counsel for that matter, to explain the reasons for
removing a juror from the panel through the use of a peremptory challenge.
Apart from Batson, the Supreme Court precludes real scrutiny of a
prosecutor's subjective intent because permitting such an inquiry as a proxy
for determining whether a defendant's constitutional rights were violated
engenders an even greater harm in the criminal justice system. Although one
reason the Court fails to inquire into prosecutorial motive is possibly the
result of the haphazard nature of the constitutional analysis,28 it is more likely
that it is simply unrealistic to expect an advocate to reveal completely the
reasoning for a particular decision made during an adversarial proceeding,
assuming one is even articulable. This premise is paralleled by the fact that
the law recognizes a protection for an attorney's work product in civil
litigation to preserve the confidentiality of a lawyer's thoughts from
discovery, even if the information is not otherwise privileged. This is the case
because attorneys need a "certain degree of privacy" to fairly represent their
clients.29
Once called upon to provide a justification for conduct in a criminal case,
the government's response in most cases will probably be that its attorneys
and investigators acted properly. 30 Further, if the Court asked the government
27. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
28. See Reiss, supra note 26, at 1367 ("Reliance upon prosecutorial intent has been not only
unsystematic, but largely unreflective.").
29. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). The Supreme Court first recognized the
work product doctrine in Hicknan, and the protection has been incorporated into the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Fed. R. CIV. P. 26(bX3). Of course, the doctrine is not an absolute bar to discovery,
and a party can compel production of an opposing attorney's work product on a showing of a
particularized need and that substantially equivalent evidence is unavailable. See id.
30. I do not mean to imply that government attorneys never admit mistakes to the detriment of
their case. For example, in Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966), then-Solicitor General
Thurgood Marshall requested that the Supreme Court order a new trial when federal investigators
improperly monitored conferences between defendants and their lawyers. See id. at 27. During the
pretrial and trial phase of a case, however, when the attorney who pursued a course of conduct is
called upon to explain the intent behind the decision, it seems much more likely that the person will
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to document decisions or to maintain records showing how it reached a
particular position, those records would probably reveal little suggesting an
unreasonable or impermissible rationale for the prosecutor's conduct, even
assuming there was such an improper motivation. If the Supreme Court
permits questioning of prosecutors about subjective intent, it will be difficult
for lower courts to reject responses as untrue, regardless of whether they
appear contrived or as apost hoc rationalization. Indeed, the exception to this
analysis, Batson, proves the folly of permitting judicial inquiry into the
prosecutor's reasons for acting. In evaluating the proffered justification for a
peremptory challenge, the Court stated that assessing the constitutionality of
the attorney's conduct "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or
even plausible." 31 Arguably, then, there is no real reason to ask a prosecutor
about prosecutorial motive when it is unlikely the prosecutor will produce
anything worth the court's consideration.
Ascertaining a prosecutor's actual state of mind is qualitatively different
from determining a defendant's intent in committing a crime. In a criminal
prosecution, the government tries to prove intent through the perpetrator's
actions and words, asking the trier of fact to infer the defendant's state of
mind from this objective evidence. Judicial inquiry into prosecutorial intent is
dissimilar because the court compels an advocate, in the midst of a
contentious proceeding, to describe the reasoning for pursuing a course of
action. Further, proof of prosecutorial misconduct often relies on the
prosecutor's own statements, which is subjective evidence, rather than
objective conduct. Unlike the prosecution of a criminal case, which has a
retrospective focus and the need for objective facts on which to draw
inferences, a judicial assessment of prosecutorial intent with respect to
possi'ble misconduct would be almost contemporaneous with the questioned
conduct, and the court does not necessarily have any observable objective
conduct on which to base such an assessment
Courts compelling disclosure of motives or knowledge essentially would
be asking prosecutors to justify their actions in order to avoid a finding in
favor of their opponent, a person whom the prosecutor believes committed a
criminal offense. The hope would be that a prosecutor would always respond
with complete candor, regardless of the effect on a pending or completed
explain a position in the most benign way possible.
31. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995); see also Jos6 Felip6 Anderson, Catch Me IfYoit
Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEw ENO. L.
REV. 343, 376 (1998) ("[A] reluctance on the part of judges to find a Batson violation fuels the
practice of offering fabricated reasons that relieves the judge of the need to implicitly call an officer of
the court a liar by ruling to reject his reason.").
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case. A realistic view should acknowledge, however, that putting such a
question to an advocate seeking the conviction of an alleged criminal raises a
serious concern regarding the expected veracity, or at least the completeness,
of the response.32 In other words, courts trying to discern the government's
actual intent may be extending to some prosecutors a tempting opportunity to
lie to protect the criminal prosecution. By using the word "lie," I do not mean
to imply that prosecutors will brazenly misstate the truth, although that can
happen on occasion. Instead, I employ the term as the starkest result of the
calculus that individuals, asked to justify their actions, may undertake to put
their position in the best light possible, especially when they understand the
potential adverse consequence of a finding of improper conduct or
motivation.33 As one practicing attorney put it, "[w]hat prosecutor in his
senses would admit to being motivated by personal pique? What action could
not be rationalized as a good faith effort to discern community needs?,
34
A prosecutor may act after weighing conflicting reasons in response to
unconscious motives, or based only on instinct when deciding whether to
pursue a particular course of action. When called upon to explain the reason
for that conduct, a prosecutor, serving as the government's advocate, may,
and perhaps should, try to put his conduct in the best light to protect the
government's case. When the impulse to present the government's case in
the best light possible is combined with the dictates of the adversarial system,
which compel attorneys for each side to vigorously assert the position of their
client,35 a court's inquiry into intent might tempt a prosecutor to explain his
32. See Reiss, supra note 26, at 1434 ("When a prosecutor is questioned about her intent, and
that intent is dispositive of a claim that the prosecutor opposes, the prosecutor faces enormous pressure
to rationalize her actions as permissibly motivated.").
33. A lawyer must disclose facts to a tribunal when "necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by the client" MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(aX2) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. There is no prohibition against trying to advance a client's interests by putting
forward the most favorable interpretation of those facts. The troublesome question for the legal system
concerns how far a lawyer may go in creating impressions that the lawyer knows do not reflect the
truth. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.3.4 (1986) ("Beyond the prohibition
against presenting blatantly false evidence, what restraints are placed on lawyers to prevent their
taking steps in litigation to create impressions in the mind of the fact finder that a lawyer knows to be
false?"). Wolfram concludes that "it is certainly not a standard requirement that an American advocate
always avoid distorting facts." See a In a well-known article on prosecutorial ethics, Professor Uviller
noted that the ethical codes provide little concrete guidance to prosecutors in exercising their
discretion, and argued that prosecutorial discretion should be guided "by an honest effort to discern
public needs and community concerns [rather] than by personal pique or moralistic impertinence." H.
Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71
MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1153 (1973).
34. Id.
35. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE] ("A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.").
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actions in a way that may not necessarily reflect all of his private thoughts or
motivations. A judicial assertion that the government attorney owes a special
duty to uphold justice serves as powerful rhetoric that highlights the danger
to society when a prosecutor engages in misconduct.36 The admonitions to
prosecutors in ethical codes and judicial opinions to "do justice" in
prosecuting a case has little meaningful effect, however, when the public
judges prosecutors by the results of cases. Government attorneys are also
aware that they operate within an adversarial system in which that same duty
is not imposed on the other side. This could, in some circumstances, allow
defense counsel to employ tactics that may obfuscate the truth without fear of
admonition or reprisal.37
36. The oft-cited statement of a prosecutor's special duty to ensure justice came from Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), in which Justice Sutherland stated:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about ajust one.
Id. at 88. As discussed below, the demarcation between hard and foul blows is as indistinguishable as
any in the law, subject to much judicial hand-wringing amid strongly-worded admonishments to
prosecutors to avoid the line.
37. See Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and
Administrator ofJustice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCs 1301, 1301 (1996) ("Unfortunately, the 'minister of
justice' language, so lofty-sounding at first, degenerates into malarkey upon closer examination.");
Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 951, 957 (1991) ("[The] double standard
[imposing on government attorneys a heightened duty to seek justice] furnishes much of the ethical
tension inherent in the role of the government lawyer."); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutor's Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 48 (1991) ("The
'do justice' standard, however, establishes no identifiable norm. Its vagueness leaves prosecutors with
only their individual sense of morality to determine just conduct.'). In a criminal prosecution, a
defense lawyer is generally acknowledged to have the duty to raise doubts about the government's
case, even if the attorney believes that the prosecution's witnesses are testifying truthfully. See
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 214 (1990) ("[A] defense lawyer can
ethically cross-examine a prosecution witness to make the witness appear to be inaccurate or
untruthful, even though the lawyer knows that the witness is testifying accurately and truthfully.");
WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 12.4.5 ("General agreement exists among commentators that defense
counsel in a criminal case may permissibly cross-examine a witness known to be telling the truth in an
effort to persuade the jury not to believe the witness."); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous
Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 210-11 (1988) ('[W]e give defense
lawyers a special license to use truth-defeating trial tactics.... But the prosecutor, enjoined to 'fight
fairly,' is barred from using the same tactics.... [S]he is sent into battle with a blunted sword, while
her opponent's is sharpened to a razor's edge."); Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie Necessary? Further
Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689, 689 (1988)
("[P]recluding the defense attorney from attacking a truthful case against the defendant may be
incompatible with the defense attorney's responsibility to assure that the prosecution meets its high
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B. Ethical Rules
The adversarial structure of the American justice system makes the
lawyer's zealous advocacy on behalf of the client the linchpin of the
process.38 Yet, the ethical rules that govern the legal profession single out
prosecutors as the only participants who must adhere to a special duty
beyond that of representing zealously their "client." This higher duty has
been variously phrased to require the prosecutor "to seek justice, not merely
to convict, ' 39 and "to serve as a minister of justice and not simply [as] an
advocate."40 The recurrent theme is justice, although the codes do not furnish
any guidance about what that means or even whose perspective determines
whether a particular result was just.41
The prosecutor labors under the pull of two divergent forces created by
the ethical precepts. One of these forces requires an attorney to advocate
passionately the government's position, while the other pushes the prosecutor
to seek a result that may not be exactly what the client and the attorney
desire: a conclusion short of a criminal conviction. Therefore, at the core of a
prosecutor's function lies a potentially irreconcilable conflict between doing
burden of proof at trial."). Professor Freedman noted the asymmetry between the roles of the
prosecutor and defense counsel, but asserted that there is no ethical basis to 'justify a prosecutor in
making a defense witness appear to be testifying inaccurately or untruthfully when the prosecutor
knows that the witness is testifying accurately and truthfully." FREEDMAN, supra, at 214. But see
Joseph D. Grano, Criminal Procedure: Moving from the Accused as Victim to the Accused as
Responsible Party, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 711, 716 (1996) ("[P]erhaps defense counsel should
be ethically precluded not just from presenting perjurious testimony but also from offering defenses
that counsel knows to be false, even when this can be done without pejured testimony."); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REV. 647, 676 (1986) ("The
lawyer should not use her courtroom experience and the nervousness of the witness, however, to make
an honest witness appear less than honest. She may not do so because this action no longer is good
faith testing of the witness.').
38. See FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 65 ("The ethic of zeal is ... pervasive in lawyers'
professional responsibilities, because it inspires all of the lawyer's other ethical obligations with
'entire devotion to the interest of the client.") (quoting 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (1821);
WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 10.3.2 ("In the dominant legal culture in the United States, to ask why it
is that a lawyer should be zealous in pursuit of a client's interests is to raise a question the answer to
which most lawyers probably feel is intuitively obvious.'). I do not question the efficacy of the
adversary system in ascertaining truth, as many others have done. See id. Rather, I accept it as a given
of the current criminal justice system that is unlikely to be changed significantly in the near future.
39. MODEL CODE, supra note 35, EC 7-13; see also STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.2(c) (1992) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to
seek justice, not merely to convict.").
40. MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1992).
41. The Model Rules impose a duty on every attorney to deal with the court and opposing
counsel honestly and fairly. MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule 3.3 ("Candor Toward the Tribunal")
& 3.4 ("Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel"). The prosecutor's special duty appears to be owed
to the entire justice system rather than just to the other participants in a particular proceeding.
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justice-which the ethical codes do not define-and the prosecutor's role as
the government's primary advocate in the criminal justice system.42 The
special place prosecutors occupy seemingly entails a duty to refrain from
acting in an independently unethical way, but prosecutors have no guidance
for discerning whether their conduct can constitute acceptable zealous
advocacy under the rules but at the same time not advance justice.43
It is clear that no lawyer in a civil or criminal case may use either false or
inadmissible evidence." If the admonition that prosecutors "do justice" only
prohibits the use of such evidence or similar illegal tactics, then a
prosecutor's special duty is redundant If it requires something more of a
prosecutor, so that the standard has some independent meaning that instructs
prosecutors to act differently from other lawyers, then that broader obligation
would hinder the furtherance of the state's interest Thus, only by tempering
the zealous advocacy that could otherwise be acceptable can the caveat that
prosecutors must also further justice make sense. The result is that imposing
a separate duty on prosecutors may contradict their obligation as lawyers
representing the government in a criminal prosecution.
42. See Zacharias, supra note 37, at 52 ("TIThe noncompetitive approach to prosecutorial ethics
is inconsistent with the professional codes' underlying theory.")
43. See Lanctot, supra note 37, at 967. Professor Lanctot notes that
[A] review of both modem codes shows that neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules reflects
much detailed consideration of the government lawyer's role in the advocacy system. To the
extent that they address government lawyers at all, the ethical codes suggest that government
lawyers are sulject to different ethical considerations than other lawyers, but the nature of these
considerations remains ambiguous.
Id See also Uviller, supra note 33, at 1153 ("Let us frankly acknowledge that justice in the criminal
process and the rectitude of its administrators are both largely a matter of myth. (I use myth in the
anthropological sense, as a community belief which ... is necessary for the functioning of some
institution of that community)."); Vorenberg, supra note 1, at 1557 ("It is simply unrealistic to expect
the adversary counsel to ensure the fairest possible exercise of this enormous power. The ambiguous
role of the prosecutor subverts 'the appearance of evenhanded justice which is at the core of due
process."' (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455,469 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
44. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility contains a detailed list ofprohibitions:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the
evidence is false.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule.
MODEL CODE, supra note 35, at DR 7-102. The Model Rules similarly prohibit the submission of false
evidence, and require that even if the information is subject to the confidentiality provisions of the
Rules, the information about falsity must still be disclosed. See MODEL RULES, supra note 33, Rule
3.3(aX4),(b).
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In addition to ethical rules, constitutional and statutory provisions also
constrain the authority of the government and protect the criminal defendant
at every stage of the proceeding. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
impose important limits on the government's ability to gather evidence and
mandate specific procedures for initiating and conducting a criminal trial. 4
Similarly, statutes at both the state and federal level govern discovery and the
timing of prosecution, among other things.
The ethical admonition to "do justice" cannot mean just that a
government attorney may not violate any of the myriad constitutional and
statutory rights afforded a defendant because then the admonition would only
reiterate the underlying axiom that a lawyer represent a client within the
bounds of the law. If advancing justice only means refraining from breaking
the law, then every attorney labors under the same standard, and the
prosecutor has no more of a special duty than other members of the bar. The
innumerable constitutional and statutory constraints on prosecutorial
behavior concededly give prosecutors a greater number of opportunities to
violate the law. But this does not illuminate why the ethical precept that
attorneys must operate within the confines of the law should apply more
stringently to prosecutors.
C. Due Process
Courts embrace the perceived special ethical duty of prosecutors,
referring frequently to the distinct obligation of prosecutors to be more than
advocates seeking a conviction. Berger's oft-repeated phrase, that a
prosecutor's interest "in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done,"" showed that the Supreme Court recognizes a
prosecutor's special duty beyond simple compliance with the law; that is, a
line exists between acceptable and unacceptable prosecutorial conduct
beyond just respecting a defendant's statutory and constitutional rights. In
almost the same breath, however, the Court noted the prosecutor's duty to
strike "hard blows," while avoiding "foul ones," and stated that the
government's attorney may "use every legitimate means" to secure a
conviction.47 The tension in Berger is the same as under the ethical codes: the
point at which a hard blow becomes a foul one is impossible to identify, so
45. See Saltzburg, supra note 37, at 666 (noting that constitutional rules "recognize, implicitly
more than explicitly, that the legal system must control the desire to win in criminal investigations and
prosecutions and the desire to convict and punish all persons believed by prosecutors to be guilty.").
46. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
47. Id.
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prosecutors must be forceful advocates, but not so forceful that a court can
later conclude that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct.
48
The Berger Court, explaining neither the source nor the scope of this
special duty imposed on prosecutors, reversed the defendant's conviction
because the government's evidence was weak and "the prosecuting
attorney's argument to the jury was undignified and intemperate, containing
improper insinuations and assertions calculated to mislead the jury."'"
Although the Court never identified which of the defendant's rights the
government violated, its references to the "fairness" of the proceeding,
resulting from the prosecutor's prejudicial statements, appeared to invoke the
due process protection of the Fifth Amendment.50 Asserting that the special
duty of prosecutors derives from the Due Process Clause, however, does not
illuminate what that duty entails. Berger made clear that the prosecutor must
pursue the case "with earnestness and vigor ..... 51 There can only be a
constitutional violation, therefore, when the prosecutor has not sought justice,
but prosecuting vigorously is part of doing justice. If prosecutors "do justice"
in order to ensure due process, they must still prosecute a case vigorously or
they will not ensure that justice is done. If due process only means that the
prosecutor may not violate a defendant's other rights, then it does nothing
more than reiterate the ethical duty of every attorney. Thus, raising the
prosecutorial standard to a constitutional level does not resolve the conflict
between the prosecutor's duty to vigorously represent the government and
the admonition to "do justice."
Much like both the ethical mandate to "do justice" and the Berger court's
analysis of due process, consideration of whether an act constitutes
"prosecutorial misconduct" does not help define the scope of the prosecutor's
duty beyond the requirement that the government not violate any of the
defendant's constitutional or statutory rights. Claiming that the government
engaged in misconduct is easy because due process and the prosecutor's
special duty apply at every stage in the criminal process.
Kojayan,5 Demjanjuk,53 and Wang54 each involved an appellate court's
48. Cf. Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial". When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal
Convictions, 9 GEO. L LEGAL ETHICS 537, 544 n.27 (1996) ("Translated into district attorney lingo,
the Supreme Court [in Berger] has told prosecutors, "Kick butt, but don't kick groin.").
49. Berger, 295 U.S. at 85, 89.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.").
51. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
52. 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993).
53. 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993).
54. 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996).
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determination that prosecutors violated the rights of a participant in the
criminal justice system. These cases are disturbing because of the broad
discretion prosecutors have to decide both whether to bring a case and how to
conduct the proceeding. Courts do not inquire into the government's reasons
for deciding not to bring a case, and challenges to a decision to file charges
generally are doomed to failure absent a clear showing of an impermissible
motivation.55 Control over the investigative process often provides the
government with a substantial advantage in deciding what information to
release to a defendant. For example, courts acknowledge that it is the
prosecutor, not the judge, who makes the initial decision as to whether
evidence in its possession is exculpatory such that it must be disclosed to the
defendant.
56
The absence of a workable definition of the special duty of a prosecutor
means that courts cannot engage in serious review of prosecutorial conduct
without referring to the specific rights of a criminal defendant. Only in the
context of determining the effect of the government's conduct on the
defendant is a court able to determine whether the prosecutor's actions rose
to a level of misconduct that constituted a failure to "do justice." The analysis
of the defendant's rights necessarily involves examining the prosecutor's
actions. The important question is how the court's analysis should
incorporate the motivations and knowledge of the prosecutor. If a court
considers the prosecutor's state of mind in deciding whether he violated a
defendant's rights, and concomitantly determines whether the prosecutor
violated the special duty to "do justice," then the prosecutor will possibly be
less than candid in responding to judicial inquiry regarding his intent. In
deciding whether prosecutors have done justice, it makes little sense to ask
those charged with this special duty whether they think they have acted
justly, because prosecutors operate under conflicting ethical duties. By
asking "Why?", a court may only frustrate the inquiry and thereby make
justice less obtainable by creating an incentive for prosecutors to be less than
completely honest.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 57-146 (reviewing vindictive and selective prosecution
analysis).
56. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (determination of what constitutes material
exculpatory evidence "must accordingly be seen as leaving the government with a degree of
discretion"); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("[Ihe prosecutor is not required to
deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial"); cf. id. at 696-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Thus, for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon his role as an advocate and pore through
his files, as objectively as possible, to identify the material that could undermine his case.').
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II. PROSECUTORIAL INTENT AND THE DECISION ABOUT WHO AND WHAT
TO PROSECUTE
The prosecutor's discretion begins, in a sense, with the formation of a
miscreant's criminal intent Once a person decides to commit a crime, a
prosecutor could, if informed of the plan, initiate an investigation that could
culminate in filing formal charges. Alternatively, the prosecutor could
decline to prosecute, even if credible evidence existed that an individual
engaged in criminal conduct This first step defines the breadth of
prosecutorial discretion because all else flows from the initial decision about
whether to set the criminal process in motion.57 The prosecutor's authority is
increased by the expansiveness of criminal codes, which often permit the
government to file charges under multiple provisions based on a single
course of conduct 58 As Professor Richman noted, "[p]rosecutors... emerge
as mediators between phenomenally broad legislative pronouncements and
the equities of individual cases, and as technical judges of when evidence is
sufficient to proceed."59
Allowing prosecutors such broad discretion, especially at the charging
stage, raises the issue of monitoring the fairness of their decisions. Justice
Jackson, in a famous address given in 1940 when he was the Attorney
General, noted that "[w]hile the prosecutor at his best is one of the most
beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base
motives, he is one of the worst"0 The problem with prosecutorial discretion
is obvious: insulating a prosecutor's actions from judicial review can lead to
57. See Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CH. L. REV. 246, 246-47 (1980) (describing criticisms of
prosecutorial decisions to accept a lenient disposition in a criminal case, but noting that "[i]t has long
been recognized ... that police and prosecutors exercise even broader discretion in the arrest and
screening stages."). The issue at the charging stage concerns the exercise of the prosecutor's judgment,
not whether there is sufficient evidence to support bringing a criminal charge and securing a
conviction. See Michael Kades, Exercising Discretion: A Case Study ofProsecutortal Discretion in the
Wisconsin Department of Justice, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 115, 120 (1997) ("Discretion has two
components: accuracy and judgment. Accuracy is the ability to process information, decide what
actually happened, and determine what can be proved in court .... Judgment is the ability to prosecute
the most important cases.").
58. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979). The opinion stated that
[t]his Court has long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the
Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of
defendants. Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions
that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion.
IM
59. Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939,958 (1997).
60. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 . AM. JUDICATURE SOC'y 18 (June 1940).
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violations of citizens' rights through the arbitrary or, worse, malevolent
exercise of authority.6'
Imposing greater accountability on prosecutors, however, raises a
different set of concerns. The greater a defendant's opportunity to challenge a
prosecutor's decision, the more courts will have to immerse themselves in
the operations of prosecutorial offices. Judicial review of charging decisions
would inevitably result in the formulation of specific criteria for maldng such
decisions because courts ordinarily do not limit their pronouncements to the
particular case at bar. This undermines a major advantage of the current
system by limiting the prosecutor's ability to apply limited resources flexibly
to respond to new challenges and to achieve the greatest measure of
deterrence and punishment through the criminal justice system.62 As then-
Circuit Judge Burger stated in Newman v. United States,63 "[flew subjects are
less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his
discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or
what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once
brought"
The tension between countenancing unfettered exercise of the
prosecutor's powers and acquiescing to judicial review of charging decisions
reflects the ethical conflict underlying the role of the prosecutor both as a
zealous advocate and an official charged with a broader duty to ensure
justice. Courts cannot simply abjure all authority to oversee the fairness of
such an important process, yet the impetus to engage in judicial review
conflicts with an important precept of the criminal justice system: the
executive branch decides the proper means of enforcing the criminal law to
the exclusion of the judiciary.
61. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 189 (1969)
("Even if we assume that a prosecutor has to have a power of selective enforcement, why do we not
require him to state publicly his general policies and require him to follow those policies in individual
cases in order to protect evenhanded justice?").
62. See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1971) ("The major advantage of such discretion is that it provides early in the
decision-making process a flexibility and sensitivity not available in a system where prosecutorial
decisions must be made according to predetermined rules.").
63. 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
64. Id. at 480. Newman based its rejection of judicial overview of prosecutorial charging
decisions on separation of powers grounds, stating that "it is not the function of the judiciary to review
the exercise of executive discretion whether it be that of the President himself of those to whom he has
delegated certain of his powers." Id. at 482. See also Sarah J. Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An
Overview, 13 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 383, 391 (1976) ("Review by some outside authority cannot
guarantee protection from the hazards of discretion; the question of review is not that simple. A trial is
essentially a review of a prosecutor's decision to prosecute; all tried cases offer review of his decisions
in the case at bar.").
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The Supreme Court has affirmatively recognized judicial authority to
review prosecutorial charging decisions in two situations: when the decision
to increase charges was vindictive, and when the government improperly
selected the defendant based on an impermissible classification. Whether the
prosecutor acted vindictively or selected the defendant based on an
unacceptable criterion focuses judicial review of prosecutorial conduct
squarely on the motivations of the particular attorneys who made the
decision. The Court's approach, however, avoided the hard issue of how to
ascertain actual intent by adopting tests that made meaningful inquiry into
the prosecutor's state of mind irrelevant for a vindictive prosecution claim,
and almost impossible for a selective prosecution claim. Any judicial review
of the decisions of whether to charge a particular person and which crime
should be charged seems to be an area in which the prosecutor's thought
process would be of paramount importance. The Court, however, has made
intent essentially irrelevant, most likely because it recognized that asking
prosecutors why they acted would be fruitless and perhaps even counter-
productive.
A. Vindictive Prosecutions: Isn't That What You're Paid For?
The dictionary defines "vindictive" as "having a bitterly vengeful
character" or "characterized by an intent to cause unpleasantness, damage, or
pain."65 One of the definitions for "vindication" is "to take vengeance for;
avenge., 66 Describing the prosecutor's role as vindicating society's interest is
an acceptable characterization, while attributing to that person a measure of
vindictiveness is unsettling because of the negative connotation the word
carries. "Causing unpleasantness" and being "bitterly vengeful" do not sound
like qualities society seeks in an official invested with substantial discretion.
Yet vindictive and vindication are closely related, each involving a measure
of retribution that maintains society's interest in punishing criminal
conduct 67 The distinction is as fine as that discussed in Berger between the
65. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged 1966).
66. Id.
67. One rationale for imposing criminal sanctions is the "just desserts" or retributive theory of
criminal sanctions, that "liability and punishment should be imposed because the offender deserves it,
whether or not such liability and punishment would help avoid future offenses." PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2 (1997); see generally Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals: How Can Something
That Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448 (1990) (discussing retributive principle of
criminal punishment). To the extent that the criminal law rests on seeking retribution from criminals
for their wrongdoing, the prosecutorial function is to seek convictions to the fullest extent possible
within the confines of acceptable constitutional and statutory guidelines. That would appear to give
prosecutors a broad mandate to "vindicate" society's interests and make the category of prosecutorial
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hard and foul blows struck by the prosecutor.
68
The Supreme Court prohibits prosecutorial decisions that are vindictive,
but it has opted to prevent inquiry into actual motives, even though the
attorney's state of mind seems to be at the heart of the question. While the
judicial system encourages vindication of society's interest in punishing
criminals, so that a retributive motive is acceptable for prosecutors, it abhors
personal vindictiveness on the prosecutor's part Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has sidestepped describing how to discern between these two positions
in any meaningful way.
1. The Presumption of Vindictiveness
The proscription against vindictive prosecutorial charging decisions
originated not in the setting of the prosecutor's decision to pursue a case, but
in the context of judicial sentencing. A prosecutor's reasons for pursuing a
case are generally private. A judge, on the other hand, announces a
sentencing decision in open court after conviction, often describing on the
record the reasons for imposing a particular sentence. In North Carolina v.
Pearce,69 the Supreme Court reviewed two defendants' increased sentences
imposed on remand after they had successfully challenged their convictions
on appeal.7° The Court stated that "vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the
sentence he receives after a new trial," and that due process "requires that a
defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the
part of the sentencing judge." 71 The Court limited a judge's authority to
impose a higher sentence after appeal because "the imposition of a penalty
upon the defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right of
appeal or collateral remedy would be no less a violation of due process of
conduct that might be impermissibly "vindictive" quite narrow.
68. See United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 459 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (Merritt, J.,
dissenting) ("Mhe prosecutor's attitude toward the defendant in a hard-fought criminal case is seldom
benign or neutral.").
69. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
70. In the first case, North Carolina v. Pearce, the defendant challenged his conviction after trial
on Fourth Amendment grounds and was convicted after the retrial. See id. at 713. The defendant in the
second case, Simpson v. Rice, pleaded guilty and then successfully challenged the guilty plea because
he was denied the right to counsel. See id. at 714. Although the court in Pearce applied the
presumption of vindictiveness to both cases. See id. at 726, the Court later overturned the decision in
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 803 (1989), holding that the presumption of vindictiveness does not
apply when a court vacate a guilty plea and then imposes a higher sentence upon conviction after a
trial.
71. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
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law., 72 Pearce did not outlaw all increased sentences after a successful
appeal; rather, the sentencing judge must state on the record the reasons for
the increase, which must be based on the defendant's conduct "occurring
after the time of the original sentencing.,
73
Pearce adopted a seemingly clear rule that prohibits an increased
sentence after a successful appeal unless the sentencing judge discloses
reasons that demonstrate a valid basis for the new punishment The
presumption that the judge acted vindictively arose from the defendant's
point of view. The possibility of an increased sentence created an
apprehension that, unless affirmatively dispelled, would lead the defendant to
forego an appeal lest he be punished for exercising a valuable right.74
The Court expanded the Pearce rule in Blackledge v. Pery 7 5 to cover a
claim ofprosecutorial vindictiveness when the prosecutor increased charges
against the defendant after he appealed to a higher court for a trial de novo.
The Court held that, although there was no evidence of actual prosecutorial
bad faith, "the opportunities for vindictiveness in this situation are such as to
impel the conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that
of the Pearce case."76 What constitutes impermissible vindictiveness was not
considered solely from the point of view of the defendant, however, because
the possibility of increased punishment only violates the Due Process Clause
72. Id. at 724. The Court, however, rejected the defendants' equal protection argument. See Id. at
722-23.
73. Id. at 726. Justice Black dissented from the majority's due process analysis, arguing that "the
Court does not explain why the particular detailed procedure spelled out in this case is constitutionally
required, while other remedial devices are not. This is pure legislation if there ever was legislation."
Id. at 741 (Black, J., dissenting). Later, the Court expanded the permissible reasons a judge may give
for enhancing a sentence to include information concerning events that took place prior to the original
sentencing but discovered later. See Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986).
74. The Court limited its reliance on the defendant's personal apprehension of a vindictive
motive as the basis for a due process violation in two later cases, Coten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104
(1972), and Chaffln v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). In Colten, the Court held that an increased
sentence by a judge who had no role in the initial trial and sentencing was not presumptively
vindictive. See Colten, 407 U.S. at 116-17. Chaffin held that the presumption of vindictiveness does
not apply to an increased sentence imposed by a jury so long as the jury does not know about the
original sentence. See Chaffln, 412 U.S. at 35. In both cases, the defendants exercised a right to seek
review of their convictions before receiving the increased sentences, yet the Court rejected the
argument that any increase impermissibly deterred a defendant from exercising the right to appeal. See
Coten, 407 U.S. at 116 (stating that the problem addressed in Pearce was not an increased sentence
per so, but the possibility that the increased sentence constituted "purposeful punishment" of the
defendant); Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 33-35 (indicating that requiring the defendant to make some choice of
rights does not violate due process if the choice was attenuated from any punitive result). Pearce's
prophylactic rule, therefore, does not always protect the defendant from every apprehension of
vindictiveness, but only when the same judge imposed the sentence. Even then, a judge could avoid
the strictures of the rule by stating permissible reasons for the increased sentence.
75. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
76. See Id. at 27-28.
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if the circumstances "pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.' 77
The Pearce rule can be explained by the fact that judges act in open court
when they impose sentence and therefore should not render judgments with
any hint of malice. Calling upon judges to dispel any notion of vindictiveness
by supplementing the record with their reasoning before imposing a higher
sentence adds only a very small burden to a process. On the other hand,
prosecutors, unlike judges, operate mainly behind closed doors in deciding
who and what to charge, with no required disclosure of their reasoning
beyond the fact of the criminal charge. Moreover, prosecutors inevitably act
with a degree of vindictiveness, in the sense that they are charged with
avenging the wrong inflicted on society and the victim of the crime, by
selecting who to bring into the criminal justice system and what punishment
to seek. The Court in Blackledge did not explain why it transferred the
Pearce rule, with its presumption of vindictiveness, to an arena in which the
government acts properly when its decisions incorporate at least some
measure of vindictiveness.78
2. The Irrelevance ofActual Intent
After applying the Pearce presumption to prosecutors, the Supreme Court
resisted any inquiry into actual prosecutorial motives by noting that genuine
good faith would not justify the increased charges because the "potential for
vindictiveness" in response to the defendant's assertion of his right to appeal
triggered the due process violation." Why did the Court render the
77. Id. at 27. Pearce had referred to freeing the defendant from the "apprehension of ... a
retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge," Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, but that subjective
fear no longer serves as the guiding principle of the vindictiveness analysis after Colten and Chaffin.
See supra note 74 (discussing limitation of apprehension aspect of vindictiveness analysis).
78. The Court's use of the term "presumption" in this context is a misnomer because a
presumption can be rebutted, while Blacdedge and subsequent decisions appear to adopt a categorical
rule that requires courts to disregard evidence of the prosecutor's actual intent if the so-called
presumption applies. See United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1371 (5th Cir. 1983) (en bane)
(Goldberg, 3., dissenting) ("[E]ven in the face of a factual finding, supported by the record, of no
actual vindictiveness, a 'presumption of vindictiveness' would still establish a due process violation.
No mere evidentiary presumption concerned with the presence or absence of actual vindictiveness
would function in that manner."). The different approaches to judges and prosecutors may be
explained by the broader discretion prosecutors have, which requires imposition of a categorical rule
rather than a true presumption. See Note, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the Criminal Appellate
Process.: Due Process Protection After United States v. Goodwin, 81 MICH. L. REV. 194, 215 n.100
(1982) ("One could argue that if the Pearce rule is adequate to control judges, it should also be
adequate to control prosecutors. The distinction between the position of the judge and the prosecutor
is, however, substantial: prosecutors have more discretion than judges, are more likely to act
vindictively because of their role as an adversary, and operate less openly than the courts.").
79. See Pearce, 417 U.S. at 28-29. The potential breadth of the prophylactic rule applied to
prosecutors was shown in two circuit court cases decided shortly after Blackledge. In United States v.
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prosecutor's motives irrelevant for determining the existence of a
constitutional violation premised on the prosecutor acting with an improper
motive? The Court's subsequent decisions continued to reject any probing of
prosecutorial motives, probably because the Court recognized the futility of
asking prosecutors to explain themselves. Asking "Why?" would be a
meaningless exercise, unlike having a judge explain the reasons for a
sentence on the record, because the criminal justice system operates by
having prosecutors act with some degree of vindictiveness. If the Court
sanctioned judicial review of prosecutorial decisions, then an explanation that
reflected any vindictiveness would be open to a challenge on constitutional
grounds. The line between acceptable and unacceptable vindictiveness would
be impossible to delineate coherently, so the Court in Blackledge adopted
instead a bright line rule to determine when prosecutors act with the proper
vindictiveness. The Court rendered moot the issue of intent by applying a
prophylactic rule that substituted judicial assessment of the likelihood of an
improper motivation for any inquiry into the prosecutor's actual state of
mind.
The Court's prophylactic approach to prosecutorial vindictiveness
became clear in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,80 a case in which the prosecutor
threatened the defendant with reindictment on more serious charges if he did
not plead guilty to the pending indictment.8 ' The prosecutor's stated reason
Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court of appeals held that Blacidedge barred increased
charges after a mistrial because "[i]mposing a ceiling on subsequent indictments after reversals but not
after mistrials would discourage defendants from seeking mistrials when error prejudicial to them has
occurred, whereas mistrials in such cases may represent a significant saving ofjudicial resources." Id.
at 416. The D.C. Circuit focused on the language in Blackledge and Pearce regarding the defendant's
apprehension of vindictiveness, and not whether increasing charges after the grant of a mistrial was in
fact based on an improper motive to punish the defendant. See id. at 413. In United States v. Ruesga-
Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976), the government had indicted the defendant on higher charges
after he refused to waive his right to a jury trial and agree to trial before a magistrate on misdemeanor
charges. See id. at 1368. The Ninth Circuit read Pearce and Blackledge as establishing a blanket rule
"beyond doubt, that when the prosecution has occasion to reindict the accused because the accused has
exercised some procedural right, the prosecution bears a heavy burden of proving that any increase in
the severity of the alleged charges was not motivated by a vindictive motive." Id. at 1369. The Ninth
Circuit's reading essentially gave a defendant immunity from increased charges once that person had
exercised some right in the criminal proceeding, unless the government could justify the increase. See
also United States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A re-indictment increasing the
severity of the charges following the exercise of a procedural right creates an appearance of
vindictiveness which, if not dispelled by the government, constitutes a due process violation."). Under
the guise of prohibiting vindictive prosecutions, Ruesga-Martinez transformed Blackledge into a
substantive prohibition on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by requiring the prosecutor to
explain to the court the reasons for increasing charges.
80. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
81. See id. at 358-59. The government charged Hayes with forging a check for $88.30, a felony
punishable by 2 to 10 year imprisonment. See id. at 358. Under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act,
KY. REV. STAT. § 431.190 (1973) (repealed 1975), Hayes faced a mandatory term of life
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for seeking the plea bargain was to "save the court the inconvenience and
necessity of a trial.'4 2 The defendant refused the offer and was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment.83 It was obvious that the prosecutor sought to
dissuade the defendant from exercising his Sixth Amendment jury trial right,
and that the superseding charge came in retaliation for forcing the
government to prove its case at trial.
The prosecutor clearly violated the defendant's due process right if one
understands the language of Pearce and Blackledge as prohibiting any
appearance of vindictiveness in response to the exercise of a constitutional
or statutory right 84 Yet, the Court in Bordenkircher rejected the due process
claim, holding that "in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no
such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to
accept or reject the prosecution's offer.'4 5 The prosecutor's acknowledged
retaliatory intent in increasing the charges did not violate due process, so
certainly the defendant's mere apprehension of vindictiveness during plea
bargaining could not suffice for a constitutional violation.
The Court sought to temper the effect of its analysis by emphasizing the
forthrightness of the prosecutor, that his intent to increase the charges "was
clearly expressed at the outset of the plea negotiations. Hayes was thus fully
informed of the true terms of the offer when he made his decision to plead
not guilty.'486 Bordenkircher's emphasis on disclosure to the defendant as an
aspect of the constitutional analysis contradicted the Court's aim to limit
inquiry into the prosecutor's actual intentions. Complimenting a prosecutor
imprisonment because he had two prior felony convictions. See id. at 358-59.
82. Seeid.at358.
83. See id. at 359.
84. See Blacldedge, 417 U.S. at 28 ("A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his
statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a
more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential
period of incarceration."); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 ("[TIhe imposition of a penalty upon the defendant
for having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be ... a
violation of due process of law."); Barbara A. Schwartz, The Limits of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness,
69 IowA L. REv. 127, 166 (1983) ("[lI]n Bordenkricher there was no dispute that the prosecutor's
enhancement of the charges against Hayes was in response to Hayes' exercise of his right to trial. This
difference seems to make the due process violation in Bordenkircher even clearer than in
Blackledge."); Reiss, supra note 26, at 1378 (deeming Bordenkircher "a crystal clear case" of actual
vindictiveness).
85. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363. The Court found that plea bargaining could not exist unless
the government could employ coercive tactics "to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead
not guilty." Id. at 364. The Court took the same position in considering a challenge to the voluntariness
of a plea in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), when it stated that "pleas are no more
improperly compelled than is the decision by a defendant at the close of the State's evidence at trial
that he must take the stand or face certain conviction." Id. at 750.
86. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 360.
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for being forthright was comforting, but permitting a defendant to assert a
due process claim based on the government's failure to disclose its intentions
during plea bargaining would have put the Court in the very position it
avoided in adopting a prophylactic rule. Asking the prosecutor why he chose
a course of action would only invite the government to furnish the answer
that protected its higher charges. That is, the government might simply assert
its good faith by stating, for example, that the prosecutor's office was
unaware of prior offenses or had not decided whether to pursue the higher
charge until after the defendant rejected the plea offer. A court must either
accept the government's proffered explanation and find no retaliation
violative of due process, or reject it as a falsehood. While superficially
reassuring, Bordenkircher's reference to the forthrightness of the prosecutor
was irrelevant to the Court's holding.87 Plea bargaining simply falls outside
the Blackledge presumption because the negotiation process works best when
prosecutors can act vindictively by seeking greater punishment if a defendant
does not waive important constitutional and statutory rights.
The Court took the same approach in United States v. Goodwin,88 a case
arising from the pre-trial stage, by rejecting explicitly any inquiry into
prosecutorial motives in deciding before trial to increase charges after a
defendant exercised a constitutional right.89 The government in Goodwin had
charged the defendant with misdemeanor assault, and after unsuccessful plea
negotiations the defendant asserted the right to a jury trial.9° The government
attorney assigned to the matter did not have the authority to conduct jury
trials, so another attorney reviewed the matter and decided to seek an
87. If the prosecutor had not informed the defendant of the possible increase in charges, would
that failure render the conduct impermissibly vindictive? The analysis adopted in Bordenkircher
suggests that it would not because the Court essentially defined the prophylactic rule in such a way
that it did not apply to vindictive prosecutorial acts during plea bargaining. See id. at 363.64. The
government's failure to inform the defendant of a potentially higher charge that it may file would not
make the additional charge any more retaliatory than if the defendant did not know the effect of
rejecting the plea offer. See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 170 ("The fact that the prosecutor announced
his intention to up the ante if Hayes declined to waive trial did not render retaliatory conduct
nonretaliatory. Rather, the prosecutor's announcement manifested his retaliatory intention and served
to eliminate the need for a prophylactic device."). If the government does a bad job of bargaining by
not employing its strongest lever, the increased charge, to persuade the defendant to forgo his
constitutional right to trial, it is unclear why that ineptitude would demonstrate impermissible
vindictiveness. Moreover, failing to warn the defendant of the possible consequences of not accepting
the plea offer creates no apprehension that the government will punish the exercise of a right because
the defendant believes he will be tried on the existing charges. Increasing them without warning,
therefore, could not create any additional apprehension or make the prosecutor's motive more
retaliatory so as to justify finding a due process violation.
88. 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
89. See id. at 372-73.
90. Seeid. at370-71.
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indictment charging four felonies with higher sentences than the original
misdemeanor charge.91 The defendant challenged the higher charges on the
ground of prosecutorial vindictiveness, arguing that the government
retaliated against him for exercising his right to ajury trial.92
To determine whether the higher charges violated the Blackledge
presumption of vindictiveness, 93 the Court looked at the type of right invoked
and the timing of the government's response. First; the Court labeled
"unrealistic" the assumption that the prosecutor would retaliate against
invocation of what it called a "procedural" right, such as ajury trial in lieu of
a bench trial, because those rights are such an integral part of the system that
defendants assert them routinely.94 Second, the Court stated that the
presumption of vindictiveness did not apply when the government acted
before trial, as opposed to after a conviction that has been successfully
challenged, as in Blackledge.95
The Court's holding was not surprising in light of its finding that the right
asserted was only procedural and that the prophylactic rule curbing any
perception of improper vindictiveness would not work well in the pretrial
setting. More telling than the Court's holding was its rejection of actual good
faith as a ground for upholding the conviction.96 In response to the
defendant's motion in the trial court, the second prosecutor submitted an
affidavit outlining his reasons for increasing the charges, making the
assertion that his "decision to seek a felony indictment was not motivated in
any way by Goodwin's request for a jury trial in the District Court." 97 The
trial court found the affidavit had eliminated the appearance of vindictiveness
but the court of appeals applied the prophylactic rule of Blackledge and
91. Seeid.at371.
92. See id.
93. The Court noted that there was no proof of actual vindictiveness, and therefore that "t]he
conviction in this case may be reversed only if a presumption of vindictiveness-applicable in all
cases-is warranted." Id. at 380-81.
94. Id. at 381. The Court stated that "[t]he distinction between a bench trial and a jury trial does
not compel a special presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness whenever additional charges are
brought after ajury is demanded." See id. at 383.
95. See id. at 381 ("Thus, a change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is
completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than is a pretrial decision.").
96. As Professor Schwartz notes:
Essentially the same facts that the majority interpreted as removing a reasonable likelihood of
vindictiveness could have been viewed as providing sufficient objective evidence to dispel any
initial likelihood of vindictiveness. Given the nature of the evidence available to the prosecutor
and his reasons for enhancing the charges, the Court could have reversed the Fourth Circuit
without significantly undermining the Pearce-Blackledge doctrine and its underlying premises.
See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 183.
97. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 371 n.2. I think it would have been surprising had the prosecutor said
something different.
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reversed the conviction.98 Rather than adopt the district court's factual
findings, the Supreme Court rejected expressly any attempt to ascertain the
prosecutor's motives for bringing charges. The Court stated:
The imposition of punishment is the very purpose of virtually all
criminal proceedings. The presence of a punitive motivation,
therefore, does not provide an adequate basis for distinguishing
governmental action that is fully justified as a legitimate response to
perceived criminal conduct from governmental action that is
impermissible response to noncriminal, protected activity. Motives are
complex and difficult to prove.99
Goodwin supports the proposition that some measure of vindictiveness on
the prosecutor's part is acceptable in a criminal proceeding.1' Asking
whether a prosecutor's motive was improper therefore invites a response
likely to be less than complete, a point the Supreme Court recognized by
adopting a bright line rule in Blackledge, Bordenkircher, and Goodwin.'
98. See id. at 371-72.
99. Id. at 372-73 (emphasis added). While Goodwin rejected the circuit court's conclusion that
the government acted with improper vindictiveness, it did agree with the lower court's statement that
the prophylactic rule of Blacidedge was "designed to spare courts the unseemly task of probing the
actual motives of the prosecutor in cases where objective circumstances suggest a realistic possibility
of vindictiveness.' Goodwin, 475 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250, 255
(1981). See also United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en bane). The Sixth Circuit
indicated that when a court finds a presumption of vindictiveness, the government can respond with
objective evidence, but stated that "we do not think that judges should pass on subjective good faith
assertions by prosecutors ... we think that only objective, on-the-record explanations can suffice to
rebut a finding of realistic likelihood of vindictiveness." See id. at 456.
100. See also United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1989) ("A certain amount of
punitive intent ... is inherent in any prosecution. This case presents us with the delicate task of
distinguishing between the acceptable "vindictive" desire to punish Doran for any criminal acts, and
"vindictiveness" which violates due process."); C. Peter Erlinder & David C. Thomas, Prohibiting
Prosecutorial Vindictiveness While Protecting Prosecutorial Discretion: Toward a Principled
Resolution of a Due Process Dilemma, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 341, 387-88 (1985) ("The
issue in the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine is differentiating between punitive motives that are
improper under the law and those that are not.").
101. See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 195-96 ("Following the Court's decisions in Bordenkircher
and Goodwin, words like 'vindictiveness' and 'penalty' ... are terms of art that denote forbidden
practices. If the practice is not forbidden, it cannot be considered vindictive or a penalty, even if it is
retaliatory or imposes cost on the assertion of a right."). In two later decisions, Thigpen v. Roberts, 468
U.S. 27 (1984), and Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984), the Court stated that if the
presumption of vindictiveness applies, the sentencing judge or the prosecutor can rebut it with
objective evidence. See Thigpen, 468 U.S. at 32 n.6 ("[We note that the Blackledge presumption is
rebuttable."); Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569 ("[W]here the presumption applies, the sentencing authority or
the prosecutor must rebut the presumption that an increased sentence or charge resulted from
vindictiveness.'). In much the same sense that courts will not renounce authority to review a
prosecutorial decision based on an improper motive, courts also wanted to avoid a hard-and-fast rule
prohibiting any increased charges after a successful appeal. But courts do not explain what objective
evidence could rebut the Blackledge presumption, nor how the government can provide "objective"
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The Court's decisions protected prosecutorial discretion by adopting a
prophylactic rule defining, ex ante, what was improperly vindictive. The
effect of this approach should prevent lower courts from compelling explicit
statements of prosecutorial motivation, which provide fodder for the
dismissal of charges or reversal of a conviction on due process grounds.
Can prosecutors ever be subject to a claim of acting with impermissible
vindictiveness when they increase charges after unsuccessful plea
negotiations or at other times before trial? The Court in Goodwin made it
clear that the judiciary would not abdicate all authority to police the conduct
of prosecutors, despite its assertion that prosecutorial motives are irrelevant.
At the end of the opinion, the Court noted that "we of course do not foreclose
the possibility that a defendant in an appropriate case might prove objectively
that the prosecutor's charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish
him for doing something that the law plainly allowed him to do."'1 2 For the
Court to state otherwise would give prosecutors free reign to retaliate against
a defendant's assertion of rights without fear of reprisal.'0 3 The Court,
evidence that does not involve the prosecutor rationalizing a decision and asserting good faith.
The courts allow prosecutors to rebutt the presumption of vindictiveness because courts do not
want to close the door to a prosecutor furnishing proof that justifies a new charge, such as the
unexpected discovery of previously unknown physical evidence or the appearance of a new witness. It
is highly unlikely, however, that a defendant faced with new evidence that results in more serious
charges brought after a successful appeal has the slightest apprehension that the government acted with
improper vindictiveness. In that instance, a court would likely find that the presumption should not
apply because of the lack of apprehension, not that the government has rebutted the presumption.
When the prosecutor files higher charges after a successful appeal without any new evidence, the
classic Blackledge situation, there is no objective evidence the government can provide that would
justify the increased exposure in the second proceeding. Therefore, it would seem difficult to imagine
a situation in which a prosecutor could rebutt the presumption of vindictiveness.
102. Goodwin, 457 U.W. at 384.
103. The Court's recognition that objective evidence might support a claim that the prosecutor
harbored an improper motive leaves open the question of whether a defendant can obtain discovery to
determine the prosecution's intent. Permitting defendants to rummage through the government's files
or call prosecutors assigned to their cases for cross-examination raises troublesome issues. Any real
inquiry into vindictiveness, however, would require discovery. See Erlinder & Thomas, supra note
100, at 395 (stating that courts must allow thorough discovery in vindictive prosecution cases). In
United States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit ordered discovery of the
government's motives because "there is enough smoke here, in our view, to warrant the unusual step
of letting the defendants find out how this unusual prosecution came about." Id. at 1146. The "smoke"
in Adams was the possible retaliation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in referring
a case to the United States Attorney that involved a defendant who had previously worked for the
Commission and had filed a sex discrimination lawsuit against the agency. See id. at 1144-46. The
Sixth Circuit did not find that a presumption of vindictiveness applied, but found enough evidence of
possible actual vindictiveness to order discovery. See id. at 1146. The problem with ordering discovery
is that it draws the court into the very assessment of motives that Goodwin and Bordenkircher sought
to avoid. Absent clear evidence of prosecutorial animus based on the defendant's exercise of a right,
discovery should not be permitted. See United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990)
("[W]e must guard against allowing claims of vindictive prosecution to mask abusive discovery tactics
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however, did not describe what "objective" evidence might establish a case
of actual vindictiveness. 104 Bordenkircher permitted retaliation against a
defendant for rejection of a plea offer, while Goodwin held that an increase in
charges after the pre-trial assertion of a constitutional right did not invoke a
presumption of improper vindictiveness. 105 Therefore, courts cannot compel
the government to explain its motive for increasing charges in the absence of
a presumption of vindictiveness, which appears to apply only in a second
proceeding after either a conviction or a mistrial.'O° Without the ability to
by defendants.") The existence of such objective evidence of improper vindictiveness makes the need
for discovery less important to the ultimate resolution of the due process claim. The Supreme Court
has recognized the problem of permitting wide ranging discovery in the context of selective
prosecution claims by establishing a very high threshold for permitting discovery to avoid allowing
defendants to probe into prosecutorial motives. See infra Part ll.B.
104. Courts have found evidence of negligence or evidence test a prosecutor failed to fully prepare
a case sufficient to rebut the presumption. For example, in Paradise v. CCI Warden, 136 F.3d 331 (2d
Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit found the presumption of vindictiveness rebutted when the
government's failure to charge the defendant with a greater offense until after the state supreme court
barred charges for less serious offenses resulted from its failure to fully analyze the law, noting that
"[w]e should not allow the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness to be invoked ... to require
application of some hypothetical presumption ofprosecutorial infallibility, and to require the release of
a guilty defendant every time a prosecutor stumbles into an inadvertent pleading error." Id. at 336 n7.
In Gardner v. State, 963 S.W.2d 590 (Ak. 1998), the Arkansas Supreme Court found that the
government's explanation that it did not seek evidence of a defendant's prior convictions until the
week before trial rebutted a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness when it sought to use a
sentencing enhancement provision after the defendant successfully had his guilty plea vacated on
collateral attack. The court held that the prosecutor's conduct constituted prima facie vindictiveness,
see id. at 596, but held that the prosecutor's statement that "'a lot of times' he did not completely
review a case 'until just before trial'" satisfactorily disproved vindictiveness. Id. at 597.
105. Similarly, in Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978), the Court upheld a statutory scheme
under which a defendant could only receive a reduced sentence by pleading guilty to the charge. See
id. at 226. The Court asserted that precedent "unequivocally recognize[s] the constitutional propriety
of extending leniency in exchange for a plea of guilty and of not extending leniency to those who have
not demonstrated those attributes on which leniency is based." Id. at 224.
106. Increased charges after a mistrial do not appear to be as qdestionable as increases after an
appellate court reverses a conviction or sentence. See Lane v. Lord, 815 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1987).
In United States v. King, 126 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 1997), after a mistrial, the grand jury issued a
superseding indictment adding the lone defendant's corporation as a co-defendant as a response to his
defense at the first trial that the corporation was responsible for the violation and he did not have direct
knowledge of the allegedly illegal activity. Id. at 397-98. The Second Circuit applied a presumption of
vindictiveness to the government's actions without noting that the entire vindictiveness issue was
irrelevant because neither defendant was the target of any vindictive intent, at least as the Supreme
Court had defined the analysis. If the individual defendant claimed adding a defendant violated his due
process right, that would not amount to the vindictiveness which the Supreme Court recognized as
impermissible because there was no increase in charges against the individual. Similarly, if the claim
was that the superseding indictment violated the corporation's rights, there was no increase in the
charges, only the institution of charges against the corporate defendant. There was no prior assertion of
a right by the corporation that could trigger a vindictive response, so indicting the corporate entity
could not be vindictive. While the government in King certainly sought to gain an advantage from the
earlier, aborted trial, its actions did not meet the prerequisites for a vindictive prosecution claim by
either defendant.
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seek discovery of the government's motives in the pre-trial phase, the
defendant's objective evidence would probably have to consist of a
prosecutor's explicit admission that the government retaliated against the
defendant solely because of the assertion of a constitutional or statutory right
to which the government had no principled basis to object.107 The temporal
sequence of the defendant's assertion of a right followed by the filing of
additional charges would not demonstrate objectively that the prosecutor had
an improper purpose. Rather, the evidence must show the government's
unreasonable motivation by establishing a direct link between the retaliatory
response and the defendant's exercise of a right.108 Outside of the post-trial
setting, the prophylactic rule does not prohibit the prosecutor from increasing
charges, regardless of how questionable the timing of the government's
decision might seem. 109
107. See Erlinder & Thomas, supra note 100. The authors note:
[I]f the prima fade case required in a challenge to vindictive prosecutorial acts is more than a
recitation of the objective actual predicates... together with a general assertion of improper
motive, only a defendant who can allege the existence of an admission in a 'smoking gun' memo
will be able to survive a motion to dismiss. Under this construction, courts would be prevented
from reviewing any prosecutoial impropriety that was not open and notorious. Thus, prosecutors
would be quite free to take actions that were vindictive in fact without the possibility ofjudicial
oversight unless they openly admitted their improper motive.
See id. at 394-95 (emphasis in original). See also Murray R. Garnick, Note, Two Models of
Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 17 GA. L. REV. 467, 471 (1983) ("A successfiul [vindictive prosecution]
defense often depends upon the prosecutor's willingness to admit his illegitimate motives in court.").
108. See United States v. Bullis, 77 F.3d 1553, 1559 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhere is no evidence to
suggest that the relatively quick entry of the superseding indictment following the successful motion to
transfer was anything more than a temporal coincidence."); United States v. Miller, 948 F.2d 631, 634
(10th Cir. 1991) ("[A]s a policy matter, we find a presumption of vindictiveness based on timing alone
unsound as it could easily be abused.'). An example of the type of evidence that might establish actual
vindictiveness in the pre-trial context can be found in State v. Hailing, 672 P.2d 1386 (Or. Ct. App.
1983). In Hailing, the Oregon Court of Appeals found a prosecutor's statement to defense counsel,
after the collapse of plea negotiations, that "I have a brilliant idea. I have just thought of a way to
cause further evil to poor Mr. Halling" constituted objective evidence of actual prosecutorial
vindictiveness. See 1d. at 1388. Absent the prosecutor's obnoxious threat to defense counsel, the court
would have had no basis under Bordenkircher and Goodwin to conclude that the prosecutor's
subsequent filing or additional charges violated the defendant's due process rights.
109. Lower court decisions have permitted the government to increase or add charges in a variety
of situations in which the prosecutor's intent was clearly punitive. For example, indicting a defendant
on new charges after an acquittal on charges involving the same underlying conduct would seem to be
a vindictive response, in that the government seeks to punish the defendant even though it failed to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a prior proceeding. Unless the second prosecution
violates the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition, however, a second indictment following an
acquittal does not invoke the presumption of vindictiveness. See United States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443,
1449 (10th Cir. 1994) ("T]he acquittal itself cannot form the basis for a charge of prosecutorial
vindictiveness."); United States v. Esposito, 968 F.2d 300, 303-04 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Where... the
prosecutor has done nothing to deter the exercise of one's right during the [prior] case or proceeding,
and the prosecution has come to a natural end, no presumption of vindictiveness applies:); United
States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Assuming, arguendo, that the sole motive for
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
One can ask quite fairly whether a prosecutor would ever admit
vindictiveness, but this problem did not concern the Court in Goodwin.n0
The possibility always exists that a government official will announce that
the prosecutor's office acted to retaliate against the defendant's assertion of a
constitutional right,"' at which point the Court does not want to leave the
judiciary powerless to provide redress. Short of a clear admission of an
improper motive linked directly to the defendant's assertion of a right,
however, Blackledge, Bordenkircher, and Goodwin render the actual intent
of the prosecutor irrelevant to deciding whether the prosecutor's actions raise
a realistic probability of improper vindictiveness. 12
B. Selective Prosecution: You Can't Get There From Here
A vindictive prosecution claim puts a court in an uncomfortable position
because it pits the prosecutor's broad discretion against the judicial function
of ensuring justice rather than simply serving as a rubber stamp for the
executive branch. A claim of selective prosecution, on the other hand,
bringing the Arizona indictment was the Colorado acquittal... such a motive should not raise the
presumption of vindictiveness. It is a legitimate prosecutorial consideration"). Courts have also found
that the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when, after a mistrial, the government adds an
additional charge that does not increase the potential penalty, in order to provide a basis for the
admission of evidence excluded at the first trial. See Lane v. Lord, 815 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1987)
("The choice facing the defendant when a jury reports a deadlock involves too much speculation for us
to conclude that the prospect of an increased chance of conviction at retrial ... would impair the
defendant's opportunity to seek a mistrial. A presumption of vindictiveness did not arise in this
case."). But see United States v. D'Alo, 486 F.Supp. 954, 960 (D.R.I. 1980) (granting motion to
dismiss charges added after mistrial because the new charges, which increased the probability of
conviction, constituted a penalty for the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to a fair trial.
Even the government's negligence in failing to file charges for which it had sufficient information
before the first trial that resulted in an acquittal is insufficient to raise the presumption of
vindictiveness). See United States v. Rodgers, 18 F.3d 1425, 1431 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that there
was no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness when, although the evidence necessary to indict on the
added charge was available to agents before first indictment, and "[w]hile this might indicate a lack of
preparation on the part of the prosecution, it does not indicate a reasonable likelihood of a vindictive
motive").
110. See Erlinder & Thomas, supra note 100, at 429 ("[R]ather than setting out standards that
would aid prosecutors in effectively fulfilling their obligations, Goodwin is an indication that the Court
may be willing to 'solve' the problem by reducing judicial oversight of the prosecutorial function.').
111. See, e.g., United States v. Cady, 955 F.Supp. 164, 167 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (suggesting that the
prosecutor's letter to defense counsel threatening to indict defendant on additional charges "as a result
of your client's most recent tactic" of collaterally attacking his prior guilty plea constituted evidence of
actual vindictiveness); State v. Hailing, 672 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (indicating that
prosecutor's statement linking new charges to defendant's refusal to plead guilty effectively admitted
vindictive motive).
112. Professor Reiss notes that, after Bordenkircher and GoodWn, "it is simply unclear what
actual prosecutorial vindictiveness is .... Thus, many entirely legitimate prosecutorial actions could
be said to be punitively or retaliatorily motivated." Reiss, supra note 26, at 1387.
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permits judges to wax eloquent about the need for fair administration of
justice under the Equal Protection Clause's clear limit on a prosecutor's
discretion. The Supreme Court has noted on more than one occasion that "a
prosecutor's discretion is 'subject to constitutional constraints, ' ' ' n  and a
prosecution "based upon 'an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or
other arbitrary classification' cannot be permitted. 14 The constitutional
pedigree of the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on selective
prosecutions is impeccable, reaching back to the Court's 1886 decision in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins."5 That case overturned the denial of a writ of habeas
corpus for a defendant who suffered from the sheriff's enforcement of a
municipal ordinance only against laundries owned by Chinese-Americans
and not others. Yick Wo's language has become the standard for measuring
unequal application of a law:
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the constitution."
6
In the late 1960s, the selective prosecution door opened briefly, when four
lower court decisions found that the government had based its decision to
prosecute on improper criteria. The cases are interesting mainly for their
historical character, revealing that judges were caught up in the political
tenor of the era; three of these cases involved acts of civil disobedience and
one reflected the growing perception that law enforcement agents used
overwrought investigatory tactics against fringe groups."
7
In United States v. Falk,"' the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction of
a draft resistance leader for selective service violations." 9 The court was
troubled by the apparent selection of the defendant for his protest activities,
113. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114,125 (1979)).
114. Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 (1962)).
115. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
116. Id.at373-74.
117. Involvement in anti-war activities, however, did not insulate one from criminal prosecution,
as shown by the successful prosecutions of Philip Berrigan and Elizabeth McAlister, two prominent
activists. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973) (upholding conviction for
smuggling items into federal prison after trial in which district court refused to permit defendants to
call prosecutors as witnesses to establish selective prosecution defense).
118. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane).
119. Seeid.at624.
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finding the circumstances suspect because a number of high-ranking
Department of Justice officials reviewed and approved the decision to bring
charges.12
0
Similarly, in United States v. Crowthers,'2' the Fourth Circuit overturned
convictions for creating a disturbance at the Pentagon during a prayer service
protesting the Vietnam war. 1  The court found an Equal Protection violation
because the government had not prosecuted participants in sixteen other
events that had been sanctioned by the government but had the same
disruptive effect as the defendants' conduct.'23
In United States v. Steele, 24 the Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction
of an anti-government activist for refusing to fill out a census form when the
government could not show any other defendants who had been charged with
the same crime, asserting that "[a]n enforcement procedure that focuses upon
the vocal offender is inherently suspect.' 'il 5
Finally, in United States v. Robinson,12 a district court overturned the
conviction of a private detective for using an illegal wiretap because
government agents had systematically violated the same statute in
investigations of left-wing organizations without ever being prosecuted. The
district court cited to a number of articles and books detailing governmental
abuses of civil liberties through electronic surveillance, leading to the
conclusion "that there has been systematic discrimination in the enforcement
of the act against the defendant in this case ....
These four cases, decided during a relatively brief period of significant
political turmoil, represent the sum total of reported selective prosecution
cases decided in a defendant's favor. The virtual impossibility of proving a
selective prosecution claim can be traced to the sentiment expressed in Oyler
v. Boles, in which the Supreme Court recognized that "the conscious
exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal
120. See id. at 622 ("It is difficult to believe that the usual course of proceedings in a draft case
requires such careful consideration by such a distinguished succession of officials prior to a formal
decision to prosecute."). It is equally difficult to comprehend how careful review of a case
demonstrates improper selectivity in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Such a process should
diminish the possibility of unfair use of authority, not increase it.
121. 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
122. Seeid.at1081.
123. The court stated, "In choosing whom to prosecute, it is plain that the selection is made not by
measuring the amount of obstruction or noise but because of governmental disagreement with ideas
expressed by the accused." Id. at 1079.
124. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
125. Id. at 1152.
126. 311 F.Supp. 1063 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
127. Id. at 1065.
128. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
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constitutional violation."' 29 While recent decisions reaffirm the constitutional
prohibition on unequal application of the law in deciding who to prosecute,
the Court also has eliminated any meaningful judicial inquiry into the
prosecutor's actual motivations. Although grounded on different
constitutional provisions, the conclusions reached in selective and vindictive
prosecution cases are strilingly similar. the Court will not compel
prosecutors to justify their decisions by forcing them to disclose the reasons
for charging a defendant because those statements are unlikely to furnish any
useful information and may in fact be less than forthright
In Wayte v. United States,'3" the Court showed a decided lack of
sympathy toward equal protection claims involving the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, adopting an approach that diminished significantly a
defendant's chance of success in raising a claim that the prosecutor singled
him out for criminal charges based on an impermissible criterion. The Court
in Wayte, revealing how attitudes had changed since the Vietnam war era,
reinstated the indictment of a defendant who refused to register for the draft
despite evidence that the government selected him for prosecution under a
policy that made vocal proponents of non-registration more likely to be
charged.' The Court held that, to demonstrate selective prosecution, a
defendant must show that the government's decision "had a discriminatory
effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."' 32 Proof of
discriminatory intent required a defendant to demonstrate "that the
government prosecuted him because of his protected activities," not just that
his involvement in protected speech was one reason for the decision to
prosecute.133 In imposing a high threshold for proof of a selective prosecution
claim, the Court emphasized the problem with judicial scrutiny of the
government's reasons for choosing to pursue a particular defendant. The
Court stated that "[e]xamining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal
proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's
motives and decision making to outside inquiry, and may undermine
prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement
129. Id. at 456.
130. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
131. See id. at 603. Moreover, the defendant was among a rather exclusive group of young men
numbering less than 20 out of a total of approximately 674,000 non-registrants picked for prosecution.
See Id. at 604 & n.4.
132. Id. at 608.
133. Id. at 610 (citing Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)). See also Barry Lynn Creech, Note, And Justice for All: Wayte v. United States and the
Defense of Selective Prosecution, 64 N.C. L. REV. 385, 408 (1986) ("From the majority's equal
protection analysis, it appears that a defendant must introduce a virtually direct showing of
discriminatory motive to establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution.").
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policy.
134
The burden established by Wayte for a selective prosecution claim was
heavy but certainly not insurmountable if defendants had some means of
ascertaining the prosecutor's motives. The Court, however, made
ascertaining prosecutors' motives nearly impossible in United States v.
Armstrong. 35 The Armstrong Court virtually ruled out the availability of
discovery to determine whether an impermissible criterion supplied the
primary reason for selecting the defendant. The district court dismissed an
indictment for selling crack cocaine after the United States Attorney's Office
refused to comply with an order requiring it to provide information regarding
prosecutions for similar offenses and "to explain its criteria for deciding to
prosecute thef defendants for federal cocaine offenses."'
136
Without considering the merits of the selective prosecution claim, the
Supreme Court focused on whether the defendants had made the requisite
showing to obtain discovery of the prosecution's motives. It began by noting
the "background presumption" for a selective prosecution claim "that the
showing necessary to obtain discovery should itself be a significant barrier to
the litigation of insubstantial claims."'137 The standard adopted indeed created
a significant barrier. "In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has
not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present 'clear
evidence to the contrary."",138 Armstrong effectively required proof of an
equal protection violation before a court could allow the defendant to engage
in discovery of the prosecution's motive. Such discovery would then be used
to establish the equal protection violation.
The circularity of the Armstrong standard could not have been lost on the
Court, despite its assertion that the high threshold for establishing invidious
discrimination "does not make a selective-prosecution claim impossible to
prove.' 39 Perhaps not impossible, but Armstrong makes the standard of
proof necessary just to obtain discovery so rigorous that it is difficult to see
how raising such a claim can be anything but an exercise in futility. 140
134. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
135. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
136. Id. at 459. The defendants had moved to dismiss the indictment because they claimed that
federal prosecutors selected them because of their race. According to the defendants, the federal
government prosecuted only African-Americans for crack offenses. According to information from the
federal defender's office, all of the 24 crack cocaine cases defended by that office in 1991 involved a
black defendant. See id. The government refused to comply with the discovery order, leading the
district court to dismiss the indictment. See id. at 461.
137. See id. at 463-64.
138. Id. at 465 (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
139. Id. at 466.
140. See Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of
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Without explicitly saying so, the Court made protection of prosecutor
motives paramount to the defendant's ability to assert a selective prosecution
clain. 1
41
Why is Armstrong so protective of the government? The answer becomes
evident after one considers the effects that a lower threshold for discovery
would likely produce. 42 If a prosecutor were asked to state her reason for
Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 574-75 (1998) ("[Tlhere is no
doubt that Armstrong cripples a defendant's ability to attack race-based decisionmaking when it
occurs."); Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of
Armstrong, 73 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 605, 640 (1998) ("The Armstrong holding and the implications of
its reasoning create a barrier to discovery that, for the great majority of criminal cases, is
insuperable.") (emphasis in original); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective
Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1071,
1079 (1997) ("[D]espite the Court's reassuring language to the contrary, the 'control group' and
'similarly situated' requirement poses an insurmountable barrier for many defendants."); Stephen D.
Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 683 (1997)
("Although theoretically stringent, the prohibition on discriminatory selective prosecution is largely
meaningless in practice because courts require that a defendant raising such a claim prove both
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent, burdens that are all but impossible to satisfy."); Reiss,
supra note 26, at 1373-74 ("A defendant seeking to raise a selective prosecution claim is thus placed in
a Catch-22 type bind. She cannot obtain discovery unless she first makes a threshold showing... of
selective prosecution.... Yet making a sufficient preliminary showing of discriminatory intent may be
impossible without some discovery.").
141. Cf. McAdams, supra note 140, at 641 n.109 ("I do not think it is plausible to defend
Armstrong by claiming that the harm of unnecessary discovery greatly exceeds the harm of undetected
racially selective prosecution, unless one raises the objection to dismissal [as the remedy for a
violation].').
142. Commentators have argued for a more liberal discovery standard to permit judicial review of
the prosecution's intent. See Poulin, supra note 140, at 1107 ("A better approach than Armstrong
would give a trial court confronted with a discovery request latitude to balance the strength of the
defendant's claim against the government's need to shield its internal deliberative processes."); Robert
Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for
Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (1997) ("[A]
prosecutor, as a fiduciary of the people, has ajudicially enforceable duty in certain situations to answer
a defendant's accusations of unconstitutional selective prosecution through discovery mechanisms.");
Tobin Romero, Note, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfilling the Promise of
Equal Justice, 84 GEo. L.L 2043, 2044 (1996) ("This note argues for mandatory disclosure of
government documents material to a claim of selective prosecution."). Professor Clymer proposes a
different approach to ensuring review of prosecutorial motives, arguing that the rational relation
standard applicable to equal protection claims should apply to a federal prosecutor's decision to charge
a defendant with a crime that could also be charged under state law. Clymer, supra note 140, at 685-
86. Under this approach, a defendant charged by the United States Attorney could challenge the
rationality of the federal charges, and the burden would be on the prosecutor to "disclose the
classification scheme that resulted in the defendant's selection." Id. at 732.
Proposals to lower the threshold for discovery misunderstand the thrust of the Court's approach to
selective (and vindictive) prosecution claims. If the court's goal was to allow defendants to ferret out
any possible bias or retaliatory motive, then a more generous discovery standard would be warranted.
That was not, however, the Court's design. Rather, in requiring proof of improper selection before
permitting discovery, the Court sought to eliminate inquiry into the motives of the prosecutor much as
it had sought to do in adopting a prophylactic rule that makes actual intent irrelevant in vindictive
prosecution claims. The Court sought to eliminate inquiry into prosecutorial motives because of the
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selecting a particular defendant, the answer would be unlikely to reflect a
motivation based on a protected status, such as race or sex, even if such a
criterion were in fact the reason for singling out the defendant for
prosecution. Requiring the government to produce internal memoranda
would probably be equally fiuitless because it is hard to imagine an attorney
committing to paper an expression of racial or sexual bias as a motivating
factor in deciding to file charges. 43 The search for motives is unlikely to
produce proof of a discriminatory purpose even if one exists.
If the concern is with unconscious bias causing the improper selection of
a class of defendants for prosecution, discovery will not yield any hard
evidence of intent. Almost by definition, documentary evidence would not
reflect the effect of unconscious discrimination in individual cases. Allowing
discovery of statistics relating to prosecutorial decisions as a means to
establish the discriminatory effect prong of the claim would be marginally
more revealing, especially for a claim of unconscious bias. But if the bias is
unconscious, it is difficult to see how the defendant could establish the actual
intent necessary to show an equal protection violation using only a statistical
analysis. Moreover, even if the office keeps records of the rates of
prosecution of various protected groups, such records may not reflect fairly
the processing of the caseload. 144 Recalling the adage regarding damned lies
problems attendant in giving one party in an adversary proceeding access to the other side's decision
making process. Thus, the Court rejected a liberal discovery rule in Armstrong, even though in so
doing it effectively made proving a selective prosecution claim impossible absent an explicit
admission of an improper motive. Criticism of Armstrong on the ground that it undermines effective
judicial control of prosecutorial misconduct ignores the Supreme Court's broader policy against
permitting courts to compel prosecutors to justify their decisions. One can argue with that policy, but
the high threshold of proof established in Armstrong was the product of a deliberate choice to
foreclose inquiry into prosecutors' motives, and not of a misunderstanding of what the selective
prosecution standard entails.
143. See Clymer, supra note 140, at 730 ("[Elven if the prosecutor has consciously selected the
defendant for an impermissible reason, she almost certainly will have avoided generating any tangible
evidence of that intent."). Allowing discovery of internal government documents would also raise
questions regarding the availability of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, and
whether grand jury secrecy rules permit disclosure of protected records. See Philip J. Cardinale &
Steven Feldman, The Federal Courts and the Right to Nondiscriminatory Administration of the
Criminal Law 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 659, 679 (1978) ("[D]iscovery [of prosecutorial records] is
limited further by the work product rule, grand jury secrecy, executive privilege, and the separation of
powers doctrine.").
144. There is no uniform requirement that prosecutors' offices keep statistics on the disposition of
cases, and it may be hard to define when a person is considered a suspect in a case for record keeping
purposes. Proposals to grant defendants greater access to government information regarding the
decision to prosecute rely on imposing such a refinement. See Leipold, supra note 140, at 560 ("[O]ne
of the easiest steps to take would be to have the government gather precise data on the size and scope
of the correlation between race and crime.'); Poulin, supra note 140, at 1120 ("The government should
be required to maintain and publish additional information.'); Romero, supra note 142, at 2069 n.164
("In many cases, there will be little evidence to disclose because few prosecutors' offices ... keep
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and statistics,145 reporting how many potential defendants the government
considered for criminal prosecution and how many cases it brought or
declined can be subject to a number of differing interpretations. It would be
difficult for courts to fashion a standard that permitted discovery of statistical
evidence without also allowing inquiry into the prosecutor's subjective
intent-the type of inquiry disapproved of by the Supreme Court in Wayte
and Armstrong. The likelihood of fruitful discovery growing out of a less
restrictive standard may not be sufficient to warrant relaxing the Armstrong
rule, given the incentive such a standard would give to prosecutors to create
documents that serve only to justify their decisions in the event a judge starts
questioning their motives.
Does Armstrong mean that a successful selective prosecution case will
never be brought? None have succeeded since the early 1970s, although there
may have been instances in which the government agreed to dismiss a case
because of the appearance of an illegal bias in the decision to prosecute. As
with vindictive prosecutions, a successful selective prosecution case will
require the defendant to produce an admission by the prosecutor that an
impermissible criterion played a significant role in the decision to prosecute
and that it was the type of "but for" reason referenced in Wayte.146 In that
event, however, additional discovery of the prosecutor's motives is of
minimal importance because the key piece of information is already available
to show both discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose. Absent such
proof, the Court has made discovery of the reason for the selection virtually
impossible.
Ill. PROSECUTORIAL MIscoNDucT AND EVIDENCE OF GUILT
Once the prosecutor files charges or the grand jury indicts a person, a host
of constitutional rights govern the conduct of the proceedings and the
assistance the government must provide to the defense. Under the Sixth
statistics regarding nonprosecuted offenders. For [the] rule [allowing greater discovery in selective
prosecution cases] to be most effective, the legislature should require prosecutors' offices to maintain
guidelines, written reasons, and statistics regarding nonprosecuted offenders.").
145. "There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics." Benjamin Disraeli (as
attributed to him by Mark Twain in his autobiography) (quoted in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIOSS 249 (4th ed. 1992)).
146. Even an admission by the investigating agent regarding a discriminatory reason for referring
or recommending a matter for criminal prosecution is not enough to justify dismissal of an indictment.
See United States v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 1997) ("We will not impute the unlawful
biases of the investigating agents to the persons ultimately responsible for the prosecution.'); United
States v. Monsoor, 77 F.3d 1031, 1035 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A]nimus of a referring agency is not, without
more, imputed to federal prosecutors.").
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Amendment, the government must inform the defendant "of the nature and
cause of the accusation," provide counsel for the accused, try the case before
"an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed," and furnish to the defendant "compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor."147 Moreover, the Fiftfh Amendment affords two of the
most prominent protections for criminal defendants during trial. The
defendant cannot "be compelled.., to be a witness against himself," and
under the Due Process Clause, the government bears the burden of proving
all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.1
48
While the Constitution grants a plethora of rights to defendants as the
prosecutor pursues a conviction, there is a significant gap in the
constitutional protection. Although the Constitution gives defendants the
right to compel witnesses to appear at trial and to confront those who testify
for the government, there is no affirmative constitutional right to discovery of
the prosecution's evidence before trial to prepare one's defense.' In Moore
v. Illinois,150 the Court stated that there was "no constitutional requirement
that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense
of all police investigatory work on a case."'51 While state and federal rules
grant defendants varying degrees of discovery of the government's case, the
lack of any explicit constitutional guarantee to a minimum level of access to
the government's evidence subjects defendants to the vagaries of the
legislative process. Deference to the legislature's prerogative to define the
appropriate rules for discovery reflects the common law rule that the
judiciary's inherent authority does not encompass ordering pretrial discovery
in a criminal proceeding.
152
Discovery is just one aspect of the relationship of the prosecutor to the
evidence that will convict or acquit the accused. Prosecutorial inaction can
result in the loss of evidence that a defendant may consider critical to
mounting a defense to the charges. Over time, the Supreme Court has
fashioned rules to govem the prosecutor's duty to preserve and disclose
evidence, despite never recognizing an explicit constitutional right to
147. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
148. U.S. CoNsT. amend V. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court stated, "Lest there
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364.
149. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is no general constitutional
right to discovery in a criminal case.").
150. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
151. Id. at 795. See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("[l]he prosecutor is
not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel.').
152. See LAFAVE& ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 20.1(a).
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discovery in a criminal case.
The genesis of the Court's treatment of the prosecutor's disclosure duty
came through a series of cases dealing with the seemingly unrelated issue of
governmental use of fabricated evidence. In Mooney v. Holohan,'53 the Court
first confronted prosecutorial misconduct relating to the use of false evidence
by considering whether the introduction of false evidence violated the
defendant's due process rights even in the absence of an affirmative right to
discovery. The Mooney Court easily concluded that the use of false evidence
was unfair,' 4 but had no occasion to address the harder question of whether a
prosecutor would violate due process by hiding evidence rather than
fabricating it. The due process right that prevents the use of false evidence
ultimately led to the seminal decision in Brady v. Maryland,'55 in which the
Court recognized a broader due process right to disclosure in every criminal
case to prevent prosecutorial misconduct in suppressing evidence favorable
to the defense.1-o
Thus, while a defendant technically still has no constitutional right to
discovery, Brady held that due process requires a prosecutor to disclose
exculpatory evidence in its possession that is both material and favorable to
the accused regarding either guilt or punishment. 57 The Court's reliance on
the Due Process Clause provided a powerful vehicle for defendants seeking
to impose constraints on prosecutors' allegedly improper uses and abuses of
evidence. Not surprisingly, since Brady, the Court has groped to establish the
contours of this aspect of due process, much as it did in the context of
vindictive prosecutions claims. The question of prosecutorial intent played a
significant role in the Court's consideration of the limits imposed by due
process on governmental actions that affect the defendant's right both to
learn what the government knows and to impose on prosecutors a duty to
preserve evidence that might be useful to the defense.
A. The Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony
The application of the due process protection to discovery of the
prosecution's evidence traces its roots to Mooney v. Holohan,158 a case in
which the defendant, a labor agitator, filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that the government violated his constitutional rights by
153. 294U.S. 103 (1935).
154. Seeid. at 112-13.
155. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
156. See id. at 86-87
157. Seeid.at87.
158. 294 U.S. 103.
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introducing false evidence that he detonated a bomb in a crowd in San
Francisco. 159 Although the Court rejected the petition on procedural grounds,
it paused to note that due process could never be satisfied "through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a
defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the
presentation of testimony known to be perjured."'16 Because the Court did
not grant the defendant any relief, it did not need to consider what test should
apply to determine whether the government violated due process in
presenting false testimony.
Similarly, in Pyle v. Kansas,"' the Court implied that using false
testimony violated due process, in reviewing an allegation that the
government used pejured testimony to convict the defendant. As in Mooney,
the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus based on the prosecutor's
intentional use of perjury to obtain a conviction. 162 The Court, however, only
found that the defendant's allegations, if true, would support granting the
writ, and did not discuss due process beyond a perfunctory acknowledgment
of the protection. 163 The Court's references in Mooney and Pyle to testimony
"known to be perjured" and false evidence "knowingly used" indicated that
the prosecutor's knowledge, and not just that of the lying witness, was
important to determining whether the defendant's due process right had been
violated.164
Mooney and Pyle involved allegations that the government manufactured
evidence by having its witnesses testify falsely to convict innocent men.
Alcorta v. Texas stated that false testimony includes not only affirmative
misstatements, but also the failure of a witness to be entirely trutu165 The
defendant in Alcorta offered a "heat of passion" defense to a charge of
159. For a discussion of the facts underlying Mooney, see Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional
Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 136 (1964). A later investigation of the
Mooney prosecution found that the government's witnesses had lied at the instigation of the San
Francisco District Attorney. Id.
160. 294 U.S.at 112.
161. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
162. Seeid. at215-16.
163. The defendant in Pyle also alleged that the government had suppressed favorable evidence,
see id. at 214, and the Court did not distinguish between knowing use of pejured testimony and
governmental suppression of favorable evidence. It is unclear whether Pyle held that these claims in
combination established a constitutional violation, or whether either one would be sufficient to
establish a constitutional violation.
164. In Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956), the Court relied on its supervisory power to
reverse a conviction and grant a new trial based on the pejured testimony given by a government
witness even though there was no suggestion that the prosecutor knew the witness testified falsely
during the trial. See id. at 9 ("The dignity of the United States government will not permit the
conviction of any person on tainted testimony.").
165. 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
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murdering his wife, contending that he became enraged when he saw her
kissing one Castilleja in a parked car.166 At trial, Castilleja testified that he
was just a fiend of the defendant's wife and was dropping her off at home
after work.167 After trial, Castilleja admitted to having had a sexual
relationship with the wife, and that the prosecutor "told him he should not
volunteer any information about such intercourse but if specifically asked
about it to answer truthfully."'" The Court reversed Alcorta's conviction
because the testimony created a "false impression," and because the
prosecutor allowed the witness to testify knowing the actual relationship of
the parties but never disclosing it to the defendant or eliciting the truth at
trial. 69 Similarly, in Napue v. !//inois,170 the Court reviewed the prosecutor's
knowing use of perjured testimony that created a misleading impression of
the witness' potential bias. The government's principal witness denied on
both direct and cross-examination that he testified against the defendant in
exchange for a recommendation of leniency at sentencing, when the
prosecutor in fact had promised leniency.171 Emphasizing that the prosecutor
knew the witness perjured himself, the Court held that due process "does not
cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility
of the witness.
' 172
The prosecutor's knowledge of the perjury was not at issue in any of these
cases. Mooney and Pyle accepted the allegations of the defendants as true,
while the prosecutors in Alcorta and Napue essentially admitted their
knowledge of the untruthful testimony after the convictions. It is not
surprising that the Court found prosecutorial misconduct when the procedural
posture of the case or the government's admissions established at the outset
that the prosecutor knew of the testimony's falsity. The more important
question raised by these cases concerns why the prosecutor's knowledge was
an element of the due process analysis. Answering this question requires an
understanding of the limits on the judiciary's authority to overturn a
conviction on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The perjurious
166. See id. at 28-29.
167. See id. at 29.
168. See id. at 30-31. The Court noted that the prosecutor admitted to making this statement to the
witness. See id. at 3 1.
169. Id. at 31-32.
170. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
171. Seeid.at265.
172. Id. at 269. In his subsequent petition to reduce the witness' sentence, the prosecutor stated
that he had "promised" to recommend reduction in exchange for the trial testimony. See id. at 266.
When called to testify at the hearing on Napue's habeas corpus petition, however, the prosecutor
denied that such a firm agreement had been reached, stating that his earlier statements regarding a
"promise" had "probably used some language that he should not have used .... " Id. at 267.
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nature of testimony generally does not come to light until after conviction.1
73
Once discovered, the defendant may seek a new trial free from the tainted
evidence if he can show that a new trial would likely produce a different
result.' 74 In Mesarosh v. United States,'75 however, the Court noted that
newly discovered evidence "which is merely cumulative or impeaching is not
... an adequate basis for the grant of a new trial."' 76 Moreover, even with the
revelation of peijury, a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence must be made within a limited period after the entry of the final
judgment of conviction.177
If a defendant learns of perjury only after the period in which he may file
a new trial motion, the only procedural avenue available is a collateral attack
on the conviction alleging that the use of perjured testimony rose to the level
of a constitutional violation. To decide the constitutional issue, a court cannot
simply transform the newly discovered evidence standard for a new trial into
the due process analysis. That approach would circumvent the time limits by
173. The vast majority of cases in which the prosecutor uses false evidence at trial involve false
testimony. Most commonly, witnesses testify falsely about their recollection of the events or fail to
disclose information that would undermine their credibility. Even cases in which a prosecutor submits
adulterated or counterfeited physical evidence usually involve false testimony about the nature of the
item, the circumstances regarding its discovery, and its relation to the defendant's guilt (i.e.,
relevance). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the proponent of evidence must authenticate it "by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." FED.
R. Ev1D. 901(a). Physical evidence is commonly authenticated through testimony. Similarly, records
of a business come within an exception to the hearsay rule when a "custodian or other qualified
witness" testified regarding the preparation and maintenance of the records. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
Furthermore, the government may call expert witnesses to testify about physical evidence in order to
explain tests performed on the item. See FED. R. EVID. 702. Whether the problem is false testimony
regard the witness' recollection, failure to respond truthfully to a question, or the creation or
adulteration of physical evidence, all entail perjury by a witness.
174. See United States v. Young, 17 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1994) (ordering a new trial because
the prosecutor used an officer's false testimony and outcome probably would have been different
absent the testimony); United States v. Cam, 965 F.2d 1548, 1558 (10th Cir. 1992) (denying motion
for new trial because newly available testimony of co-conspirator was unlikely to change result when
co-conspirator had earlier made statements inculpating the defendant). In addition to showing that a
new trial would likely produce a different outcome, a defendant must show that "(I) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (2) the failure to learn of the evidence at the time of trial was not due to the
defendant's lack of diligence; (3) the evidence is material to the issues involved; [and] (4) the evidence
is authentic . . . ." Andrew Moriarty et al., Project, Twenty-Sixth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure, 85 GEo. L.L 1463, 1464-65 (1997).
175. 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
176. Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. See, e.g, FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (motion must be made within three years after the verdict or
finding of guilt). Some states require a defendant to move for a new trial within a fairly brief period.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.2 Sec. 2(1) (1982) ("[A] motion for a new trial shall be made
within 60 days after entry of the judgment"). Also, the Supreme Court has held that a Texas statute
providing only 30 days to file the motion based on newly discovered evidence does not violate
fundamental fairness. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,411 (1993).
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allowing a defendant to rely on the newly discovered evidence as proof of the
constitutional violation without complying with the statutory requirements.
Due process must entail something greater than the standard for a new trial,
i.e., more than just the existence of perjured testimony. Reliance on the
prosecutor's knowledge of the perjury provides the additional element that
raises questions regarding the fundamental fairness of the proceeding beyond
just the probative value of the newly discovered evidence.178 Given the lack
of any real controversy regarding the prosecutors' knowledge in the Mooney
line of perjured testimony cases, the Court did not have to consider how
much inquiry into the government's intentions it should permit to prove a
due process violation.
The knowing use of perjured testimony is probably quite rare because it
involves multiple participants who must keep their shared secret forever,
ultimately, someone may reveal the truth. Absent the type of clear evidence
available in Alcorta and Napue, the defendant would have a difficult time
showing the prosecutor's actual intent If the extent of the due process right
concerning prosecutorial use of evidence were limited to just those clear
cases that involved a knowing introduction of false testimony, then the
Constitution provided only a very narrow protection. The lack of any
constitutional right to discovery means that a prosecutor's intentional
withholding of evidence from the defendant, which is different from perjury,
would not be a constitutional violation. If a prosecutor need not provide any
evidence to a defendant, then how can a knowing refusal to reveal it be
improper and violate due process? The problem with limiting due process to
only those cases involving false testimony was that withholding evidence can
work as great an injury on the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial as
perjury. The due process analysis that addressed newly discovered evidence
of perjury reached only an egregious, but comparatively rare, instance of
prosecutorial misconduct in the use of evidence.
B. Extending Due Process to Undisclosed Evidence
The problems in Alcorta and Napue would have been avoided had the
178. In elaborating on the Court's due process analysis in Napue v. Illinois, one student
commentator notes:
[Tihe [Napue] Court did not explain how this particular lie prejudiced the defendant Nonetheless
it held that there had been a denial of due process. The only explanation is that the Court
concerned itself with the prosecutor's conduct more than with the defendant's harm, with a
protection of the criminal process rather than with the possibility that the lie influenced the
defendant's conviction.
Note,supra note 159, at 138-39.
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government been required to turn over evidence of its witnesses' conflicts,
i.e., the personal relationship with the victim and the promise of leniency in
return for testimony. Moreover, if the witnesses had never been asked the
questions to which they responded falsely, there would have been no pejury
to form the basis of a due process violation. The Court began to address the
matter of prosecutorial suppression of relevant evidence in Jencks v. United
States,'79 holding that the government had to produce written reports
prepared by two informants regarding conduct involving the defendant. 8 '
The Court relied on its supervisory power, stating that justice "requires no
less" than providing the defense access to the reports to decide whether they
would assist in discrediting the government's witnesses. 81 Jencks had a
limited reach, however, because the federal courts could not rely on their
supervisory power to review instances of suppressed evidence by prosecutors
in state courts.
In Brady v. Maryland,182 the Court expanded due process to prohibit "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused.., where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."'1 3 The Court relied on the
Mooney line of cases for the proposition that applying due process to the
prosecutor's suppression of evidence "is not punishment of society for
misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.' 84
The opinion did not discuss why prosecutorial intent was irrelevant, even
though it had been the key element in the due process analysis of perjured
testimony since Mooney. Although unstated, the Court's reason is clear:
reliance on prosecutorial intent would create an unduly narrow rule that
could make judicial ascertainment of the government's motives paramount to
an assessment of the fairness of the trial. Brady cited Mooney and its progeny
to reach a result that fundamentally changed the due process analysis of
prosecutorial misconduct, eschewing an assessment of prosecutorial intent
for a broader review of the overall fairness of the proceeding. 8 5 By avoiding
179. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
180. Seeid. at668-69.
181. Id. The defendant in Jencks had been convicted of filing a false affidavit regarding his
participation in the Communist Party, and the principal witnesses were two Party members who were
covert informants. Id. at 659. Congress overturned the Court's broad disclosure requirement shortly
after the decision by adopting the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994), which limits disclosure of
reports to only those prepared or adopted by witnesses, and then only after the witness has testified,
See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a).
182. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
183. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
184. Id.
185. See Note, supra note 159, at 142-44. As the student commentator notes:
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the distraction of questioning why the prosecutor did not reveal evidence,
Brady signaled a substantial departure from the false testimony cases by
measuring the effect of prosecutorial misconduct on the outcome of the trial
without regard to either the prosecutor's stated or actual underlying motive.
Prosecutorial intent was simply irrelevant when the government's failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence made the proceeding unfair.'86
By eliminating prosecutorial intent as an element of the due process
analysis, the Court also sidestepped the problem posed by the traditional rule
that defendants have no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.
Knowledge was irrelevant to the Brady analysis, so the probative value of the
suppressed evidence determined whether it should have been disclosed, even
if a prosecutor was unaware of its existence at the time of trial. 187 Without so
stating, Brady implicitly recognized a due process right to discovery, limited
as it may be to only favorable evidence. The difference between Brady and
Mooney is that the former required a determination of materiality that
focused solely on the effect of the suppressed evidence on the fairness of the
proceeding, while the latter relied on the prosecutor's intent to remove the
misconduct from the newly discovered evidence rule and elevate it to a
constitutional due process violation.' 8
Did Brady's materiality analysis subsume the Mooney line of cases, that
found a due process violation based on the prosecutor's knowing use of
perjured testimony? The government's failure to disclose that it knew
testimony was false would be exculpatory because a prosecutor is unlikely to
introduce fabricated evidence if it is not helpful to the case, or to jeopardize a
prosecution when other evidence strongly favors a guilty verdict without the
false testimony. The knowing use of pedured testimony would certainly meet
Brady's materiality requirement for a due process violation because
When courts do not concem, themselves with the prosecutor's misconduct the constitutional
rationale based on fraud has no application. Instead Brady focuses upon prejudice to the defendant
The factor which diffemates the suppression cases and gives them constitutional dimension
is that they grow out of a situation which makes a fair trial for many defendants nearly impossible.
Id.
186. One student commentator has pointed out the difficulty with giving prosecutors the
responsibility of determining which evidence fits the definition of materiality. See Stephen P. Jones,
Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 25 U. MEM. L. REV.
735, 765 (1995) ("The tension is apparent-a prosecutor cannot decide that the failure to disclose
evidence in his possession would violate due process and undermine the correctness of a guilty verdict
and retain the good faith belief that the defendant is guilty.") (emphasis in original).
187. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,438 (1995) (rejecting government's argument that Brady
was not violated because only the police investigators knew about existence of exculpatory evidence).
188. But see Reiss, supra note 26, at 1413 ("Prosecutorial intent is clearly an important factor in
claims that the prosecutor violated her constitutional disclosure obligations, notwithstanding the
Court's seeming insistence that, as a matter of doctrine, it should be irrelevant.").
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disclosure of the fact of the perjury would have a strong negative effect on
the government's case and undermine confidence in the jury's verdict.189 The
Mooney analysis therefore remains viable as a separate means of showing a
due process violation. 19° Unlike Brady's balancing of suppressed evidence
with the strength of the government's case, knowing use of perjured
testimony reaches a particularly egregious level of prosecutorial misconduct
and should therefore trigger an automatic reversal of a conviction upon a
finding of actual prosecutorial knowledge. 191
189. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court gave content to the Brady
materiality standard in holding that "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at
682. This standard essentially incorporated the harmless error analysis into the determination of
whether the failure to disclose evidence rose to the level of a due process violation. Under this
standard, even if the suppressed evidence were exculpatory, the proceeding was not unfair if the result
would most likely have been the same had the evidence been available to the defendant. Bagley
created a balancing test that requires courts to weigh the effect of the undisclosed evidence against the
strength of the government's case to determine whether the failure to disclose rose to the level of a due
process violation.
190. See United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239,242 (7th Cir. 1995) ("If the prosecutors did not think
their cases airtight (and so they tried to bolster it improperly), this is some indication that it was indeed
not airtight."). In Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1991), the prosecutor repeatedly referred to
robbery as the defendant's motive for killing the victim, pointing out that the victim's wallet and
jewelry were missing. See id. at 1012-13. As the prosecutor knew, however, the items had been given
to the victim's family at the hospital after her death. See id. at 1014. Deeming the prosecutor's
statements "intolerable," the Ninth Circuit upheld reversal of the conviction despite eyewitness
testimony identifying the defendant as the assailant. See id. at 1015-16. The court reasoned that
without the prosecutor's statements regarding a robbery motive "testimony identifying Brown as the
murderer would at least be puzzling, and the jury might well have scrutinized such testimony more
carefully." Id. at 1016. This was pure judicial second-guessing of the jury with nothing to support the
appellate court's conclusion beyond what it surmised the jury "might well" have thought without any
statement of motive. While the suppressed information did not rise to the level of materiality under
Brady, knowing use of false evidence by the prosecutor permitted the court to find that the conviction
must be reversed with no more than a minimal showing of prejudice. Brown illustrates the point that a
prosecutor's knowing use of false evidence calls into question the government's entire case, leading
courts to conclude virtually automatically that the improper evidence prejudiced the defense. As the
Boyd court pointed out, why would a prosecutor lie so brazenly if the government's case was airtight?
191. The Court's decision in Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967), illustrates the continuing vitality of
the Mooney analysis after Brady. In Miller, the prosecutor exhibited "blood-stained" underwear as
proof of the defendant's involvement in a murder, knowing full well that the garment had only paint
stains. The Court never cited Brady, only the Mooney line of cases, for the proposition that "[t]here
can be no retreat from [the] principle" that the knowing use of false evidence violates due process. Id.
at 7. See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 704-05 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("In a case
of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct, automatic reversal might well be proper.... A deliberate effort
of the prosecutor to undermine the search for truth clearly is in the category of offenses antithetical to
our most basic vision of the role of the state in the criminal process."); Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair
Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133,
1151-52 (1982) ("[T]here is frequently no real difference between the jury's hearing perjury and its
failing to hear significant favorable evidence. But there is a distinction if we consider whether the
prosecutor's actions constitute fair play. Acceding to perjury is like stepping over a side line ... in
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Giglio v. United States'92 highlighted the difference between the Brady
and Mooney approaches. In Giglio, a prosecutor promised the only witness
linking the defendant to the crime that the government would not prosecute
him if he testified before the grand jury and at trial1 93 The witness testified
on cross-examination that no promises had been made. A second prosecutor
assigned to try the case, unaware of the earlier promise, asserted in closing
argument that the witness received no promises in exchange for his
testimony. 194 Because there was no evidence that the second prosecutor knew
the witness had not testified truthfully, the Court did not apply the Mooney
analysis. The Court found that the information was material under Brady,
stating that with a primary government witness "evidence of any
understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to
his credibility. .. ."'9' Had the second prosecutor been aware of the promise,
Mooney would have governed the due process analysis. Under Mooney,
proof of the requisite prosecutorial knowledge would have established on its
own that the falsified evidence was material, thereby requiring reversal of the
conviction without further inquiry into the effect of the perjury on the
outcome or the strength of the government's other evidence.196 But since
violation of the rules."). In United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit
found that the prosecutor's knowing use of false evidence was "a far more serious act that a failure to
disclose generally exculpatory material." Id. at 392.
192. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
193. Id. at 150-51
194. Id. at 152-53. Like Alcorta and Napue, the prosecutor who made the promise admitted that
fact publicly, so the Court did not have to make any assessment of whether there was actual
knowledge on the government's part.
195. Id. at 154-55.
196. The Court's analysis of Giglio in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), supports the
view that the knowing use of perjured testimony should result in an automatic reversal of the
conviction. In Agurs, the Court found that Giglio and the Mooney line of cases had "applied a strict
standard of materiality, not just because they involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly
because they involve a corruption of the trth-seeking function of the trial process." Id. at 102-03. The
Mooney test of materiality was phrased in the language of harmless error, i.e., whether the perjured
testimony "could have affected the judgment of the jury." Id. at 103. The prosecutor's knowing use of
false testimony should always meet this test because it would be highly unlikely that the government,
after fabricating evidence, could turn around and argue that the false evidence could not have affected
the outcome. Why would an attorney risk his entire career and expose himself to a possible criminal
charge to introduce false evidence that was incidental to guilt or innocence? While theoretically
possible, it is highly improbable that the knowing use of perjured testimony would be harmless error.
See United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1991) ("if it is established that the
government knowingly permitted the introduction of false testimony reversal is 'virtually automatic'")
(quoting United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975)).
In United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit stated that "[t]he
knowing use of perjured testimony is not an automatic ground for a new trial. There must be some
likelihood that it made a difference." Id. at 243. How much likelihood is not clear, but I think the
required amount is quite small. Once the prosecutorial misconduct becomes known, it taints the
government's entire case by calling into question the veracity of other witnesses. Moreover, in the
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there was no proof of actual knowledge, the case came under the Brady
materiality analysis, and prosecutorial intent was irrelevant to whether the
government had a duty to disclose the information.1
97
A recent case applying the Brady analysis shows that suppression of
evidence encompasses a broader range of prosecutorial misconduct than
knowing use of perjured testimony, which is limited to the use of evidence at
trial. In Wood v. Bartholomew,98 the Court held that the government's
failure to disclose the results of a failed polygraph examination of two
prosecution witnesses that could not have been admitted at trial for
impeachment purposes did not constitute a Brady violation. The Court noted
that "[i]f the prosecution's initial denial that polygraph examinations of the
cases involving the knowing use of pejured testimony, the witness giving false testimony is often the
key declarant linking the defendant to the crime. It is hard to imagine a case where the prosecutor
knowingly introduced false evidence or coached a witness to cover up impeachment information
without raising a substantial doubt about the validity of the guilty verdict. Such a corrupt process
should trigger a new trial for the defendant free from the taint ofprosecutorial misconduct. As the New
York Court of Appeals found in People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y. 2d 554 (1956) (a case relied on by the
Supreme Court in Napue);
A lie is a He no matter what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the district
attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the
truth.... We may not close our eyes to what occurred, regardless of the quantum of guilt or
assertedpesauasveness of the evidence, the episode may not be overlooked.
Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
197. In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the Court reiterated the point regarding the
irrelevance of actual prosecutorial knowledge of the existence of exculpatory information:
[TlMhe individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. But whether the prosecutor
succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation (whether, that is, a failure to disclose is in good faith or
bad faith, see Brady) the prosecution's responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable
evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable.
Id. at 437-38 (citation omitted). In Smith v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801 (10th
Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit found that a factual dispute as to whether the prosecutor actually knew
about a witness' concealment of information removed the case from the Mooney analysis, but that the
possession of the information by a police officer brought it within the knowledge of the government
for the purposes of the Brady analysis. Id. at 830-31. See also United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753
(Ist Cir. 1991). The Court in Osorio stated that:
It is apparent that [the information] was well known to others in 'the government,' including both
the United States Attorney's Office and the FBI, which was using him as a cooperating individual.
'The government' is not a congery of independent hermetically sealed compartments; and the
prosecutor in the courtroom, the United States Attorney's Office in which he works, and the FBI
are not separate sovereignties.
Id at 760. Similarly, in United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988), the First Circuit held that
the government's contradictory characterizations of evidence in different prosecutions did not
constitute perjury or submission of false evidence because the characterization as such was
"technically not untruthful." Id. at 128. Though the court castigated the prosecutors for asserting
contradictory positions, the court held that "the government's inconsistent positions did not rise to the
level of constitutional error" underBrady because a characterization of facts was not material when the
defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness about the inconsistency. Id.
198. 516 U.S. I (1995) (percuriam).
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two witnesses existed were an intentional misstatement, we would not
hesitate to condemn that misrepresentation in the strongest terms.1
199
Although subject to condemnation, false statements by prosecutors regarding
the existence of evidence made outside of a trial still fall under the Brady
materiality analysis and not the more stringent Mooney approach, which only
governs the use of false testimony at trial.
This special form of prosecutorial misconduct requires a court to find the
prosecutor had actual knowledge of the falsity of the evidence submitted to
the jury, not just that the trier of fact has been misled by the false evidence.2°
In United States v. Wallach,2° I however, the Second Circuit adopted a lower
threshold for prosecutorial knowledge, holding that the government violated
due process by using false testimony when "the government should have
been on notice that [the witness] was perjuring himself."20 2 The court
acknowledged that the government did not have actual knowledge that the
witness had testified falsely, and "the record demonstrates that the
prosecution did not 'sit on its hands' after becoming aware that [the witness]
may have perjured himself.. .".203 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found a
Mooney violation because it appeared that "the prosecutors may have
consciously avoided recognizing the obvious," i.e., that the witness lied.
204
Wallach overlooked the key to the due process analysis involving the
knowing use of perjured testimony, that the prosecutor's actual knowledge
distinguished the case from Brady, which covers a broader range of conduct
by considering only the effect of undisclosed evidence on the trier of fact.
The fact that the government did not affirmatively know that its witness
testified falsely, even if the prosecutor had reason to suspect it, should not
permit reversal without determining the materiality of the false testimony
199. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
200. It is the specific knowledge of the prosecutor who elicits the false testimony that determines
whether there has been a knowing use of perjured testimony. The knowledge of other government
agents is not attributable to the prosecutor, unlike within the Brady analysis that considers the
knowledge of every member of the investigatory and prosecution team to be that of the government.
See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1220 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Noriega points to no evidence
that the government had actual knowledge of the alleged payment by the Cali Cartel"); United States
v. Steinberg, 99 F.3d 1486, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that government's failure to disclose
exculpatory information known to investigative agents but not to the prosecutor did not consistute
knowing use of peijured testimony, but instead the failure to disclose constituted a Brady violation).
201. 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991).
202. Id. at 457.
203. Id.
204. Id. Cf Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1221 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Although the government appears to
have treaded close to the line of willful blindness, the crossing of which might establish constructive
knowledge, we decline to charge the government with prior cognizance of the alleged payment").
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under Brady.205
Injecting a negligence standard, even gross negligence as the Second
Circuit adopted in Wallach, raises the specter of judicial inquiry into
prosecutorial motives as an element of the due process analysis. That is
exactly what Brady and Mooney avoided in reviewing prosecutorial
misconduct in relation to the evidence of guilt. Brady made prosecutorial
intent irrelevant, while the Mooney line of cases required clear proof of the
prosecutor's actual knowledge of the falsity of the testimony or evidence, not
just an estimation of whether the prosecutor should have inquired further into
the veracity of the witness' statement or why the government failed to detect
the perjury. Wallach improperly added an element of judicial inquiry into
prosecutorial intent for not pursuing further investigation, thereby requiring a
reviewing court to ascertain whether the government should have acted on
any possible suspicions regarding the veracity of its witness or evidence.
Determining whether prosecutors acted reasonably, negligently, or perhaps
even recklessly, as part of the due process analysis, would compel a close
examination of both the prosecutor's knowledge of the falsity of the
testimony or evidence and the motives for not investigating further. The
approach adopted in Wallach conflicts with the Supreme Court's carefully
crafted due process analysis, that avoided making such an inquiry relevant by
either requiring clear proof of actual prosecutorial knowledge or dispensing
with prosecutorial intent all together.
C. The Destruction ofEvidence
The Mooney line of cases addressed the government's fabrication of
evidence, either by direct testimony or a witness' failure to respond
truthfully, while Brady adopted a broader rule that the government's failure
to furnish exculpatory evidence to the defendant violates due process,
regardless of the prosecutor's intent. A third means by which the government
can alter the proof available at trial is the destruction of evidence that a
defendant could use to support a defense. Unlike the circumstances that
205. By using the automatic reversal rule for the knowing use of perjured testimony, the court in
Wallach avoided the tougher question of whether the perury, which only related to the credibility of
the witness and not the testimony regarding the underlying conduct charged in the indictment, was
material under Brady. As an alternative ground for its decision, the Wallach court applied the newly
discovered evidence standard for a new trial and concluded that the jury would likely have found the
defendant not guilty had the witness testified truthfully. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 458. Given that
conclusion, the court did not need to reach the constitutional issue of whether the government had
knowingly used false testimony in violation of due process, or, if the court found it necessary to
consider due process, whether in finding that the jury would likely have acquitted could have met the
materiality standard for a Brady violation.
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triggered a due process violation in Mooney and Brady, this type of
prosecutorial misconduct ensures that exculpatory evidence will never be
available to the defendant or the court, thus hampering judicial review of
both its probative value and its likely effect on the outcome of the trial.
The Supreme Court first dealt with the problem of evidence made
unavailable by the government in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,2 6 in
which the Immigration and Naturalization Service deported a group of aliens
that the grand jury charged the defendant illegally transported into the United
States.20 After the indictment, the prosecutor determined that none of the
aliens had any evidence material to the illegal transportation charge, but the
defendant never had an opportunity to interview them to determine whether
they could aid in his defense.208 The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction on
due process and Sixth Amendment compulsory process grounds, finding that
testimony from the now-unavailable aliens "could conceivably [have]
benefit[ted] the defendant."'2 9 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
defendant "must at least make some plausible showing of how their
testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense.
' 210
Requiring proof of the materiality of the evidence poses a significant
hurdle for a defendant challenging the government's actions. As Valenzuela-
Bernal acknowledged, obligating a defendant to demonstrate that the missing
witnesses would have provided favorable evidence of sufficient magnitude to
affect the outcome makes proving materiality virtually impossible-how can
one show the probative value of evidence to which one never had access?
The Court addressed this problem by reducing Brady's materiality standard
in cases alleging the improper destruction of evidence. A defendant need
only make a "plausible showing" of materiality, indicating that "the
testimony was not merely cumulative to the testimony of available
witnesses.
211
After relaxing the materiality threshold for evidence destruction claims in
Valenzuela-Bernal, the Court had to establish a standard for determining
whether the evidence was favorable to the accused so as to trigger a duty to
206. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
207. Id. at 860.
208. Id.at 861.
209. Id. at 862.
210. Id. at 867. The Court noted that its standard was reflected in the Brady materiality test
applicable to the suppression of evidence in the government's possession. Id. at 867-68.
211. Id. at 873. The Court further noted that "courts should afford some leeway for the fact that
the defendant necessarily proffers a description of the material evidence rather than the evidence
itself." Id. at 874.
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preserve it for the defendant's use at trial. In California v. Trombetta,212 the
Court required a defendant to show that the exculpatory value of the
destroyed item was "apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and... of
such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
evidence by other reasonably available means." 213 Trombetta found that the
destruction of breath samples taken from drivers was not a "calculated effort
to circumvent the disclosure requirements established by Brady" because the
officers who destroyed the samples acted "in good faith and in accord with
their normal practice.
214
The Court's reference to good faith was not directly relevant to the
analysis of the exculpatory nature of the evidence. Nor did Trombetta explain
how it discerned the government's intentions in destroying the breath
samples. The Court appeared to view cases involving the government's
destruction of evidence as falling under the Brady analysis, which makes the
prosecutor's intent in suppressing evidence irrelevant to the due process
question. Trombetta focused on the notice to the government, from the nature
of the item, that the evidence was so clearly exculpatory that its destruction
was unreasonable. Good faith may have been a proxy for finding that the
exculpatory nature of the item was not so obvious as to constitute a due
process violation. Yet, Trombetta's language implied a gross negligence
standard, that an item which is so obviously exculpatory should put the
government on notice to preserve it for future use by the defendant, which
would negate any assessment of actual bad faith. The Court's reference to
good faith appeared to signal a shift toward a more subjective approach that
considers what the government actually knew, and away from Brady's
objective analysis, which weighs the effect of the government's actions on
the fairness of the proceeding.215
The Court's analysis in Arizona v. Youngblood2t6 made it clear that
212. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
213. Id. at 489. The defendant, charged with drunk driving, alleged that the state's practice of not
preserving breath samples tested to determine whether a person was intoxicated violated due process
because it prevented any independent analysis of the evidence. The Court found that the destruction of
evidence did not violate due process because "the chances are extremely low that preserved samples
would have been exculpatory." Id.
214. Id. at 488 (quoting Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231,242 (1961)).
215. The Trombetta opinion raises the question of what remedies are available for a due process
violation based on the bad-faith destruction of exculpatory evidence. If the evidence would have
affected the outcome, but is no longer available, then according to Trombetta the only plausible
remedies are to bar prosecution or to suppress evidence related to the destroyed item, which could
make it virtually impossible to secure a conviction. Id. at 486-87. Relying on the government's good
faith seems to accomplish little, other than serving as a comfort in a close case when a court denies the
defendant any relief.
216. 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
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governmental good faith, and not Brady's materiality standard, was the true
focal point of the due process analysis of prosecutorial misconduct. Moving
away from Trombetta's flirtation with a gross negligence standard, the Court
held that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the
police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a
denial of due process of law."217 In Youngblood, the police failed to preserve
the clothing of a sexual abuse victim that contained semen, thereby
preventing Youngblood from testing the semen to determine whether it
supported his defense that the victim wrongly identified him as the
assailant.28 The Court acknowledged that "the likelihood that the preserved
materials would have enabled the defendant to exonerate himself appears to
be greater than it was in Trombetta," but found that the absence of proof that
the government acted in bad faith meant that there was no due process
violation.219 Although the police came perilously close to being grossly
negligent in Youngblood, the Court supplanted Trombetta by raising the
defendant's burden of proof for a due process violation to a showing that the
government acted with actual bad faith in destroying evidence.220 No longer
a gross negligence standard, due process requires that, absent proof of actual
knowledge, the exculpatory nature of the evidence had to be so apparent that
a court could infer the government knew that this particular evidence was
required to mount a defense. In other words, unless a piece of evidence
screams "Save me!", destruction of the evidence by the government does not
violate a defendant's due process rights under Youngblood.Y
217. Id.at 58.
218. Id. at 53, 54.
219. Id. at 58.
220. See United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Youngblood's bad faith
requirement dovetails with the first part of the Trombetta test: that the exculpatory value of the
evidence be apparent before its destruction.").
221. See H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal
Discovery in Federal Court Belie this Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1089, 1106 (1991) ("Mhe
Court's 'bad faith' holding [in Youngblood] represented a major theoretical shift away from the
objective analysis of the evidence and how its unavailability affected the defendant's ability to receive
a fair trial.").
Another type of misconduct involving governmental actions affecting the defendant's evidence
occurs when the prosecutor puts excessive pressure on a witness to not testify on the defendant's
behalf at trial. In this context, "[a] defendant's constitutional rights are implicated only where the
prosecutor or trial judge employs coercive or intimidating language or tactics that substantially
interfere with a defense witness' decision whether to testify." United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d
1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998). Courts recognize that prosecutorial misconduct that causes a witness to
absent himself or assert the Fifth Amendment privilege and refuse to testify can constitute a violation
of the defendant's due process right. See United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 953-54 (6th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 991 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Moore, 11 F.3d 475, 479
(4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hoffinan, 832 F. 2d 1299 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Lord, 711
F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 227-28 (3d Cir. 1976); see
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A footnote in Youngblood stated that "the presence or absence of bad
faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily
turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at
the time it was lost or destroyed."t' m While Youngblood appeared to sanction
judicial inquiry into governmental intent to determine the due process
violation, lower court cases demonstrate that it is the defendant's notice to
the government of the need to preserve evidence that is the key to
demonstrating bad faith.2
generally JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 22 at 22-10 et seq. (3d ed.
1996). The Youngblood standard applies in this context as well, requiring proof that the testimony
would be material and exculpatory, and that the government acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Hoffman, 832
F.2d at 1303 ("There can be no violation of the defense's right to present evidence, we think, unless
some contested act or omission (1) can be attributed to the sovereign and (2) causes the loss or erosion
of testimony which is both (3) material to the case and (4) favorable to the accused."),
Some courts have found that there is an inherent judicial authority to order the government to
immunize a defense witness when the government has immunized or reached a plea agreement with
one of its own witnesses and when the failure to immunize the defense witness would deprive the
defendant of material, exculpatory evidence. See United States v. Young, 86 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir.
1996) ("IThere is a serious danger that the government's denial of immunity to Delfs-the only
witness who could have impeached Drake as the government's critical witness-distorted the fact-
finding process."); United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1991) ("For the
government to grant immunity to a witness in order to obtain his testimony, while denying immunity
to a defense witness whose testimony would directly contradict that of the government witness, is the
type of fact-finding distortion we intended to prevent in Lord.").
222. 488 U.S. at 57.
223. In United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of an indictment because the government destroyed laboratory equipment seized from the
defendants in a prosecution for manufacturing methamphetamine. Id. at 933. Notwithstanding the
defendants' repeated requests after their indictment to maintain the equipment so that they could show
it was incapable of producing the illegal drug, and despite the investigatory agent's assurances as to its
availability, the government disposed of it in a toxic waste dump. Id. at 929-30. Exacerbating the
problem was the fact that a government agent assured defense counsel that the evidence would be
preserved while knowing that it would be held for only a short period before its disposition as toxic
waste. Id. at 930. Likewise, in United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth Circuit
reversed a conviction and ordered dismissal of an indictment after the government ignored the
defendant's repeated requests to preserve evidence. Id. at 914. The circuit court found that the
destruction of the evidence in the face of recurrent entreaties to prosecutors to preserve it, "in the
absence of any innocent explanation offered by the government, gives rise to a logical conclusion of
bad faith" Id. at 913. It is not clear what "innocent explanation" the government could give that would
somehow extricate it from the finding of bad faith. If it had an acceptable reason for the destruction, or
had the defendants not communicated their need for the goods, then there would be no evidence to
support a due process violation under the Youngblood standard unless the item was so clearly
exculpatory that the government could only act in bad fhith by disposing of it. It is unlikely that the
defendants could have shown that the items were obviously exculpatory without giving notice of their
defense. Under Youngblood, once a defendant shows that the government disregarded the defendant's
notice and destroyed the evidence, a court can conclude that the government acted in bad faith. The
court should not ask the government to try to explain the way it acted after the fact because that
amounts to asking the prosecutors to manufacture an excuse to salvage the case, i.e,. a clear
opportunity to lie. Absent notice from the defendant of the need to preserve evidence, which
establishes actual knowledge of its potential exculpatory value, the most a defendant can usually show
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How had the intent of the government become an element of the due
process analysis after Brady appeared to render it superfluous? Youngblood
took an approach similar to the Mooney line of cases in holding that notice to
the government of the importance of the evidence to the defendant raised a
knowing destruction of exculpatory evidence to the same level as the
knowing use of perjured testimony. In both cases, the proof of governmental
knowledge triggered a due process violation because the prosecutorial
misconduct rendered a trial fundamentally unfair, not just that the trier of fact
would not have all relevant information to judge the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Therefore, to activate this aspect of the due process
protection, a defendant must give notice of an item's importance to establish
the government's knowledge. Absent such affirmative proof, the only means
to demonstrate the requisite governmental knowledge would be to show that
the exculpatory nature of the evidence was so obvious that the government
must have known of its materiality to the defense, allowing an inference of
bad faith.
D. Loss of Evidence Through Governmental Delay
In addition to deliberate acts that destroy evidence, governmental inaction
can cause the loss of evidence. While the government has no obligation to
investigate leads for a defendant, its failure to file charges in a timely fashion
after gathering sufficient evidence of a person's wrongdoing can result in the
destruction or dissipation of evidence crucial to establish a defense. Does a
defendant have a right to have the government act expeditiously to preserve
evidence for his defense? The Sixth Amendment imposes one timeliness
requirement on the government in a criminal case, that "the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy... trial."224 The trigger for the speedy trial right is
the formal conclusion of the investigatory stage of a case: "these guarantees
are applicable only after a person has been accused of a crime."22
5
is that the government acted negligently. After Youngblood, even gross negligence does not trigger a
due process violation unless the evidence is so plainly exculpatory that its destruction can only be
explained by actual governmental bad faith. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58. See also United States v.
Femia, 9 F.3d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that even if government's destruction of tapes was
grossly negligent, that did not constitute bad faith so as to warrant suppression of evidence related to
transcripts of tapes); United States v. Barton, 995 F.2d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the
government's mishandling of bags of marijuana that eventually disintegrated was only negligent and
therefore did not amount to a bad faith destruction of exculpatory evidence); United States v. Richard,
969 F.2d 849, 853 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that defendants' failed to offer evidence that government
had notice of need to preserve marijuana to establish due process violation).
224. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
225. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,316-17 (1971).
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1. The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Right
Governmental delay after the initiation of a criminal proceeding can
impair a viable defense, although it is often difficult to allocate to either side
in a case the harmful effect of delay. The Supreme Court noted that prejudice
from a delay in the proceedings can cut both ways, that "[d]elay is not an
uncommon defense tactic" to make the government's case harder to establish
through the loss of evidence over time.226 Moreover, the Sixth Amendment
right "is a more vague concept than other procedural rights... [and it is]
impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied.
' 227
Measuring whether the government proceeded with the requisite dispatch
in trying a defendant depends on the four-part analysis adopted by the Court
in Barker v. Wingo. The balancing test weighs four factors: "Length of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice
to the defendant"22s The first factor is a "triggering mechanism" requiring
the defendant to show that the delay was sufficient to permit a presumption
of prejudice.Y9 The second factor, the government's reason for the delay,
requires that the prosecutor explain the reason for the delay between the
initiation of the proceedings and trial, and that any "deliberate attempt to
delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily
against the government" 230 The Court's analysis does not appear to involve
any inquiry into the veracity of the government's reason for the delay,
instead taking it at face value. It is then up to the defendant to demonstrate
that the prejudice resulting from the delay outweighs the government's
explanation for it.
The speedy trial right addresses two different issues arising from pretrial
delay: the defendant's liberty interest and the problem of lost evidence. By
requiring the prosecution and the judiciary to act expeditiously once the
government formally charges a person, the Sixth Amendment limits the time
a defendant might be incarcerated before an adjudication of guilt, and makes
less likely any impairment to either side from evidence lost through the
passage of time.231 Barker v. Wingo recognized that avoiding prejudice to the
226. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,521 (1972).
227. Id.at 521.
228. Id. at 530.
229. Id
230. Id. at 531. A reason such as governmental negligence or a crowded docket "should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Id.
231. Id. at 532. Another prejudicial factor noted by the Court was minimizing the "anxiety and
concern of the accused." Id I consider this liberty interest of the defendant in a prompt adjudication of
the charges similar to the interest in not being held involuntarily prior to the trial.
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defense was the more important protection provided by the speedy trial right
Sixth Amendment lost evidence cases are similar to destruction of evidence
cases, in that the defendant must show that the unavailable evidence could
have affected the outcome of the case.
While the prejudice requirement is reminiscent of Trombetta and
Youngblood, the Court took a different approach in Doggett v. United
States.212 Doggett left the country for two years shortly after his indictment
on drug trafficking charges, and, unbeknownst to investigators, returned to
live in the United States for six years while the government made no effort to
locate him.z  The prosecution had no explanation beyond inertia for its
failure to locate Doggett, who lived under his own name after his return and
was not aware of the indictment34 The Court held that the government's
negligence, combined with the eight and one-half year delay after the
indictment, constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment, requiring
dismissal of the indictment.235 The Court found unrebutted the presumption
of prejudice generated by the extended delay, concluding that the
government's unreasonable procrastination in locating the defendant had not
overcome the initial trigger of the Barker test, which established a minimum
threshold to presume prejudice against the defendant 2 36
Unlike Trombetta and Youngblood, Doggett found a constitutional
violation without any proof from the defendant regarding either what
evidence was lost through the delay or how its loss would have affected the
outcome of the case. The Court accepted at face value the government's
reason for the delay and did not require the defendant to demonstrate any bad
faith on the part of the prosecutor. While Doggett and the other destruction of
evidence cases involved the same basic issue-prejudice from the loss of
probative evidence--the Sixth Amendment contains an explicit directive to
the government to bring a defendant to trial expeditiously, while the Fifth
232. 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
233. Id. at 248-50.
234. Id. at 649-50. Although two police officers told the defendant's mother about the indictment,
the government conceded to the trial court that Doggett had no actual notice of the indictment Id. at
653. On appeal, the government's appellate counsel "expressed amazement" at this concession, which
became the factual predicate for the decision. Id.
235. Id. at 657-58. The Court stated that while "negligence is obviously to be weighted more
lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the
divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has
begun." Id. at 657. The government had made no serious effort to locate the defendant for over six
years to determine if he still resided abroad, which the Court noted was a "progressively more
questionable assumption... [and] they could have found him within minutes." Id. at 652-53.
236. The Court stated that "such is the nature of the prejudice presumed that the weight we assign
to official negligence compounds over time as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows. Thus,
our toleration of such negligence varies inversely with its protractedness." Id. at 657.
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Amendment provides only a generalized requirement that a defendant
receive a fair trial. Doggett adopted a very different tone in its approach to
the prejudice issue, putting the burden on the government to show that its
reason for the delay was sufficient before requiring the defendant to prove
actual prejudice. The prosecutor's plea of incompetence could not overcome
the timing requirement embedded in the Speedy Trial Clause, a line the
government cannot traverse regardless of the lack of any demonstrable harm
from the delay.
2 3 7
Requiring proof of actual harm in every Speedy Trial Clause case would
reduce the Sixth Amendment to little more than a reiteration of the Due
Process Clause, that the government does not violate the defendant's rights
unless he can prove actual harm. By granting a remedy despite the absence of
bad faith or affirmative proof of prejudice, the Supreme Court established
that the Sixth Amendment protection represents an independent requirement
beyond just providing a fair trial.23' Doggett reaffirmed that Barker v.
Wingo's balancing test simply takes the prosecutor's explanation for the
delay at face value to see if it overcomes the presumption of prejudice; if it
does not, then the indictment must be dismissed even if there is no proof of
actual harm traceable to the delay.
2. Due Process and the Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions
Unlike the timing of a criminal trial, which is partially subject to the
control of the judiciary, the prosecutor retains sole discretion regarding when
to officially charge an accused with a crime. Even if the government gathers
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to charge a defendant, the
prosecutor need not immediately seek an indictment or file charges. There
are a number of reasons to delay the start of formal proceedings; some
important, such as persuading a perpetrator to cooperate with the
government, others more trivial, such as coordinating the vacation schedules
237. Professor Amar has criticized the remedy of dismissal of the indictment with prejudice for
violations of the speedy trial right, arguing for a damages remedy for a violation. SeeAkhil Reed
Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEo. L.L 641,674-77 (1996).
238. Justice Thomas' dissent in Doggett argued that the Speedy Trial Clause is not directed
against prejudicial delay, but only to protect a defendant's liberty interests in being free from
protracted pretrial incarceration and the burden of living while under the suspicion generated by the
formal charges filed by the government. 505 U.S. at 659-60 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Thomas, "The touchstone of the speed trial right... is the substantial deprivation of liberty that
typically accompanies an 'accusation,' not the accusation itself." Id. at 663 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Under this analysis, the defendant in Doggett would not have a Sixth Amendment claim because he
was never incarcerated before trial and, because he did not know about the pending indictment, was
not subjected to the continuing anxiety and suspicion created by a criminal charge.
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of the various government agents and attorneys. Most prosecutions must be
initiated within a certain period after the completion of the offense, or be
barred by the statute of limitations.239 Because the speedy trial right does not
attach until an arrest or the filing of formal charges, if the government brings
the case within the relevant limitations period, then the defendant would
appear to have no claim that the timing of the prosecutor's decision was
constitutionally impermissible.24°
The Court recognized in United States v. Marion,241 decided the same
term as Barker v. Wingo, that due process, not the Sixth Amendment,
governs the propriety of the government's conduct during the pre-indictment
phase of a criminal case. While rejecting the defendant's argument that the
Sixth Amendment applied before an arrest or the filing of charges, the Court
noted in dictum that due process "would require dismissal of the indictment
if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused
substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair trial and that the delay was
an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused."242 In its
subsequent decision in United States v. Lovasco,243 the Court held that the
prosecution of "a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive
him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat
239. In Toussie v. UnitedStates, 397 U.S. 112 (1970), the Supreme Court described the protection
afforded by a statute of limitations:
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain
fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature had decided to punish
by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend
themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of
time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past
Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials
promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.
Id. at 114-15. Although certain serious crimes, such as murder, may have no limitations period in some
states, most felonies must be prosecuted between three and six years after the criminal act, and
misdemeanors between one and three years. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 24, at § 18.5(a). Under
federal law, "any offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limitation," 18 U.S.C.
§ 3281 (1994), while other offenses, with certain exceptions, must be brought within five years after
commission of the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994).
240. The filing of the indictment or criminal charges tolls the statute of limitations, even if the
defendant is not aware of the formal initiation of the criminal proceeding. For example, under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court can seal the indictment pending the arrest of the
defendant. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(eX4). In United States v. Hayes, 40 F.3d 362 (1lth Cir. 1994), the
circuit court rejected a speedy trial claim when the grand jury returned an indictment shortly before the
expiration of the statute of limitations, and the indictment remained under seal for almost five years
after its return while the government sought the arrest and extradition of one of the defendants who
resided abroad. Id. at 367.
241. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
242. Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
243. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
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prejudiced by the lapse of time."244 In addition to actual prejudice, Lovasco
required proof of prosecutorial intent to gain a "tactical advantage" over the
defendant through the delay in filing the charges. 245 Unlike the speedy trial
balancing test, Lovasco's due process analysis of pre-indictment delay
focused specifically on the prejudice to the defendant from the loss of
evidence caused directly by the government's intentional choice to postpone
initiating formal criminal proceedings. Lovasco rejected the defendant's
argument that there was an independent constitutional requirement similar to
the Speedy Trial Clause compelling the government to act with any particular
dispatch in filing charges.
The effect of governmental inaction on the defendant's evidence in the
pre-indictment phase is analogous to the destruction of evidence issue. In
fact, the Court in Youngblood relied on Lovasco's incorporation of an actual
intent standard as the key element of the due process analysis as precedent
for adopting the bad faith test for determining whether the government's
destruction of evidence violated due process. Lovasco and Youngblood are
two sides of the due process coin, one holding the government liable only for
bad faith conduct that delayed charges in order to destroy evidence not within
the government's possession, the other finding a constitutional violation only
upon proof that the government destroyed evidence in its possession in order
to put it out of the defendant's reach. Lovasco went further than Youngblood,
however, by holding that the government may be held responsible for the
loss of evidence over which it had neither control nor perhaps even
knowledge of its existence.
The Speedy Trial Clause and the due process analysis both rely on
temporal delay as a trigger for protection. It is easy to view them as
interchangeable, and the Court's consideration of the government's reasons
for the delay for a speedy trial violation was reminiscent of the bad faith
element of the due process analysis.246 A closer look, however, shows that
the two rights are fundamentally different The Barker v. Wingo test balanced
the government's reason for a delay against the other factors, including the
presumption of prejudice, to determine a constitutional violation. Lovasco
244. Id. at 796 (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 795.
246. Compare United States v. Bishel, 61 F.3d 1429, 1436 (9th Cir. 1995) ([R]eliance on
Doggett's presumptive prejudice analysis in asserting a due process delay claim is "unavailing...
Doggett was a case of postindictment delay. A Sixth Amendment case, Doggett by its own terms is
inapplicable."), with United States v. Benjamin, 816 F.Supp. 373, 381 (D.V.L 1993) ("Applying the
analysis of the Supreme Court in Doggett, this Court concludes that, where as here actual prejudice is
sufficiently proved and negligence has resulted in unreasonable [preindictment] delay not persuasively
rebutted, Benjamin is entitled to relief:").
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and Marion did not adopt a balancing test, any more than the due process
analysis in Youngblood or Mooney balanced the government's intent with
possible prejudice to the defendant Unlike the speedy trial right, which arises
from a specific constitutional protection requiring the government to act
within some general time constraint, due process protects against
prosecutorial misconduct related to the use or destruction of evidence. Delay
alone is not a due process violation, even if the government's reasons for not
acting expeditiously were ill-considered or reflected a slovenly approach to
the investigation.U4
Some lower courts have ignored the requirement of actual bad faith
adopted in Lovasco and Marion, instead substituting a broader examination
of the government's reasons for the delay that is more akin to the balancing
test of Barker v. Wingo. In United States v. Foxman,248 the Eleventh Circuit
held that once the defendant showed prejudice from pre-indictment delay, the
court must determine whether it was the result of an intentional decision by
the government to gain some tactical advantage that resulted in harm to the
def ndant 2 4 9 The Fxman court asserted that the tactical advantage sought
by the government through the delay need not be designed to cause harm to
the defendant, so that a due process violation may occur when the
government acts to gain any benefit from a delay in filing charges. 2
0
Similarly, in United States v. Sowa,' the Seventh Circuit held that under
Lovasco "once the defendant has proven actual and substantial prejudice, the
government must come forward and provide its reasons for the delay. The
reasons are then balanced against the defendant's prejudice to determine
whether the defendant has been denied due process."
247. In United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane,
held that the government's extended pre-indictment delay in filing charges due to insufficient
resources to investigate the case did not rise to the level of a due process violation absent proof of bad
faith. Id. at 1510. The court rejected a balancing test that would weigh prejudice to the defendant
against a determination whether the government's reasons for the delay were "appropriate" because
"[tlhe items to be placed on either side of the balance (imprecise in themselves) are wholly different
from each other and have no possible common denominator that would allow determination of which
'weighs' the most." Id. at 1512.
248. 87F.3d1220(llthCir. 1996).
249. Id. at 1224.
250. Id. at 1223 n.2. The court stated:
We think intentional government acts designed to obtain a tactical advantage which only
incidentally cause delay have never been ruled out as a potential basis for due process violations.
The main point is showing acEs done intentionally in pursuit of a particular tactical advantage:
delay (and the prejudice directly caused by the delay) need not necessarily be the tactical
advantage sought.
Id.
251. 34 F.3d447 (7th Cir. 1994).
252. Id.at451.
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Foxman and Sowa weighed the government's reason for a delay against
any prejudice that resulted from its decision. That approach ignores what the
Supreme Court intended in requiring proof of bad faith, that there must be a
direct connection between the government's reason for the delay and the
prejudice. In other words, prejudice that is an incidental effect of delay is
insufficient for a due process violation. Unlike Doggett, which found a Sixth
Amendment violation based on governmental negligence, a defendant
asserting a due process claim arising from pre-indictment delay must show
that the government's intent was to harm the defendant by means of the
delay. The balancing approach of Foxman and Sowa suggested that the
government may have to initiate formal proceedings as soon as it has
probable cause, or be prepared to explain why it did not if the delay has an
adverse effect of the defendant's evidence. Of course, because the lost
evidence is not in the government's possession, that risk will always be
present. The due process analysis of Foxman and Sowa therefore counsels in
favor of charging the defendant as soon as the prosecution possesses
sufficient evidence to go to trial. However, that was the very rule the Court
rejected in Lovasco when it stated that "[p]enalizing prosecutors who defer
action for these reasons would subordinate the goal of 'orderly expedition' to
that of 'mere speed.' This the Due Process Clause does not require. ',253
When the Lovasco and Marion courts spoke of gaining a tactical
advantage, they did not mean to rule out the wide range of strategic reasons
for delaying an indictment For example, the government frequently delays
charging defendants involved in group criminal activity while it tries to get
one or more to cooperate and testify against their coconspirators. That delay
is certainly tactical, because the government's design is to generate a stronger
case against the other conspirators. Moreover, a defendant would be
prejudiced by that delay, not only because the prosecution's case is stronger
but also possibly through the loss of other evidence helpful to the defendant
during the period in which the government sought the cooperation of others.
Is this the type of bad faith delay Lovasco and Marion were directed against?
Prosecutorial conduct of this type is probably the height of good faith
because the government is using legitimate means to put together the
strongest case possibleY 4 Any test that simply compares prejudice to the
253. United States v. Louasco, 431 U.S. 783,795-96 (1997) (citation omitted).
254. See United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996). The court stated:
Intentional delay for the purpose of gaining tactical advantage would include delay for the purpose
of rendering unavailable evidence favorable to the defense or which would tend to undercut the
government's case. But it would not include delay to affirmatively strengthen the government's
case-such as delay until a potential witness for the government becomes available by reason of a
plea bargain or the like.
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defendant with the prosecutor's reason for a delay runs the risk of holding the
government responsible for the loss of testimony or items about which it had
no knowledge, and, more importantly, no intention of removing from the
body of evidence available at trial. If a defendant could show some harm
from the government's decision to postpone initiating a prosecution, then the
balancing test would give courts the authority to assess the government's
reasons for delay and to decide whether they met some unspecified criterion
of acceptability.2
5
The decisions making prosecutorial bad faith the linchpin of a due process
violation do not rely on a comparison between the government's culpability
and the effect on the trial. A defendant must first show that the prosecutorial
misconduct had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the proceeding, unlike
the Sixth Amendment analysis that permits a presumption of prejudice that
the government must rebut. A defendant must then demonstrate that the
prosecutor intended, through the misuse or destruction of evidence, to
undermine the ability of the defense to establish its case. There is no room for
negligence in a due process analysis that relies on governmental bad faith.
The Supreme Court has been consistent throughout its decisions reviewing
knowing use of perjured testimony, destruction of exculpatory evidence, and
investigatory delay, in holding that a defendant must furnish proof of actual
prosecutorial intent to harm, not just that government negligence resulted in
prejudice.
Does proof of actual intent require judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's
motives? The answer is yes, but that inquiry is the second step in the
analysis, and the defendant must overcome a substantial hurdle to reach that
point. First, a defendant must demonstrate the government's knowledge of
the loss or destruction of the evidence, without any direct examination of the
prosecutor. Absent proof from the defendant of the government's knowledge,
there is no basis to inquire into the prosecutor's motive for not acting with
greater dispatch. While it appears that prosecutorial intent is the focal point
of this due process inquiry, the analysis actually requires the defendant to
provide clear proof of the government's knowledge of the loss of evidence
outside its control, not just that the evidence was material as required under
Brady. Whether the government acted reasonably in not pursuing its case, i.e.
the prosecutor's intent, is not at issue without proof of knowledge regarding
Id. at 1514 n.23.
255. See id. at 1512 (rejecting a balancing test for due process violation based on pre-indictment
delay because "[i]nevitably, then, a 'length of the Chancellor's foot' sort of resolution will ensue and
judges will necessarily define due process in each such weighing by their own 'personal and private
notions of fairness,' contrary to the admonition of Lovasco").
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the loss of material evidence. As Justice Marshall noted in Lovasco, the fact
that a defendant has been "somewhat prejudiced" is not sufficient by itself to
establish a due process violation.
IV. BATSONLIES
The concept of vigorous representation is, for better or worse, the central
premise of the judicial system in this country. We expect attorneys to
represent their clients' interests forcefully, and would be surprised to see a
lawyer taldng a position antithetical to the client. In a criminal proceeding,
the Constitution grants defendants a right to a jury trial for all offenses
punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than six months.z 6 Because
the jury plays the key role in deciding guilt, the selection of the panel is an
integral step in defending the client Jury selection is the initial opportunity
for attorneys to convey their message and assess the group that will decide
the outcome of the case. Attorneys responding to judicial inquiry into why
they chose a particular course of action in selecting the jury will do so in light
of their client's best interests. It would be naive to expect an attorney
questioned about the motives for pursuing a line of voir dire or seeking to
remove a juror to respond with an answer that might cause appreciable harm
to the client's case.
7
The final composition of the petit jury depends, at least in part, on who
the attorneys exclude from the panel through the use of the peremptory
challenges apportioned to each side. Peremptory challenges give each
attorney the chance to shape the jury by eliminating potential jurors who, for
256. There are two jury trial provisions in the Constitution: one in Article 1M, Section 2, which
provides that the "trial of all Crimes... shall be by Jury," and another in the Sixth Amendment, which
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury." The Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 1451 (1968),
however, that the right to a jury trial only applies to "serious" offenses, which incorporates all crimes
with an authorized punishment of more than six months. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-
74 (1970). Defendant's do not have the right to demand a jury trial for petty offenses, which the Court
considers to be those with a term of imprisonment of six months or less unless a defendant can show
that an additional statutory penalty demonstrates a legislative intent that the offense be considered
serious rather than petty. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989).
257. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 209 (1989) ("The danger of
unconstitutional abuse posed by the exercise of peremptory challenges by partisan advocates is
probably greater than that posed by the discretion of officials to make random license checks or to
grant parade permits without standards."); George P. Fletcher, Political Correctness in Jury Selection,
29 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 1, 12 (1995) ("Advocates use their wits in their clients' best interests.... It
might be nice for everyone to stop making generalizations.... Trials, however, are about convicting
the guilty and preserving the freedom of the innocent. They are not about the pursuit of egalitarian
ideals:).
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whatever reason, the attorney determines should not serve.258 Every state and
federal court permits litigants in criminal cases to exercise a limited number
of peremptory challenges to excuse members of the jury pool from serving
on the petit jury in the case. The constitutional status of the peremptory
challenge is uncertain; on one hand, it is recognized by the Supreme Court as
a critical means of protecting each party's interests in a fair decision, yet it is
a creature of legislative fiat, available only to the extent authorized by the
legislature.259 Because peremptory challenges may be used arbitrarily, the
Court has long been aware that they might be abused when attorneys strike
jurors forpatently unacceptable reasons, such as race or sex. Yet, in Swain v.
Alabama,260 the Supreme Court stated that the "essential nature of the
peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated,
without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control. 261
A. Equal Protection and Peremptory Challenges
As far back as 1879, the Supreme Court held, in Strauder v. West
Virginia,62 that purposef exclusion by the legislature of citizens from the
jury pool on the basis of race violated the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause.263 But as recently as 1965, in Swain, the Court also stated that "we
cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case [by a peremptory
challenge] is a denial of equal protection of the laws."26 How could the
Court reject racial discrimination in jury selection in one form while
accepting it in another? The answer seemed to be that peremptory challenges
258. See Brian L Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury:
The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (1988) ("Another
factor prevalent in jury selection is the simple gut reaction of an attorney to a particular vemireperson.
An attorney who for any reason feels uncomfortable with a particular juror, or feels more comfortable
with another, is likely to strike the venireperson who causes the discomfort.").
259. Compare Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,376 (1892) (holding that making peremptory
challenges was an essential part of the trial), and Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)
(peremptory challenge is "one of the most important" of the rights of the accused), with Stilson v.
United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States
which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an
impartial jury is all that is secured. The number of challenges is ... regulated by the common law or
the enactments of Congress."), and Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n. 11 (1948) ("The
[peremptory challenge] is in the nature of a statutory privilege, variable in the number of challenges
allowed, which may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantees of 'an
impartial jury' and a fair trial.").
260. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
261. Id.at220.
262. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
263. Id. at 310.
264. 380 U.S. at 221.
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were somehow different, a special province of the parties to the action that
fell beyond the purview of the trial court. In Swain, the Court rejected
particularized review of a prosecutor's peremptory challenges that removed
all African-Americans from the petit jury. While acknowledging the
apparently discriminatory use of the government's peremptory challenges,
the Court held that "it is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of
Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting
on acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular
defendant involved and the particular crime charged." 265 Swain indulged the
fiction of prosecutorial goodwill in exercising peremptory challenges
because otherwise judicial review "would entail a radical change in the
nature and operation of the challenge." 266 The problem with permitting such
an inquiry was that the "prosecutor's judgment underlying each challenge
would be subject to scrutiny for reasonableness and sincerity."2 67
Swain accepted the potential for discriminatory exercise of the
peremptory challenge because close scrutiny of the prosecutor's motives
would do more than change the nature of the challenge. The Court did not
want to open the prosecutorial decision-making process to judicial review or
compel prosecutors to justify their decisions on the exercise of a peremptory
challenge. Therefore, in Swain, the Court required defendants raising an
equal protection claim regarding peremptory challenges to prove that the
prosecutor removed jurors of a particular race in a series of cases, showing a
pattern of racial discrimination comprehending more than just the individual
case at bar.268 In order to insulate prosecutors from any inquiry into their
actual motives, Swain's test for an equal protection violation required proof
of discriminatory design in striking jurors based on race that would provide
objective evidence of the prosecutor's improper intent. Swain's hurdle was
much like Armstrong's for selective prosecution in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, and is one that few defendants could ever hope to
surmount.
Swain's burden was intolerably high, however, and permitted prosecutors
to exercise peremptory challenges to remove racial minorities from serving
on a particular petit jury without fear of reversal. The cost to the system from
permitting the government to act in a manner that could be perceived so
265. Id. at 223.
266. Id. at 221-22.
267. Id. at 222.
268. Id. at 223-24 ("But when the prosecutor ... in case after case ... is responsible for the
removal of Negroes... Such proof might support a reasonable inference that ... the peremptory
system is being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the
administration ofJustice enjoyed by the white population.").
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readily as discriminatory was such that the Court reconfigured the exercise of
the peremptory challenge in Batson v. Kentucky.269 The Court asserted that it
was only tinkering with Swain's "evidentiary formulation,"270 disclaiming
what was obviously a decision to overturn Swain and to impose a radically
different test for judging whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge
violated the Equal Protection Clause.271
Batson lowered the evidentiary standard of proof for an equal protection
violation by requiring that the defendant first establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory challenge in the
instant case, not in a series of unrelated criminal trials.272 The defendant
could establish the prima facie case by showing either a pattern of strikes
against members of a particular race or improper questions asked by the
prosecutor. In addition, the defendant could point out any other evidence that
would support an inference of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor
through the exercise of peremptory challenges "to exclude the veniremen
from the petit jury on account of their race. ' 273 Once the defendant
established a prima facie case, Batson shifted the burden to the prosecutor to
furnish a neutral explanation for the peremptory strike. For this step in the
process, the Court made clear what would not suffice:
[T]he prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of
discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the
defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that
they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race
.... Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by
269. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Court found that, following Swain, many lower courts had
"reasoned that proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases was necessary to establish a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Since this interpretation of Swain has placed on defendants a
crippling burden of proof, prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 92-93.
270. Id. at 93.
271. See Kenneth L Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 451 (1996) ("[W]hile the Batson Court
characterized its decision as merely overruling Swain as to the 'evidentiary formulation' necessary to
establish racially motivated discrimination, the truth is that Batson radically recharacterized a form of
discrimination, previously endorsed in Swain, as a violation of equal protection.").
272. Batson originally required a defendant to show that both he and the struck juror were
members of the same cognizable racial group. 476 U.S. at 96. The Court dropped that requirement for
an equal protection challenge in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,416 (1991).
273. 476 U.S. at 96-97. See also Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A
comparative analysis of jurors struck and those remaining is a well-established tool for exploring the
possibility that facially race-neutral reasons are a pretext for discrimination.').
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denying that he had a discriminatory motive or afffining his good
faith in making individual selections.274
Unlike Swain, which wrongly assumed prosecutorial good faith in all
peremptory challenges, Batson required courts that found a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination to ask the prosecutor to explain in some detail,
and beyond an assertion of simple good faith, the exercise of the strike. Once
the prosecutor provides a race-neutral explanation, the third step of Batson
requires the trial court to decide whether there has been purposeful
discrimination.
The Court has since expanded the scope of the equal protection right in
jury selection far beyond Batson's original parameters, which appeared to
permit only those defendants who suffered from peremptory challenges
against members of their own racial or ethnic group to claim a violation. The
enlargement of the equal protection limitation on the exercise of peremptory
challenges involved two related issues: first, whose constitutional right was at
stake when a party employed a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory
manner; and, second, in what type of case could a party raise the Batson
claim. In Powers v. Ohio,2 the Court held that a defendant raising a Batson
claim need not share the same race as those jurors removed due to purposeful
discrimination by the prosecutor. 6 To overcome the lack of racial congruity
in the discrimination claim, the Court adopted a new rationale for the
constitutional analysis, holding that the Equal Protection Clause bars
prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges because individual jurors
"possess the right not to be excluded from [a jury] on account of race. 277
Powers broadened the scope of the equal protection right by shifting the
focus from harm to the defendant to harm to potential jurors removed from
the jury for an impermissible reason.
Based on the approach adopted in Powers, the Court quickly, although
over strenuous dissent, applied Batson's principle to private civil actions in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.271 and to criminal defendants who
struck jurors on racially discriminatory grounds in Georgia v. McCollum. 79
Both cases relied on the constitutional protection afforded the excluded
jurors, not the defendant, to support the conclusion that the Equal Protection
Clause constrained any party appearing before a court who exercised a
274. Id. at 97-98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
275. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
276. Id. at416.
277. Id. at 409.
278. 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
279. 505 U.S. 42,59 (1992).
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peremptory challenge.2'0 The Court could not extend Batson to racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges by defendants unless every party to the
judicial process could raise the equal protection claim of the removed jurors,
including the prosecution-otherwise, the defendant would be arguing that
his own discriminatory peremptory challenge violated his constitutional
right.21 Finally, in J.E.B. v. Alabama,2 2 the Court broadened Batson to
peremptory challenges removing jurors on the basis of sex.28 3 Notably,
however, the Court refused during the same term to review a case permitting
the exercise of a peremptory challenge based on a juror's religious
affiliation.28
4
In his Batson concurrence, Justice Marshall questioned the majority's
decision permitting judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's motives for
exercising a peremptory challenge, noting that any protection afforded by the
new approach may be "illusory" because "[a]ny prosecutor can easily assert
facially neutral reasons for strildngajuror, and trial courts are ill equipped to
second-guess those reasons. ' 5  His concern was not just with
straightforward misrepresentations by prosecutors, but also the harm of
unconscious racism that can lead an attorney to react negatively to racial
minorities, causing the exercise of peremptory challenges that were not based
on any overt bias. Justice Marshall proposed banning all peremptory
challenges by prosecutors, at least in criminal cases, rather than
accommodating them under the majority's prima facie test that calls on
attorneys to explain their actions before the court decides whether to allow
280. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618 ("[W]e [have] made clear that a prosecutor's race-based
peremptory challenge violates the equal protection rights of those excluded from jury service.");
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57 ("It is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to
discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race.').
281. Justice Scalia noted the incongruity of extending Batson to criminal defendants: "A criminal
defendant, in the process of defending himself against the state, is held to be acting on behalf of the
state. Justice O'Connor demonstrates the sheer inanity of this proposition (in case the mere statement
of it does not suffice)." McColliur, 505 U.S. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Melilli, supra note
271, at 453 ("Batson is only able to depart so dramatically from Swain because it stands for the
proposition that.., the rights of citizens to participate in their government, and in particular the right
to participate by service on juries, outweighs the rights of litigants to remove jurors without cause.").
282. 511 U.S. 127(1994).
283. Id. at 146.
284. See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("Indeed, given the Court's rationale in J.E.B., no principled reason immediately appears for
declining to apply Batson to any strike based on a classification that is accorded heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.'); Amy B. Gendleman, Comment, The Equal Protection Clause,
the Free Exercise Clause and Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges, 63 U. CHi. L. REV. 1639, 1666
(1996) (arguing for a prohibition on peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation, but
permitting them based on the individual jurors religious beliefs).
285. 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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the removal.
Justice Marshall's concern with the problem of examining the
motivations of attorneys, and the incentive Batson created for lawyers to
advance "neutral" explanations that might hide rather than reveal bias, was
prophetic. In Purkett v. Elem, 286 the Court explained that the "second step of
this [Batson] process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or
even plausible., 28 7 While a trial judge could find an implausible explanation
unpersuasive, therefore not overcoming the opponent's prima facie case, "a
'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does
not deny equal protection." 28 8 After Elem, the prosecution must make sure
that its reason does not reference a prohibited classification, i.e., race or sex,
to meet the minimal requirement of Batson's second step of furnishing a
race-neutral explanation. Elem probably did not change the Batson analysis,
but did make it plain that lawyers are not necessarily expected to propound
good reasons to counter an objection to a peremptory challenge on equal
protection grounds.289 As long as the statement did not explicitly rely on race
or sex, then it may be sufficient to permit the peremptory removal of a juror
from the panel.
B. The Effect ofImplausible Responses
Since Batson, trial judges generally have been willing to countenance
most explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges. 29° In Elem, for
286. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
287. Id. at 768.
288. Id. at 769.
289. Compare Michelle Mahony, Note, The Future Viability of Batson v. Kentucky and the
Practical Implications of Purkett v. Elem, 16 REV. LmG. 137, 168-69 (1997) ("Thus, in practice,
Purkett reduces Batson to a mere formality and places on the complaining party a significantly heavier
burden both in the courtroom and on appeal.") with D. John Neese, Jr., Note, Purkett v. Elem:
Resuscitating the Nondiscriminatory Hunch, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1267, 1281 (1996) ("Purkett restores
integrity to the peremptory challenge by requiring that the proponent only provide an explanation 'that
does not deny equal protection."').
290. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court. Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying
That Race Still Matters, 1994 Wisc. L. REV. 511, 592 ("Highly subjective, vague and unsubstantiated
prosecutorial claims are routinely accepted. In fact, generous acceptance of such reasons, more than
any other fact, explains the paucity of findings of discrimination post-Batson'); Michael J. Raphael &
Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U,
MICH. J.L. REFORM 229, 235 (1993) ("A prosecutor who wishes to rebut the prima facie case does not
face a significant challenge."). Serr & Maney, supra note 258, at 43 ("In practice, [rebutting or
defendant's prima facie case] is not a difficult burden, as trial judges accept virtually any explanation
proffered."). Surveys of reported cases that review Batson challenges may not be fully reflective of the
number of successful challenges to peremptory strikes that stop the removal of a juror. If a party
persuades a judge that the exercise of the peremptory challenge would violate Batson, the judge can
seat the juror. Similarly, if the jury acquits the defendant, or the jury never reaches a verdict (e.g., a
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example, the judge accepted the prosecutor's statement, in response to the
defendant's objection to striking two black men from the jury, that they were
the only two with facial hair and "I don't like the way they looked, with the
way the hair is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the beards look
suspicious to me."291 Trial courts have acquiesced to justifications based on
age, occupation, residence, and demeanor even though, at least on paper, the
explanations appear to be implausible when the effect was to strike only
members of racial minorities or one sex from the jury.292 The problem with
accepting such explanations at face value was the one described by Justice
Marshall in his Batson concurrence: trial courts have a hard time finding the
prosecutor's proffered explanation a subterfuge for purposeful
discrimination.29 3 When a defendant in a criminal case makes a Batson claim,
barring a peremptory challenge requires the trial court to find an intentional
violation of the equal protection clause by the prosecutor. That is a very
significant result, and one that no judge wants to reach lightly.
While Batson's equal protection rationale is clear, and the Court's
rhetoric on the harms of discrimination unassailable, the extension of its
principle throughout the judicial system has had problematic effects. By
shifting the constitutional analysis away from the harm to a defendant and
focusing instead on the discriminatory impact on the excluded jurors, the
remedy for an equal protection violation becomes incongruous. Since
Batson, when an appellate court determines that the trial court should not
have permitted the exercise of the peremptory challenge, the defendant
hung jury or the defendant agrees to a plea bargain during trial), then there will be no reported decision
regarding Batson. Relying solely on reported decisions can give a skewed view of the acceptability of
certain types of explanations, although published opinions provide a number of examples of
explanations offered for peremptory challenges that strain credulity.
291. 514 U.S. at 766.
292. For reviews of the types of explanations lower courts have accepted in response to Batson
claims, see Melilli, supra note 271, at 460 (presenting detailed review of different types of Batson
claims); Brand, supra note 290, 592-93; Serr & Maney, supra note 258, at 44-48. One student
commentator noted a possible explanation for judicial acceptance of questionable explanations for the
peremptory challenge, that 'judges demand explanations when the evidence of discrimination is slight,
then find that a weak explanation is sufficient to rebut the weak inference of discrimination.... By
asking for explanations, judges signal the possibility of purposeful discrimination; then, by accepting
weak explanations, they appear unwilling to correct it" Stephen R. DiPrima, Note, Selecting a Jury in
Federal Criminal Trials After Batson and McCollum, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 888, 889 (1995).
293. See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses
of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIm. L. REV. 1099 (1994). As Professor Ogletree notes:
[O]nce the Court bans discriminatory challenges in an area, those who want to discriminate will
know enough to conceal their intent, and the Court has failed to explain how that intent is to be
divined, leaving trial judges by and large to hew to the tradition of arbitrary strikes and allow
peremptory challenges in doubtful cases. Batson has therefore become impotent in preventing
discrimination.
Id. at 1104-05.
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receives a new trial automatically. 294 This remedy is unlike those granted for
most constitutional violations, which incorporate a harmless error analysis to
one degree or another, or even those violations resulting in automatic reversal
of the*conviction because of doubt about the integrity of the proceeding due
to a structural defect A Batson violation is by its nature completely harmless
to the defendant because the equal protection violation only harms the
jurors.295
Under the Supreme Court's analysis in Holland v. Illinois,296 the
constitutional jury trial right does not prevent the government from
exercising its peremptory challenges to exclude distinctive groups from a
jury. According to the Court, while the pool of citizens from which a petit or
grand jury was drawn must include a fair cross-section of the community, the
actual jury need not reflect any particular racial or sexual composition.297
Under Holland, a defendant's jury trial right is preserved so long as the jury
was impartial, even if the government removed some members from the
panel in violation of Batson. Therefore, while Batson prevented the use of
peremptory challenges based on race or sex, the jury trial right does not
provide the defendant with any right to have particular jurors seated on the
panel based on their race or sex.298 The harm from the equal protection
294. When a party raises a successful Batson claim in the trial court, the judge can prohibit the
exercise of the peremptory challenge or even require that the parties begin jury selection anew.
Because there has not been a trial, the judge can take steps to alleviate the harm immediately before
the jury is sworn in, while after trial the only possible remedy is to reverse the conviction and retry the
defendant. Even that remedy does not prevent a party trying to use a peremptory challenge in a more
subtle way to discriminate against a protected class. See Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane,
Constructing a Jury that is Both Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting In Jury
Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 725 (1998) (arguing that inclusion of venireperson on the jury or
granting a new trial do not adequately deter discriminatory peremptory challenges). My focus is on the
remedy available to appellate courts finding that the exercise of the peremptory challenge violated
equal protection. The same remedy, reversal of the conviction and a new trial, applies when the trial
court improperly found the defendant's explanation for a peremptory strike violated Batson and
refused to remove the juror. See United States v. Blotcher, 142 F.3d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1998). In either
case, a Batson error results in a new trial for the defendant.
295. See Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and
the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE LJ. 93, 118 (1996). Professor Muller notes that:
Batson's proponents have defined the Batson norm in such a way that a Batson violation is
absolutely harmless in every case... Thus the Court, presented with the question of whether to
apply harmless error analysis to a Batson violation, would be driven to the odd position that
Batson error should trigger not automatic reversal, but automatic affirmance.
296. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
297. Id. at 480-81.
298. Id. at 486-87. The Court stated:
We do not hold that the systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury system through peremptory
challenges is lawful; it obviously is not.... We do not even hold that the exclusion of blacks from
this particular trial was lawful . . . All we hold is that [defendant] does not have a valid
constitutional challenge based on the Sixth Amendment-which no more forbids the prosecutor to
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violation would have no direct effect on the defendant, so it must be harmless
except in the broader sense that it undermined the integrity of the judicial
process.
299
If the jury is fair, regardless of whether it reflects the community's
composition, then branding a prosecutor as a person acting on racial or
sexual bias in exercising a peremptory challenge becomes even harder for a
court. Moreover, the incentive for the prosecutor to advance a superficially
plausible, if not necessarily truthful, explanation for the peremptory
challenge is heightened because the actual jury will still be a fair one
constitutionally, even if the motive for removing the juror would violate
Batson. From the prosecutor's point of view, defendants who successfully
assert Batson claims receive a windfall because the jury may be slightly
biased in their favor. Successfully striking that juror by proffering a facially
neutral explanation, however, does not cause any direct harm to the
defendant while possibly increasing the chance of a conviction.
Acknowledging a Batson violation gives the defendant a benefit, while
advancing a plausible reason for a peremptory challenge does not undermine
the constitutional protection provided by the jury trial. The prosecutor, who is
an advocate for the government in seeking a conviction, may perceive Batson
as not just a procedural roadblock, but an impediment that can give
defendants an unwarranted benefit.3"'
The nature of a Batson violation as potentially providing a defendant with
a windfall was amply demonstrated in United States v. Huey.301 Huey's
attorney used his five peremptory challenges to remove African-Americans
from the jury on the ground that tape recordings which the government
intended to introduce contained racial slurs by the defendant 3°2 Both the
government and Huey's co-defendant objected to the strikes on Batson
strike jurors on the basis of race than it forbids him to strike them on the basis of innumerable
other generalized characteristics.
Id.
299. See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 2001, 2004 (1998) ("[Ojur experience over the last decade with Batson claims-where reversal
and retrial has been the standard remedy-suggests that here, too, traditional criminal procedure
remedies do not translate easily into the equal protection context.").
300. Prosecutors may be suspicious of some Batson challenges, believing that defense counsel
raise the claim to preserve a favorable juror and not because of any possible bias on the part of the
prosecutor. See Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by
Questionnaire and the Blind Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1008 (1996) ("Some
prosecutors also commented that defense counsel sometimes use the motions strategically, to
embarrass the prosecutor or to prevent the loss of a juror biased in the defendant's favor.").
301. 76 F.3d 638 (1996).
302. Id. at 639-40.
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grounds, which the trial court denied without explanation.30 3 On appeal of
their convictions, the Fifth Circuit found that Huey's counsel's peremptory
challenges violated Batson and ordered a new trial for both defendants.304
The circuit court justified granting the transgressor a remedy by asserting that
"only by repudiating all results from such a trial can public confidence in the
integrity of this system be preserved, even when it means reversing the
conviction of the very defendant who exercised the discriminatory
challenges. 3 °5
The Fifth Circuit was well aware of the irony of its decision, but relied on
the vigilance of trial judges to prevent other defendants from using Huey as a
means to generate grounds for a successful appeal.30 6 The trial judge had
acquiesced in an obvious equal protection violation, so ordering a new trial
was traceable primarily to a judicial failure to vindicate the equal protection
right of the removed jurors. The Seventh Circuit ridiculed Huey's result,
stating that "[g]iving a defendant a new trial because of his own violation of
the Constitution would make a laughingstock of the judicial process. 30 7 But
was the Fifth Circuit wrong in Hue),? While the result certainly appears
anomalous, it reflected the Supreme Court's focus on the harm to the judicial
system from an equal protection violation, divorced from the actual
proceeding in which a defendant's right to an unbiased jury may have been
fully protected and the conviction a product of a fair proceeding. Once the
Supreme Court identified the prospective jurors as the aggrieved party and
permitted defendants to attack their convictions not because the particular
verdict was tainted but on the ground that the entire system was tarnished by
discrimination, then granting every defendant a new trial should be the result.
Huey was right in not discriminating among the defendants, based on their
culpability for the equal protection violation, if a defendant need not show
any direct harm from the improper peremptory challenges to sustain a Batson
claim.308
303. Id.
304. Id. at 641.
305. Id. at 641-42.
306. Id. at 641-42.
307. United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1996).
308. In Mara v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit refused to apply Huey to a
case in which the prosecutor, defendant and trial judge agreed to remove all eight African-Americans
from the jury on the ground that the defendant had not objected to the removal and that such
agreements were unlikely to ever take place again. Id. at 1271 ("We are ... convinced that such jury
selection collusion among litigants and judges is virtually certain never to be repeated."). The
defendant's acquiescence to the obvious Batson violation in Mata should not have removed the case
from the Huey analysis that rested the reversal on the effect of the violation on the integrity of thejudicial proceeding. Regardless of how distasteful it is to permit a defendant to reap the benefit of a
violation, Batson should apply whenever there is sufficient evidence of purposeful discrimination.
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By removing Batson violations from the category of cases subject to
harmless error, the perception of windfall is heightened when the defendant
successfully challenges a conviction on appeal.309 In United States v.
Annigoni, o the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted the approach of every
other circuit that had addressed the issue by rejecting a harmless error review
of a Batson violation and holding that a conviction must be reversed
automatically upon finding the equal protection violation.311 Judge
Kozinski's dissent noted the conundrum created by a focus on the removed
juror, rather than the defendant, as the party harmed by a discriminatory
peremptory challenge, that "we are forced to choose from two all-or-nothing
rules: the error is always harmless or it is never harmless. There is no
A student author criticized the Fifth Circuit's position in Huey and supported the Seventh Circuit's
position in Boyd, with the important caveat that the bar to granting a new trial to the transgressor
"should be supplemented by an obligation on the part of judges to actively protect the interests of
jurors by initiating Batson hearings sua sponte whenever the circumstances would permit a prosecutor
to do so." Audrey M. Fried, Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of Batson: Protecting Jurors from the
Use of Race-Based Peremptory Challenges by Defense Counsel, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 1311, 1313
(1997). The problem is not the trial judge who sees a Batson violation and fails to correct it, but a
court's failure to see the violation that only becomes apparent (or noticed) at the appellate level. The
question is really one of post-conviction remedy. If the harm is to the struck juror and not the
defendant, then the source of the equal protection violation and its consequent harm to the judicial
system seems irrelevant.
That point was illustrated in United States v. Blotcher, 142 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1998), in which the
Fourth Circuit reversed a defendant's conviction because the judge erroneously found the defendant's
exercise of a peremptory challenge violated Batson. Id. at 732. The harm in Blotcher from not
permitting the defendant to remove a juror peremptorily, which is solely a statutory right, was a
finding that the peremptory challenge was permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. A non-
violation of Batson is treated the same as a violation if the judge erroneously prohibits the removal of
the juror. In this case, the harm must be to the defendant, but not such that an unfair trial took place
because the jury was not alleged to have been biased in any way. Protecting the integrity of the system
by permitting the proper removal of jurors for reasons unrelated to race or sex apparently is just as
important as protecting it from improperly motivated peremptory challenges. In either case, the
systemic harm, and not a finding of prejudice from the use or denial of the peremptory challenge,
permits a court to reverse a conviction without regard to whether the proceeding was fair or the jury
otherwise unbiased in reaching its finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
309. See Muller, supra note 295, at 121. Professor Muller states that:
Convictions are not reversed to deter violations of the Equal Protection Clause... [A]
prosecutor's illegal courtroom decision to dismiss a juror on account of race or gender should
have the same consequences for the defendant as that prosecutor's illegal office decision to fire a
secretary on account of race or gender.
Idl Professor Muller cogently argues that the way around the harmless error problem is to "relocate the
fair trial harm from the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial guarantee." Id. at 132-33. The problem with incorporating the Batson analysis in the jury trial
right is the Court's decision in Holland v. Illinois, which Professor Muller argues should be
overturned. Although the jury trial right is sufficient to protect the defendant's interest, the Court must
still rely on the Equal Protection Clause to justify extending the protections of Batson to civil cases
and prosecutors, which would create an odd amalgam of conflicting interests under the jury trial right.
310. 96F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
311. Id.atll4l.
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practical middle ground. 312 Given the problem with labeling a prosecutor as
having engaged in intentional discrimination under Batson, and the effect of
giving the prosecutor's explanation too close a review to create a record that
might invite appellate reversal regardless of the fairness of the trial, a judge
may well accept any modestly plausible explanation for the strike without
pause. If ajudge has an incentive to accept almost any explanation, however,
prosecutors will be tempted to use their peremptory challenges aggressively
if they know the trial court is unlikely to subject their explanations to any real
scrutiny.3
13
Asking prosecutors and defense counsel to explain the reason for
exercising a peremptory challenge, in a structure designed to avoid labeling
that explanation as disingenuous or discriminatory, simply invites attorneys
to respond in a way that meets the minimal requirements for avoiding a
Batson violation. The prosecutor's role is to be an advocate on behalf of the
government, and jury selection is an integral part of the process of securing a
conviction. It is naive to expect attorneys trying to win their case to respond
with full candor to a demand to explain their motivation for striking a
juror.314 Batson's goal to protect the integrity of the judicial system by
eliminating bias is laudable, but the means the Court chose to reach it was
deeply flawed.3 15 Judicial inquiry into prosecutorial motives invites
responses that may not always be candid, and indeed sometimes will be an
outright lie.316 Not all prosecutors are racist or sexist and certainly Batson has
312. Id. at 1150 (Kozinski, 3., dissenting).
313. See Montoya, supra note 300, at 1024 ("Because judges are apparently ill-equipped to
discern lawyer's intentions and reluctant to identify purposeful discrimination, the scrutiny of suspect
peremptory challenges in a Batson hearing provides no answer.").
314. See Reiss, supra note 26, at 1419 ("[Batson] requires that a prosecutor reveal and explain his
motivations in court, on the record, and in the presence of defense counsel, immediately after the
prosecutor has engaged in the challenged behavior. The stark focus on the prosecutor's subjective
intent is bound to make Batson difficult to administer.").
315. Professor Karlan summarized the point quite aptly in asserting that "[w]hat Batson shows is
that when courts cannot calibrate the remedy, they fudge on the right instead." Karlan, supra note 299,
at 2015.
316. See Anderson, supra note 3 1, at 377 ("[The ethics of both lawyers and judges are called into
question because the law makes it easier for lawyers to lie [about peremptory strikes] and makes it
easier for judges to ignore it when they do."); Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and
Discrimination 4fier Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 37 (1997) ("[O]ne possible reason not to state
honestly a nondiscriminatory reason is the fear that what one believes to be a neutral,
nondiscriminatory reason will be ruled discriminatory nonetheless.') Andrew D. Leipold,
Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEo. L. 945, 1006
(1998). Professor Leipold states that:
Since the prosecution's reasons [for a peremptory strike] by definition would not satisfy a
challenge for cause, the judge is then asked to decide whether the prosecutor's vague, often
idiosyncratic reasons are sufficient to refute the allegation of lying. Such a process can hardly
inspire confidence in defendants or the public, and as a society we might be understandably
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limited the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, although clearly it
has not eliminated it. I17 But asking prosecutors to defend their actions, and
permitting judges to accept explanations that on occasion are, at best, barely
plausible, does nearly as much harm to the integrity of the judicial system as
a peremptory challenge based on racial or sexual stereotypes. If almost any
reason can be accepted, no matter how apparently implausible, then the harm
from discrimination may only be heightened because the courts appear to
turn a blind eye to it.318
Batson sticks out like the proverbial sore thumb in the area of
prosecutorial misconduct. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has adopted
tests that largely make judicial inquiry into prosecutorial motives irrelevant.
For a Batson claim, however, the Court made inquiry into intent the
cornerstone of the equal protection edifice while empowering trial judges to
accept almost any explanation as sufficient to fulfill the requirements of
judicial review.319 The inquiry in the name of protecting the integrity of the
justice system reveals the central flaw of Batson when courts can ignore
reality and permit the peremptory strike based on a clearly questionable
reluctant to increase the opportunities for this public spectacle of charges and denials to occur.
Id.
317. See Alschuler, supra note 257, at 172 ("Because most prosecutors will probably comply with
the Supreme Court's decision in good faith, Batson may work a significant change in American trial
practice... Nevertheless, some prosecutors may seek to evade the requirements of the Batson
decision.").
318. See United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1162 (1990) (Higginbotham, J., concurring)
("On any individual case on appeal, even a flimsy explanation may appear marginally adequate and be
sustained. However, this cumulative record causes me to pause and wonder whether the principles
enunciated in Batson are being undermined by excuses that have all form and no substance."); Sheri
Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 21, 59 (1993). Professor Johnson asserts that:
If prosecutors exist who... cannot create a 'racially neutral' reason for discriminating on the basis
of race, bar examinations are too easy. If judges exist who wish to believe proffered 'racially
neutral' reasons and cannot rationalize that desire, impeachment for incompetence ought to be
more frequent. Whatever you do, just don't say race. Don't even think about it.
I.
Professor Charlow discussed the possibility of using the professional disciplinary system as a means to
police attorneys who violate Batson, but she noted that "[i]t may be difficult, however, for courts to
separate the egregious cases from all the others. And at least with regard to run-of-the-mill Batson
findings, it will surely be difficult for courts to assess which of the many possible permutations of
culpability exists." Charlow, supra note 316, at 62. See also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for
Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 475, 500 (1998) ('By now it is clear that
policing will neither curb the defiant prosecutor nor spur the inert trial judge. The Supreme Court's
extreme deference to trial court determinations of racial motivation compels a focus on ethical trial
court actors; perhaps this is the tack that should have been taken.").
319. See Reiss, supra note 26, at 1419 ("Mhe procedure for challenging a prosecutor's use of
peremptories places a spotlight on the prosecutor's motives in the most immediate, dramatic, and
intrusive fashion.").
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explanation.
The Court recognized in Swain that asking prosecutors to explain their
reasons for peremptory challenges was not a proper subject of judicial
inquiry. By the time Batson overturned Swain, the propriety of judicial
inquiry into prosecutorial motive had not changed. Yet, the Court ignored an
important aspect of its earlier decision that remained viable even though
Swain's protection for racial discrimination had to fall. The Court in Batson
should have at least considered Swain's position that judicial inquiry into
prosecutorial motives was improper and will yield just as much harm,
although of a different type, as the problem the inquiry seeks to eradicate.
Accepting the prosecutor's good faith was the downfall of Swain, but the
approach adopted by Batson has proved to be just as problematic. 320
Simply eliminating the Batson inquiry would not solve the problem of
discriminatory exercises of peremptory challenges. One possibility might be
to keep the prima facie standard, but require that the party challenging the
peremptory challenge do more than assert that the strike was based on an
impermissible motive. The problem with requiring a higher degree of proof
is that it gives the other side a "free shot" at striking at least one juror before
there is any evidence that the party used the peremptory challenges in a
321discriminatory manner. 1 It would be an odd rule that an attorney can strike
one juror based on race or sex, but that every one after that might be subject
to an equal protection challenge. Moreover, permitting a government
attorney to violate the Equal Protection Clause, even once, would resuscitate
Swain's discredited approach to peremptory challenges.
Another possibility would be to lower the standard by which the trial
court can remove a juror for cause. A party may challenge any juror if there
is a sufficient basis to show that the person will not decide the case
impartially, but under the current standards it is difficult to demonstrate either
320. See Alschuler, supra note 257, at 176 ("Even when prosecutors are forthcoming, determining
the adequacy of their explanations is a difficult and burdensome task, and prosecutors may not always
be forthcoming. For some prosecutors, Batson's message may appear to be: When your quota of free
shots is exhausted, you must make up some plausible reasons."); Montoya, supra note 300, at 1007
("Batson . . . motions are difficult to win because lawyers rebutting a prima facie case of
discrimination may not tell the truth, and the rebutting lawyer can too easily come up with a race-
neutral reason for the challenge."); but see Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in
Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 761 (1992) ("By preserving the
peremptory challenge, and superimposing an antidiscrimination rule, the Court has struck a sensible
and workable balance.... Because such a modified peremptory challenge serves important functions,
it is worth preserving.").
321. See Alschuler, supra note 257, at 173 ("Batson may afford [the] prosecutor one or two 'free
shots'-opportunities to discriminate against blacks without accounting for his or her actions....
Moreover, whenever the prosecutor ... allows one or two blacks to serve on the jury, he or she may
gain additional opportunities to discriminate.').
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actual prejudice or an inability to decide a case fairly.322 Courts could
combine the prima facie requirement of Batson with the challenge for cause,
requiring the attorney who appears to be striking jurors in a discriminatory
manner to justify the peremptory challenges by something more than just a
neutral explanation.323 While this approach would cut down on the number of
discriminatory strikes, it would not address completely the broader problem
of attorneys, especially prosecutors, furnishing explanations that mask a
discriminatory intent This change would really only overturn Purkett v.
Elem by requiring a good, or at least much more plausible, explanation
before the court permitted the peremptory challenge.
There is also Justice Marshall's proposal in his concurrence in Batson,
that the peremptory challenge be eliminated from criminal trials. He stated,
"The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process
by permitting the exclusion ofjurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the
Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system." 324 Such a
prohibition on peremptory challenges would bring the Court full circle from
Swain. While the Court had once accepted all peremptory challenges, relying
on the presumed good faith of the prosecutors, it would reject all such
challenges because of the potential for impermissible discrimination.Y
322. See Pam Frasher, Note, Fulfilling Batson and Its Progeny: A Proposed Amendment to Rule
24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to Attain a More Race- and Gender-Neutral Jury
Selection Process, 80 IowA L. REv. 1327, 1331-32 (1995) (reviewing requirements to remove jurors
for cause). The peremptory challenge can serve as an alternative means to for cause removal ofjurors
when there are serious questions regarding their impartiality. See Alschuler, supra note 257, at 206.
Professor Alschuler writes that
On occasion, unexplained challenges have provided a gentle way of excluding prospective jurors
who probably should not have been permitted to serve.., the peremptory challenge has permitted
both judges and prospective jurors to save face. Judges have resolved their doubts against
exclusion, relying on the peremptory challenge to correct their errors and to do so without
explicitly rejecting the jurors protestations of impartiality.
IL
323. See Ogletree, supra note 293, at 1133 (proposing a lowered "for cause" standard for all
strikes).
324. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
rejected a ban on just prosecutorial peremptory challenges, arguing that "[i]f the prosecutor's
peremptory challenge could be eliminated only at the cost of eliminating the defendant's challenge as
well, I do not think that would be too great a price to pay" Id. at 108.
325. See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810 (1997) (trial judge author deems himself a "late" and
"reluctant convert" to the position that peremptory challenges should be abolished); Melilli, supra note
271, at 502 ("The peremptory challenge has outlived its usefulness."); Alschuler, supra note 257, at
157 ("The Equal Protection Clause and the peremptory challenge are incompatible"). It is important to
note, however, that practitioners support the peremptory challenge, and oppose proposals to ban them
completely. See Montoya, supra note 300, at 1000 (stating that a survey of prosecutors and defense
attorneys should that practitioners overwhelmingly deemed peremptory challenges valuable); Herald
Price Fahringer, The Peremptory Challenge: An Endangered Species?, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 400, 401
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Under either regime, the attorneys would not be called upon to justify their
actions.
Implementing such a ban is easier said than done, at least in a
constitutional sense. While Batson and its progeny rely on the Equal
Protection Clause as the basis for prohibiting particular acts that show
purposeful discrimination, it would be much harder to justify a complete ban
on a well-established trial practice because it has, in some instances, been
used in a discriminatory manner. Moreover, given the extensions of Batson
in McCollum and Edmonson, the constitutional prohibition would apply to
every judicial proceeding, civil or criminal, and to every litigant That is a
substantial, and probably unwarranted, extension of the Equal Protection
Clause. Such a ban would, however, eliminate the problem caused by
Batson's sanction of judicial inquiry into the motives of attorneys exercising
peremptory challenges. It may be that the problems created by Batson
challenges are best addressed through a more radical change that ensures the
integrity of the judicial system rather than permitting attorneys, and most
prominently prosecutors, to carry vigorous representation of their client to
such an extreme that they act in ways that denigrate the system.326
(1995) ("To effectively confront the forces of prejudice and bias that afflict so many jurors called into
service today, it is imperative that the parties have a full complement of peremptory challenges.");
William F. Fahey, Peremptory Challenges: A Crucial Tool for Trial Lawyers, 12 CRIM. JUST., Spring
1997, at 29 ("Trial attorneys can only hope that there is some residual rationality left in the courts-
and that some form of peremptory challenge is allowed to remain.").
326. A detailed constitutional analysis of Batson and its progeny under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and various proposals for changing the equal protection test short of eliminating the
peremptory challenge, is beyond the scope of this article. There are a number of recent articles that
thoroughly dissect this area, some offering modifications that accommodate both the peremptory
challenge and the equal protection principle of Balson. See, eg., Roberta K. Flowers, Does It Cost Too
Much? A 'Difference'Look at J.E.B. v. Alabama, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 491 (1995); George C. Harris,
The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and the Rights of the Accused, 74 NEB. L.
REv. 804 (1995); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the
Jury, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1041 (1995); Joel H. Swift, The Unconventional Equal Protection
Jurisprudence ofJury Selection, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 295 (1996); Tracy M.Y. Choy, Note, Branding
Neutral Explanations Pretextual under Batson v. Kentucky: An Examination of the Role of the Trial
Judge in Jury Selection, 48 HASTINGS L. 577 (1997); Brian A. Howie, Note, A Remedy Without a
Wrong: J.E.B. and the Extension ofBatson to Sex-Based Peremptory Challenges, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1725 (1995). My point is that, when considered from the point of view of judicial review of
prosecutorial misconduct, Batson is misguided because it relies on attorneys who must vigorously
represent their client's interest to respond in complete candor regarding their motivations for
exercising a peremptory challenge. Reliance on a prosecutor's candor seems particularly misplaced in
a criminal prosecution when the defendant would not suffer any direct harm from a violation. It is
difficult to envision a test precluding judicial inquiry into the attorney's intent that would not result in
the almost complete demise of the peremptory challenge. See Melilli, supra note 271, at 503 ("Batson
as applied in the lower courts has demonstrated the futility of simultaneously attempting to preserve
the essential character of the peremptory challenge and to redefine 'discrimination' in such a way as to
prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of certain group stereotypes.").
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V. MISCONDUCT DURING TRIAL: CAN DOUBLE JEOPARDY CONTROL
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT?
Once a trial begins, the prosecutor's conduct shifts to a public stage on
which all can see the choices made in calling witnesses, introducing
evidence, and arguing the case to the trier of fact. The case has reached the
point at which the decision whether the defendant is guilty of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt depends, at least in part, on the government
attorney's skill in marshaling evidence and explaining how it proves the
defendant's culpability. It is in this forum that the prosecutor's role as
advocate for the government reaches its apogee. The prosecutor, no doubt
convinced of the defendant's guilt, must translate that belief into proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that will satisfy a jury (or judge) that the
defendant engaged in a criminal act with the requisite mental state.
As the government's advocate, and society's representative, the
prosecutor seeks a verdict of guilty, within the confines of the ethical rules
that govern the legal profession. The temptation to overstep, however, by
imparting to the trier of fact one's firmly held belief in the defendant's guilt,
even at the risk of allowing advocacy to degenerate into prejudicial
argumentation or unfair commentary on the evidence and credibility of the
witnesses is omnipresent Although the presence of the judge is a moderating
influence on both sides, there are numerous instances of overreaching by
lawyers during trial. Every objection sustained by the judge or sanction for
improper conduct is, in a sense, a result of one attorney's transgression,
whether it be characterized as an innocent mistake, aggressive advocacy, or
willful misconduct
If the prosecutor engages in improper conduct during trial, such as
making inflammatory arguments or asking witnesses inappropriate questions,
then "[tjhe relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments 'so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process."' 327 A claim of prosecutorial misconduct during trial requires
a court to resolve two questions: whether the prosecutor's comments were in
fact improper, and, if so, whether the remarks prejudiced the defendant's
right to a fair trial.3  The usual remedy granted to overcome prosecutorial
misconduct that prejudiced the fairness of a proceeding is a new trial.
327. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
328. United States v. Warfield, 97 F.3d 1014, 1028 (8th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Hall,
47 F.3d 1091, 1098 (1Ith Cir. 1995) ("A defendant's substantial rights are prejudicially affected when
a reasonable probability arises that but for the remarks, the outcome would be different").
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Whether the trial conduct of the prosecutor, as opposed to defense
counsel or civil attorneys, should trigger a remedy beyond a new trial raises a
different question. Unlike other attorneys, the prosecutor operates within a
system that, for the most part, gives the government only one chance at
proving its case. The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause provides
that no defendant "shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb."329 The Supreme Court's classic description of the
scope of the double jeopardy protection came in North Carolina v. Pearce:
"It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.
It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.
And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." 330 The
Double Jeopardy Clause safeguards a defendant from governmental
overreaching because "permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen
to a second trial for the same offense would arm Government with a potent
instrument of oppression., 331 Once ajury has reached a verdict, be it guilty or
not guilty, the Fifth Amendment provides that a defendant may not be
subjected to another trial for the same crime.332
The double jeopardy protection is not limited to successive prosecutions
after the verdict The language of the Double Jeopardy Clause restricts
placing a defendant "twice in jeopardy" for the same crime, which appears to
comprehend both retrials after a proceeding aborted short of a verdict, i.e., a
mistrial, and after appellate reversal of a conviction. If the first trial ended
because of prosecutorial misconduct prior to a decision by the trier of fact, or
if a reviewing court reverses a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct,
could that trigger the double jeopardy protection? If it could, then the Double
Jeopardy Clause might prohibit a retrial because of prosecutorial misconduct
that did not violate any of the specific protections a defendant receives in a
criminal proceeding, except the requirement of a fair trial. Unlike a due
process violation, which generally results in the court granting a new trial,
the sole remedy for a double jeopardy violation is a complete bar on a second
criminal prosecution. As the Supreme Court emphasized, "[W]here the
Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are no
'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy,
based on grounds which are not open to judicial examination."333 The Double
329. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
330. 395 U.S. at 717 (footnotes omitted).
331. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,569 (1977).
332. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 (1977) (plurality opinion); George C. Thomas
III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 827, 839 (arguing that verdict
finality is the only value protected by Double Jeopardy Clause).
333. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1978).
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Jeopardy Clause provides the holy grail of remedies, an absolute prohibition
on further criminal proceedings against the defendant for the charged
offense. That remedy creates a powerful incentive for defendants to seek an
expansive reading of the double jeopardy protection to encompass
prosecutorial misconduct.
A. Manifest Necessity for a Mistrial
The Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition on putting a defendant "twice
in jeopardy" is far more complicated than it first appears. Leaving aside the
thorny issues of when a second set of charges incorporates the same
underlying conduct as that considered in an earlier proceeding or whether a
civil punishment can bar a subsequent criminal action, the impact of
prosecutorial or judicial errors on a defendant's double jeopardy right has
presented a continuing challenge to the Supreme Court. Early on, the Court
confronted the question of whether a defendant, whose first trial the judge
ended short of a verdict due to a mistrial, could be retried on the same
charges. In United States v. Perez,334 Justice Story's opinion stated that a
court could retry a defendant when there was a '"manifest necessity" for
ordering a mistrial, "or the end of public justice would otherwise be
defeated." '335 In United States v. Ball,336 the Court held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not bar retrial after the defendant's conviction had been
reversed on appeal.33 The only exception to the Ball rule is when the
reviewing court reverses a conviction because there was insufficient evidence
introduced at trial to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt 3
38
The most common reason for granting a mistrial is when the jury
deadlocks and cannot render a verdict, which the Supreme Court has held
constitutes manifest necessity automatically.339 Aside from hung jury cases,
334. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
335. Id. at 580.
336. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
337. Id. at 672.
338. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (stating that the 'Double Jeopardy Clause
forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply
evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding).
339. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,509 (1978) ("[W]ithout exception, the courts have
held that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant to
submit to a second trial."). The Court has identified two similar situations in which double jeopardy
does not prohibit a second prosecution: (1) double jeopardy does not bar the government's appeal after
dismissal of an indictment without an adjudication of the defendant's factual guilt, see United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1982); and, (2) double jeopardy permits retrial after the defendant's
successful appeal results in reversal of the conviction, see United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
when a trial court orders a mistrial, the initial question in determining
whether double jeopardy bars retrial is whether the defendant consented to
the premature termination of the proceeding. In United States v. Dinitz, 0 the
Court held that "a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed
to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is
necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error."341 In that event, there is no
question of manifest necessity because the defendant chose to start again in
order to dissipate the taint of any impropriety or misconduct in the earlier
proceeding. If the defendant objects to the prosecutor's motion for a mistrial,
or to a court's sua sponte suggestion that it declare a mistrial, then the
question of manifest necessity arises. For example, if the government's
opening argument seeks to inflame the jury's passions and the judge orders a
mistrial over the defendant's objection, would double jeopardy bar a second
proceeding?
When a defendant objects to the termination of the proceeding, the court's
reason for granting the mistrial must be sufficient to show that there was a
manifest necessity under Perez. The Supreme Court has taken two different
approaches to the manifest necessity analysis, depending on whether the
reason for the mistrial can be ascribed to an error by the court or by the
prosecutor. If the court negligently granted a mistrial when it should have
taken some other means to mitigate the harm short of aborting the trial, then
double jeopardy bars a second prosecution. In United States v. Jorn,342 the
trial court declared a mistrial, without consulting attorneys for either side, to
avoid what the judge felt were self-incrimination problems for the
government's witnesses .3 A plurality of the Court found that the judge's
improvident mistrial order violated double jeopardy, stating that
"[r]eprosecution after a mistrial has unnecessarily been declared by the trial
court obviously subjects the defendant to the same personal strain and
insecurity regardless of the motivation underlying the trial judge's action."3 "
Jorn is what I call the "loose cannon' rule, preventing a retrial when a trial
judge rashly stops the proceeding for reasons unrelated to the defendant's
(1896).
340. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
341. Id. at 607 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 481 (1971)). The Court found that
"(t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant
retains primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error." Id. at 609.
342. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
343. The defendant had prepared allegedly fraudulent tax returns for the witnesses, and the judge
did not believe assertions by the government agents that the witnesses were aware of their Fifth
Amendment right, so the judge refused to permit them to testify until they had consulted with counsel.
Id. at 473.
344. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
(VOL. 77:713
1999] PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 801
factual guilt or innocence.3' In Arizona v. Washington,346 the Court held that
when the record shows "that the trial judge acted responsibly and
deliberately, and accorded careful consideration to [defendant]'s interest in
having the trial concluded in a single proceeding," then double jeopardy
would not prohibit a retrial.34 When the trial judge acts "irrationally or
irresponsibly, 3 4 however, double jeopardy provides the defendant with a
windfall from the judge's precipitous act.349
Prosecutorial negligence that causes a mistrial, on the other hand, is not
treated as harshly by the Court. In Illinois v. Somerville,50 shortly after trial
started, the prosecutor noticed that the indictment was fatally deficient
because it did not allege an element of the charged offense.351 The
government was entirely blameworthy for the error, and the defendant
objected to the government's mistrial motion. The Court held that
345. Reviewing courts do occasionally apply the double jeopardy clause to bar a second trial when
the judge acted hastily, showing that trial judges' unreflective actions can produce serious
consequences. See, e.g., United States v. Gaytan, 115 F.3d 737, 743 (9th Cir. 1997) (barring retrial
after trial court granted mistrial when "[t]he judge admonished the prosecutor [for Brady violations]
and ordered the case dismissed without pausing for any discussion of the possibility of other remedies,
all in a matter of seconds. It is quite apparent from the district court's subsequent candid remarks that
it acted in a burst of anger."); United States v. White, 914 F.2d 747, 754 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that
double jeopardy barred retrial after district court granted mistrial as to both defendants because
prosecutor's questions prejudiced one defendant, without determining whether trial as to unprejudiced
defendant could have proceeded."); United States v. Means, 513 F.2d 1329, 1335 (8th Cir. 1975)
(holding that dismissal of indictment during trial based on prosecutorial misconduct could not be
appealed and double jeopardy barred retrial "[w]hether or not Judge Nichol's dismissal of the
indictments was correct"); United States v. Glover, 506 F.2d 291,297-98 (2nd Cir. 1974) (prohibiting
retrial on conspiracy count when defendant objected to mistrial and district court's reasons for mistrial
"was not ... for the benefit of Glover but for the benefit of his co-defendants.").
346. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
347. Id. at 516. The issue in Washington was the trial judge's failure to articulate on the record the
reason for finding manifest necessity in granting the mistrial, although it was apparent that defense
counsel's improper opening argument was the reason. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment did
not require a trial court to make findings of fact or explain its reasons for declaring a mistrial. Id. at
517.
348. Id. at S14.
349. See, e.g., Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322 (6th Cir. 1997). The court in Harpster upheld an
order prohibiting the state from retrying the defendant after a mistrial that the trial judge granted
because he incorrectly believed that defense counsel had violated a pre-trial order. See id. at 330. The
court stated that "a simple corrective instruction would have sufficiently protected against juror bias.
Because this case lacks the urgent circumstances or high degree of necessity required to justify a
mistrial, double jeopardy bars the retrial of petitioner."). Id. See also Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S.
458, 469 (1973) (noting that in Jor, the "opinion dealt with action by a trial judge that can fairly be
described as erratic.).
350. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
351. Id. at 459. The grand jury charged the defendant with thef, which requires proof of an intent
to permanently deprive the owner of the property. The grand jury's indictment must charge every
element of the offense, and only the grand jury could amend it to include the missing element. Under
Illinois law, the defendant could raise an objection to the indictment at any time, including on appeal,
and the conviction would have to be overturned automatically. See id. at 459-60.
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terminating the first trial satisfied the manifest necessity requirement because
the problem was an "obvious procedural error" that would cause a lengthy
delay pending appeal, and would result in an automatic reversal of the
conviction and a second trial.35 2 Unlike the judicial negligence in Jorn, a
mistrial caused by prosecutorial error did not result in a double jeopardy bar
to a second prosecution. The reason for the different treatment of negligent
conduct, depending on who was responsible, relates to the truth-telling
incentive created by the Somerville Court's finding of manifest necessity. If
the Court had held that double jeopardy applied to mistrials triggered by
prosecutorial negligence, then prosecutors would have a powerful
inducement not to bring errors to the trial court's attention because
declaration of a mistrial would end any chance of convicting the defendant
on the pending charge.353 The government would be much better served by
sandbagging the trial court until after a conviction, at which point all the
defendant could gain under th" Ball rule would be reversal of the conviction
and a new trial. If the government need not fear revealing errors that might
result in granting a mistrial, then there was a positive gain for the criminal
justice system in encouraging prosecutorial forthrightness.
B. Goading Defendants to Seek a Mistrial
After Somerville, the Supreme Court's double jeopardy rule permitted
retrials after declaration of a mistrial in three situations: (1) When the
defendant requested or consented to a mistrial; (2) When the prosecutor acted
negligently and the trial court ordered a mistrial over the defendant's
objection; and, (3) When the trial court acted with apparent deliberateness in
ordering a mistrial over the defendant's objection, or at least did not appear
to be a "loose cannon' in reaching its decision. But what if the prosecutor
acted improperly so as to provoke a defendant to request a mistrial? Under
352. Id.at 464.
353. In Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), the Court found a double jeopardy
violation after the trial court granted a mistrial at the government's request. The prosecutor informed
the judge after the trial commenced that witnesses for two of the six counts of the indictment were
unavailable, and the judge granted a mistrial to allow the government to secure their presence. Id. at
735. After defendant's conviction on all counts on retrial, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions
on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 738. The Court held that "[t]he situation presented is simply one
where the district attorney entered upon trial of the case without sufficient evidence to convict." Id. at
737 (quoting Comero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69, 71 (1931)). The problem in Downum was not just
the prosecutor's inadequate preparation, but the trial court's improper handling of the situation that
triggered the double jeopardy violation. Had the judge granted a continuance or taken other action
short of a mistrial, there would not have been a double jeopardy issue. As it was, the trial judge's
negligence compounded the prosecutor's failure and created a situation in which the entire case, and
not just those counts involving the missing witnesses, was barred by double jeopardy.
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Dinitz, the defendant's request for a mistrial insulated the government from a
double jeopardy claim to bar the retrial. Yet the Court, much as it has done in
other areas, acknowledged the possibility that deliberate prosecutorial
misconduct causing a defendant to request a mistrial might be treated
differently than the usual case under Dinitz. In Jorn, the Court stated in a
footnote that "where a defendant's mistrial motion is necessitated by judicial
or prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid an acquittal, reprosecution
might well be barred. ' ' 54 In Somerville, it asserted that "the declaration of a
mistrial on the basis of a rule or a defective procedure that would lend itself
to prosecutorial manipulation would involve an entirely different
question."355 Even Dinitz noted a possible exception to the rule that a
defendant requesting a mistrial could not raise double jeopardy because such
a rule would be problematic if a prosecutor acted "in order to goad the
[defendant] into requesting a mistrial."3 6
These statements were only dicta, so the Court did not provide guidance
on what might trigger a double jeopardy violation until its decision in Oregon
v. Kennedy. 357 The prosecutor in Kennedy, frustrated when the trial judge
sustained objections to apparently proper questions, 58 finally asked a witness
if he had not done business with the defendant "because he is a crook[.] 35 9
There was no dispute that the question was highly prejudicial, and that the
misconduct caused the defendant to request the mistrial granted by the trial
judge. The state court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited a
retrial when the mistrial was the result of prosecutorial "overreaching." The
Supreme Court rejected such a broad application of double jeopardy that
could bar retrial in a wide range of cases in which the prosecutor's conduct,
intended to enhance the likelihood of a conviction, resulted in a mistrial. The
Court held that such an approach would "offer virtually no standards for their
application" because "[e]very act on the part of a rational prosecutor during a
trial is designed to 'prejudice' the defendant"'36 The "overreaching" test
rejected in Kennedy was really an enhanced harmless error test, weighing the
reason the prosecutor engaged in the act against the harm it caused the
defendant The Court adopted a narrower rule for determining whether
prosecutorial misconduct violated double jeopardy, holding that a defendant
354. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,485 n.12 (1971).
355. Somerville, 410 U.S. at 464.
356. 424 U.S. 600,611 (1976).
357. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
358. The Court noted that the Oregon Court of Appeals had found that "the judge's rulings were
probably wrong" Id. at 669 n.1 (quoting People v. Kennedy, 619 P.2d 948,949 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)).
359. Id. at 669.
360. Id. at 674.
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could be retried "absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the
protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause."36' According to the
Court, that determination called for "[i]nferring the existence or nonexistence
of intent from objective facts and circumstances." 362
The Kennedy standard was quite narrow, requiring a court to find that the
prosecutor specifically sought to "goad" a defendant into requesting a
mistrial in order to get a second chance at securing a conviction. While the
Court seemed to adopt a rule that relied on an assessment of prosecutorial
intent to determine the double jeopardy issue, the analysis did not in fact call
for an evaluation of the prosecutor's actual state of mind or permit judicial
inquiry into prosecutorial motives. 363 As the Court stressed, the double
jeopardy issue involved an objective test, assessing in hindsight the
prosecutor's actions to determine whether the improper act that caused the
defendant's mistrial motion could only be ascribed to a decision to abort the
first trial so that a second proceeding could take place.314
When a prosecutor pushes the limits of the rules, is she trying to provoke
a mistrial or just win a conviction? As the Court in Kennedy observed, all
prosecutorial acts at trial are designed to prejudice the defendant, in the sense
of making a conviction more likely. Therefore, a prosecutor can always argue
that improper acts were designed to convict the defendant rather than to
provoke a mistrial, even if the prosecutor acknowledges that pursuing a
course of action increased the risk of a mistrial.365 A double jeopardy claim
under Kennedy usually will involve an underlying violation of proper trial or
evidentiary procedures that caused a court to order a mistrial on the
defendants motion, such as a prosecutor's attempt to use otherwise
inadmissible evidence or to advance an unjustified argument Yet those acts,
361. Id. at 675-76 (emphasis added).
362. Id. at 675.
363. See Reiss, supra note 26, at 1426 ("Despite the Court's palliative statement that discerning
whether a misbehaving prosecutor has acted with the prohibited intent simply implicates the 'familiar'
process of '[i]nferring the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances,'
the nature and specificity of the prohibited intent make it almost impossible to prove.").
364. Presumably, the prosecutor's reason for provoking a defendant into requesting a mistrial that
would violate Kennedy would have to be to correct errors in the first proceeding that likely would
result in an acquittal, a verdict that would bar any further prosecution on the charges. If the
prosecutor's concern was that the jury would deadlock, there would be no reason to provoke a mistrial
because one would be declared eventually, after which the Perez manifest necessity standard would
automatically permit a retrial. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510 (1978) ("The trial
judge's decision to declare a mistrial when he considers the jury deadlocked is ... accorded great
deference by a reviewing court.").
365. See Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[The Prosecutor's] conduct ...
reached the limits of the trial court's rulings, and stretched the limits of propriety. It cannot be
condoned. Nonetheless, the prosecutor's arguments for pursuing the several lines of inquiry in
question, while weak, are not so wholly lacking in merit as to be termed frivolous.").
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standing alone, do not show any specific intent to goad the defendant into
requesting a mistrial because they are means, albeit impermissible ones, to
secure a conviction.
It would be easy to misinterpret Kennedy to find that it applies to any
intentional prosecutorial misconduct that triggers a successful mistrial
motion by the defendant. Focusing solely on the prosecutor's knowledge or
purposefulness in pursuing a course of action ignores the second part of the
Court's analysis, that the goading must have been intended to cause a mistrial
and not just that the effect of the prosecutorial misconduct was termination of
the first proceeding. The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida made this very error in United States v. Sterba3 6 when it held that
double jeopardy barred a retrial after the court granted a mistrial due to
prosecutorial misconduct The prosecutor had intentionally misled the judge
and defense counsel regarding the identity of a crucial government witness
by allowing the witness to testify under a false name, thereby hiding the
witness' background and criminal record until the end of trial. 367 The
prosecutor's conduct was clearly reprehensible, and cast grave doubt on the
strength of the government's case. The district court found that the
prosecutor violated the double jeopardy protection under Kennedy because
"intentional misconduct that, if known, is obviously sufficient to provoke a
motion for a mistrial by the defense constitutes 'goading,' especially if it
intrudes into the unfettered exercise of a constitutional guarantee as essential
as the right of confrontation."3" The problem with Sterba's analysis is that
the magnitude or noxiousness of a prosecutor's misconduct is not an element
of the double jeopardy analysis adopted in Kennedy. The Supreme Court
required evidence of a specific purpose in the prosecutor's conduct, to goad
the defendant into seeking a mistrial and not just that, upon discovery, a
defendant would react by moving for a mistrial. Kennedy permitted the
application of the double jeopardy prohibition only to a narrow category of
prosecutorial misconduct during trial by linking the impropriety to the
prosecutor's intent to the defendant's decision to abort the proceeding short
of a verdict.
369
366. 22 F.Supp.2d 1333 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
367. The witness initiated the contact with the defendant and agreed to meet him at the site at
which he was arrested. Id. at 1340. Because the prosecutor concealed the witness's true identity, the
defense did not learn that, among other things, the witness had been paid $2,000 for her participation
in the prosecution, had a conviction for making a false statement and filing a false police report, and
had a reputation as "an accomplished liar." Id. at 1339.
368. Id. at 1342. The court found that "the trial was not conducted on equal footing, because the
prosecutor had the force of a lie at her disposal." Id.
369. The district court noted that "[t]he typical case [under Kennedy] includes no attempt by the
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A prosecutor could demonstrate the requisite intent under Kennedy by
admitting he engaged in the conduct with the intent to provoke a mistrial
motion, but this is unlikely to occur. If the egregiousness of the prosecutorial
malfeasance does not trigger a double jeopardy violation, then the only
realistic situation that the Kennedy test addressed is a case in which the
prosecution fared poorly in presenting its case because there was some
evidence that could not be introduced in the first proceeding but could be
used in a second trial. For example, if a witness were temporarily unavailable
during the first proceeding, then that person's availability at a later date
might explain the government's actions prompting a mistrial. On the other
hand, if a witness testified ineffectively at the first trial, or a vigorous cross-
examination undermined the witness' credibility, it would be hard to connect
that failing with the prosecutor's later action that provoked the mistrial. Even
if the prosecutor believed that better preparation before the retrial would
strengthen the government's case, the act that provoked the defendant's
mistrial motion is unlikely to be so clearly connected to the particular
problem in the government's case that a reviewing court would have
objective evidence of improper prosecutorial intent It is difficult to see how a
defendant could prove the prosecutor's intent based on improper conduct
arguably designed to secure a conviction. If the witness' testimony was weak
or his credibility destroyed, the government may be more aggressive in
presenting its case, thereby accepting the risk of a mistrial. A mistrial would
permit the government to better prepare for a retrial, even though the
government is not necessarily acting with the intent of provoking the
defendant into seeking a mistrial.'" 0
prosecutor to achieve an ill-gotten verdict by furtive means," but that goading had a broader meaning
that included "intentional misconduct" that, upon revelation to the defendant, would clearly provoke a
mistrial motion. Id. The prosecutor's conduct clearly violated the defendant's confrontation right under
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), in which the Supreme Court held that "[tihe witness' name and
address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this
most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination
itself" Id. at 131. The Confrontation Clause violation, standing alone, would require only a new trial
as the remedy, not dismissal of the indictment. Given that the government violated one constitutional
protection, it is difficult to see how the presence of the prosecutor's reprehensible intent transformed it
into a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause solely on the basis of the clear evidence of intent.
370. The Kennedy test poses a substantial timing problem for the defendant asserting a double
jeopardy claim based on prosecutorial misconduct that triggered a mistrial because the Court
essentially excluded any inquiry into the prosecutor's subjective motives. How can a court assess
whether the prosecutor acted with the requisite intent to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by
goading the defendant into seeking a mistrial until the second trial takes place? If the first trial were
going well for the government before the mistrial, it is unlikely that a prosecutor would ever want to
terminate the proceeding, so Kennedy apparently would not apply. If the government's case proceeded
poorly, it would not be until the retrial that any change in strategy or presentation of evidence might
shed light on the prosecutor's motive for acting impermissibly to provoke a mistrial motion from the
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The Kennedy test provided a very limited protection for a defendant's
double jeopardy right once the Supreme Court confined the analysis to an
after-the-fact assessment of the proper inference to be drawn from the
prosecutor's conduct, a purely objective test of intent. Unless evidence of the
prosecutor's subjective intent, such as an admission of the prosecutor's
reason for pursuing an improper strategy, is available, it is unlikely a court
will have sufficient objective evidence to show the government goaded a
defendant into seeking a mistrial just to better prepare its case. Simply
appraising the strength of the government's case in the first proceeding is not
enough to satisfy Kennedy's strict requirement that the defendant show by
objective evidence the prosecutor's intent to provoke a mistrial.3 71
The Kennedy court's analysis was much like the Armstrong court's test
for discovery in selective prosecution cases, in that it held out the promise of
constitutional protection but made the hurdle for invoking the right almost
impossible to clear unless the government admits its improper motive. While
Kennedy used the language of prosecutorial intent, the Court did not adopt a
test that permits lower courts to inquire as to the prosecutor's mindset before
the action that caused the mistrial, nor even to seek a response from the
government after the fact to explain its action. As Justice Powell noted in his
concurring opinion in Kennedy, "'subjective' intent often may be
unknowable ... a court-in considering a double jeopardy motion-should
rely primarily upon the objective facts and circumstances of the particular
defendant. That is too late, however, because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a defendant
from having to submit to a second proceeding, not just running the risk of a conviction. See Flanagan
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 266 (1984) ("The right guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is
more than the right not to be convicted in a second prosecution for an offense; it is the right not to be
'placed in jeopardy'-that is, not to be tried for the offense."); United States v. Wentz, 800 F.2d 1325,
1328 (4th Cir. 1986) ("If a defendant has a valid double jeopardy claim, he should not have to endure
the ordeal of a second trial, as the Double Jeopardy Clause is meant to protect the defendant from
exactly that."). Absent an admission showing the requisite intent, ferreting out the prosecutor's motive
would require that the second proceeding show objectively the prosecutor's intent to violate the
defendant's double jeopardy right.
371. Professor Thomas has proposed a test for double jeopardy after a mistrial dependent on the
strength of the government's case at the point when the court terminated the proceeding. He would
have a court frame the issue in the following way: "Can this defendant show a likelihood of acquittal
had the judge denied a mistrial?" George C. Thomas Ill, Solving the Double Jeopardy Mistrial Riddle,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1551, 1578 (1996). His analysis is close to my position that the only realistic
situation in which Kennedy can apply is when the government has insufficient evidence at the first
trial, and additional admissible evidence currently known by the prosecutor would be available at the
retrial but not at the first trial. The subsequent availability of the evidence is the key because it is
objective proof that the prosecutor aborted the first trial in order to get a second chance, when the
additional evidence to convict would be introduced. Professor Thomas' approach is broader because it
would make every mistrial motion subject to this type of balancing test, not just those made by the
defendant. This analysis conflicts with the Court's rule in Dinitz that permits retrials almost
automatically when the defendant moves for the mistrial.
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case."372 The issue of prosecutorial intent under Kennedy is a purely
retrospective review of the circumstances of the prior proceeding to
determine whether a court can infer the requisite intent on the part of a
prosecutor to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial. After-the-fact
rationalizations from the government would be unnecessary because they
provide no help to a court in assessing a defendant's claim of a double
jeopardy violation. In order to eliminate judicial inquiry into prosecutorial
motive, Kennedy adopted the narrowest approach to prosecutorial
misconduct under double jeopardy, looking only to the historical fact of what
occurred during the first proceeding, not to the prosecutor's actual intent to
trigger a mistrial motion.
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct as a Separate Basis for a Double Jeopardy
Violation
Whether pure prosecutorial misconduct during trial, unaccompanied by
any specific intent, can constitute a double jeopardy violation seemed to have
been settled by the Court's statement in Kennedy that a double jeopardy
violation was "limited to those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the
successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into
moving for a mistrial." 373 Kennedy recognized an exception to the Dinitz rule
that appeared to condition the double jeopardy protection on the defendant's
successful motion for a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct.7 4 The
Court's approach to this trial-type prosecutorial misconduct was similar to its
analysis in Somerville of the effect of prosecutorial negligence on a
defendant's double jeopardy right Somerville encouraged prosecutors to
admit their errors up front by removing the possibility that double jeopardy
would bar a retrial caused by governmental negligence brought to the trial
court's attention by the prosecutor. The Kennedy rule should spur defense
counsel to object to governmental misconduct by requesting a mistrial as an
372. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679-80 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
373. Id at 679.
374. See Beringer v. Sheahan, 934 F.2d 110, 113 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Only when the government
intentionally and successfully forces the defendant to move for a mistrial does it deprive the defendant
of the right to go forward."); United States v. Singleterry, 683 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1982).
It seems anomalous to say that identical prosecutorial misconduct will create a constitutional bar
to retrial when the district court correctly grants a mistrial, but not when the district court
erroneously denies the mistrial request... On the other hand, underKennedy the double jeopardy
clause is concerned only with prosecutorial misconduct intended to provoke a mistrial. When a
mistrial is not declared, then the prosecutor's efforts have been unsuccessful.
Id. at 124.
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immediate remedy for serious transgressions.375
If a defendant does not request a mistrial, but instead waits until the post-
conviction stage to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, then under
Kennedy there is no double jeopardy claim because the government did not
goad the defendant into seeking a mistrial. Without a successful mistrial
motion, the only relief an appellate court may grant is a new trial, which
would not be barred by Ball because the defendant sought the reversal of the
conviction.376 The prerequisite for invoking Kennedy, therefore, is a
successful mistrial motion, because the rule encourages defendants not to
withhold a motion that, if granted, could cure the problem, much like
Somerville encourages prosecutors to seek a mistrial to repair errors that they
notice during trial. The Kennedy rule ensures that the trial judge will deal
with the prosecutorial misconduct allegations in the first instance, not an
appellate court that must decide the case based only on a paper record.
Despite Kennedy's apparent clarity, the Court's later decision in Lockhart
v. Nelson37 7 raised at least the possibility that prosecutorial misconduct that
did not goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial might serve as the basis
for finding a double jeopardy violation. In Nelson, the government sought to
have the defendant sentenced as an habitual offender by introducing evidence
of three prior convictions, unaware that the Governor had pardoned one of
them.378 This meant that the government had not met the statutory proof
requirement for the enhanced sentence. After the mistake came to light, the
defendant argued that there had been insufficient evidence at the first
proceeding to prove that he was an habitual offender, and that therefore
double jeopardy prohibited re-sentencing, at which time the government
375. In Beringer v. Sheahan, 934 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit discussed the
rationale for requiring defendants to move for a mistrial to come within the ambit of the Double
Jeopardy Clause:
We see little reason.., to encourage defendants to engage in manipulative schemes calculated to
sucker uscrpulous prosecutors into committing increasingly flagrant misconduct. We do not
generally permit defendants to sit on their rights during trial, and it does not seem unreasonable to
require defendants to move for a mistrial when faced with prosecutorial misconduct they believe
completely prejudices their right to a fair trial.... To hold otherwise would require a post hoc
inquiry into the prosecutor's intent every time a defendant successfully claims prosecutorial
misconduct on appeal.
Id.at 113.
376. If the defendant requests a mistrial and the judge denies the motion, ipso facto the
government has not received the benefit of a mistrial even if the goal was to provoke the defendant to
make the motion. When the judge denies the mistrial motion, then there can only be an "attempted"
goad, which means the defendant's double jeopardy right is not implicated because the jury convicted
and the defendant now seeks a reversal of the conviction and a new trial free of any taint of
governmental misconduct.
377. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
378. Id.at36.
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could offer evidence of another conviction to permit the court to convict him
as a habitual offender.379 Under the rule of United States v. Burks, if the
government introduced insufficient evidence to convict in the first trial, then
a defendant cannot be retried under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
380
The Nelson court rejected the argument that Burks controlled the case,
holding that double jeopardy required a court to consider all the evidence
available at the first proceeding, including that which should have been
excluded, to determine whether there was enough evidence to convict the
defendant.38' However, the Court also noted, for no apparent reason, that
"[tlhere is no indication that the prosecutor knew of the pardon and was
attempting to deceive the court. We therefore have no occasion to consider
what the result would be if the case were otherwise.' '382 The first paragraph
of the opinion makes a similarly vague reference to the lack of prosecutorial
misconduct, that "[n]othing in the record suggests any misconduct in the
prosecutor's submission of the evidence. ' 383 The Court then referenced
Kennedy with a "c' citation, perhaps to indicate that prosecutorial
misconduct involving deliberate misrepresentation might also violate double
jeopardy under the objective intent test, although it did not state that
explicitly? 314
379. Id.at37.
380. United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
381. 488 U.S. at 40-41 ("It is quite clear from our opinion in Burks that a reviewing court must
consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court in deciding whether retrial is permissible under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.").
382. Id.at36n.2.
383. Id.at34.
384. See Jacob v. Clarke, 52 F.3d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1995) ("mhe Court's latest signal is
decidedly more ambiguous. In Lockhart, an appellate reversal case decided in the prosecution's favor,
the Court introduced its double jeopardy analysis by stating that the record revealed no prosecutorial
misconduct. Such a pointed caveat suggests that this remains an open issue."). Nelson's reference to
prosecutorial misconduct appears to be misplaced. Perhaps the specter of some hypothetical state of
affairs compelled the Court to note a potential limitation under the Double Jeopardy Clause, but
Nelson's statement is irreconcilable with the Court's analysis of the double jeopardy protection. The
misconduct referenced in Nelson would amount to the knowing use of falsified evidence, which the
Court has already found constituted a due process violation in the Mooney line of cases. If the knowing
submission of false evidence constituted a double jeopardy violation, then the due process analysis
would be superfluous. While double jeopardy bars a second proceeding, under the Mooney analysis a
due process violation results in a new trial. Would a court choose one remedy over the other based on
how egregious it perceived the violation? That hardly seems in keeping with Kennedy's ostensibly
clear statement that prosecutorial misconduct violates double jeopardy only when there is objective
evidence of intent to provoke the defendant's mistrial motion. Moreover, double jeopardy does not
involve a choice of remedies. Either the defendant's Fifth Amendment right was violated, in which
case no further proceedings are permitted, or they were not and the government can proceed with its
prosecution. While Nelson hints at a double jeopardy protection tied to prosecutorial misconduct, it
does not appear that one could be recognized without distorting the Kennedy analysis and grafting the
double jeopardy remedy onto what is essentially a due process violation.
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Can prosecutorial misconduct that does not meet Kennedy's objective
intent test trigger the double jeopardy protection and bar a retrial? Recent
state supreme court decisions have held that prosecutorial misconduct during
trial constitutes a double jeopardy violation under the state constitutions even
when there was no objective proof of the prosecutor's intent to goad the
defendant to seek a mistrial to undermine the double jeopardy right In
Bauder v. State,3 85 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that "a
successive prosecution is jeopardy barred after declaration of a mistrial at the
defendant's request... when the prosecutor was aware but consciously
disregarded the risk that an objectionable event for which he was responsible
would require a mistrial at the defendant's request." 386 In Commonwealth v.
Smith,387 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court went a step further when it held
that "intentional prosecutorial misconduct designed to secure a conviction
through the concealment of exculpatory evidence" violated the defendant's
double jeopardy right.388 Smith did not condition the double jeopardy
protection on the grant of a mistrial on the defendant's motion, focusing only
on the prosecutor's intent in engaging in the misconduct that resulted in the
reversal of the conviction.
3 9
385. 921 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en bane).
386. Id. at 699. A student commentator has criticized Bauder on the ground that this broader
standard "needlessly places too much importance on the rights of the criminal defendant at the expense
of the public's interest in the fair administration of justice." Michael V. Young, Note, Double
Jeopardy and Defendant's Request for Mistrial: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Finds Prosecutor s
Intent No Longer Critical: Prosecutor Should Have Known, 27 TE. TECH L. REv. 1631, 1631-32
(1996).
387. 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992).
388. Id. at 322. In addition to Pennsylvania and Texas, the state supreme courts in Oregon and
Arizona have adopted a prosecutorial misconduct standard for a double jeopardy violation under their
state constitutions. The Oregon Supreme Court's decision came in response to the remand of Kennedy.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Oregon court of appeals in State v. Kennedy,
657 P.2d 717 (1982), affirmed the defendant's conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the state constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial "when improper official
conduct is so prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial, and ifthe
official knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial and either intends or is indifferent to the
resulting mistrial or reversal." State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1326 (Or. 1983). The Arizona
Supreme Court adopted a similar test under the Arizona Constitution's double jeopardy provision in
Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261, 271-72 (Ariz. 1984). See Cynthia C. Person, Note,
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Double Jeopardy: Should States Broaden Double Jeopardy Protection
in Light of Oregon v. Kennedy?, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1699, 1709-14 (1991) (reviewing Oregon and
Arizona standards for double jeopardy violation based on prosecutorial misconduct that caused a
defendant to request a mistrial).
389. The Connecticut Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals have recognized a
defendant's right to raise double jeopardy as a bar to retrial in the absence of a successful mistrial
motion. See State v. Colton, 663 A.2d 339, 346 (Conn. 1995).
Kennedy logically should be extended to bar a new trial, even in the absences of a mistrial or
reversal because of prosecutorial misconduct, if the prosecutor in the first trial engaged in
misconduct with the intent 'to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed at the time was
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The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted a far-reaching extension of the
double jeopardy right to prevent a retrial after prosecutoial misconduct
affected the first proceeding in State v. Breit.'90 Interpreting the state
constitution's double jeopardy protection, the court held that a second trial
was prohibited
when improper official conduct is so unfairly prejudicial to the
defendant that it cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial or a
motion for a new trial, and if the official knows that the conduct is
improper and prejudicial, and if the official either intends to provoke a
mistrial or acts in willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or
reversal.
391
The rationale for extending the double jeopardy protection to all instances
of serious prosecutorial misconduct during trial was that "fi]f the
prosecutor's conduct demonstrates willful disregard of the defendant'b right
to a fair trial, then a second trial is barred. 3 92 The trial court found the
prosecutor's actions at trial to be "out of control" and highly prejudicial to
likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct
Id. at 346 (quoting United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir. 1992)); State v. White, 354
S.E.2d 324, 329 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) ("In our view, the better reasoned arguments support the broader
test that includes bad faith prosecutorial overreaching or harassment aimed at prejudicing the
defendant's chances for acquittal, whether in the current trial or a retrial."). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, on the other hand, refused to extend Bauder to cases in which the defendant did not
successfully move for a mistrial, holding that its prior decision "applies only where a mistrial has been
granted due to reckless or intentional prosecutorial misconduct." Ex parte Davis, 957 S.W.2d 9, 14
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en bane).
As for the federal courts, in United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1992), the Second
Circuit noted in dictum that:
if any extension of Kennedy beyond the mistrial context is warranted, it would be a bar to retrial
only where the misconduct of the prosecutor is undertaken, not simply to prevent an acquittal, but
to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of
his misconduct.
Id. at 916. In United States v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit applied its
Wallach analysis but found that the prosecutor had not engaged in misconduct deliberately to vitiate
the possibility of a perceived likely acquittal. Id. at 1475. The Seventh Circuit appeared to reject
Wallach in United States v. Doyle, 121 F.3d 1078 (7th Cir. 1997), noting that the only prosecutorial
intent that can trigger the double jeopardy protection is "the prosecution's intent to abort the trial." Id.
at 1086. Yet, in United States v. Catton, 130 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 1997), Chief Judge Posner, writing for
a different panel, noted that "tihe need for such a rule [like Wallach's] is easily seen," but stated that
"[w]e need not bite the bullet in this case" because there was not a sufficient factual basis to find a
double jeopardy violation even under Wallach's analysis. Id. at 806-07. See also United States v.
McAleer, 138 F.3d 852, 856 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that post-trial order setting aside conviction and
ordering a new trial was not the "functional equivalent" of a mistrial, and therefore "the mistrial
exception for prosecutorial misconduct set forth in Kennedy simply does not apply").
390. 930 P.2d 792 (N.M. 1996).
391. Id. at 803.
392. Id. at 804-05.
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the defendant, and the New Mexico Supreme Court noted that his
misconduct was "pervasive and outrageous."
The prosecutor's conduct in Breit was certainly reprehensible, 394 worthy
of not only the extensive criticism it drew from the New Mexico Supreme
Court, but also a disciplinary proceeding by the state bar. The court's double
jeopardy analysis, however, is questionable. As an initial matter, the
unfairness of the first trial should not trigger the double jeopardy protection,
which prohibits a second proceeding regardless of the conduct of the original
proceeding. Most successful appeals arising from problems during trial in
one way or another involve a finding that the trial was unfair, i.e. the
defendant was prejudiced, whether through the improper admission or
exclusion of evidence, faulty legal rulings that affected the outcome, or
violation of a constitutional protection. Indeed, the harmless error rule
involves an assessment of the fairness of the trial to determine the reliability
of the jury's verdict. If the error was not harmless, then the remedy for an
unfair trial is a new one, free from the legal errors that undermined the
reliability of the conviction in the first proceeding. The court in Breit
responded to the superficial allure of the double jeopardy remedy which
automatically prohibits a retrial, because the severity of the sanction appeared
to punish the prosecutor for his misconduct in a way that a new trial did not.
Yet, double jeopardy is neither another form of the due process protection
ensuring the propriety of the criminal trial nor a means to protect against
outrageous government conduct.395
Another troublesome aspect of Breit is that the defendant purposely
refrained from moving for a mistrial because, according to his counsel, he did
not want to undergo a second trial if the court granted the motion. According
393. Id. at 795, 805.
394. The trial court's findings, which the New Mexico Supreme Court attached as an appendix to
its opinion, summarized continuing misconduct by the prosecutor from the opening moments of the
trial through the closing argument, including "numerous statements expressing or implying his
personal belief in the guilt of the defendant, the veracity of the witnesses, and the competency and
honesty of opposing counsel." I
395. The New Mexico Supreme Court found that "[tihe unavoidable conclusion from such
egregious misconduct, is that the prosecutor was fully aware that his actions would deprive Breit of his
right to a fair trial." Id. at 806. In support of its analysis, the court cited only to a dissenting opinion by
Justice Douglas in Gor v. United Stae, 367 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1961). The Supreme Court has never
held that double jeopardy is a means of deterring prosecutorial misconduct, or that the policies
supporting the protection are a supplement to the due process clause for particularly nettlesome cases.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii followed Breit's analysis in State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 405 (Haw. 1999),
to prohibit on double jeopardy grounds a retrial after the prosecutor improperly referred to the
defendants race in the closing argument. L at 1237. The court held that under the Hawaii constitution
"reprosecution of a defendant after mistrial or reversal on appeal as a result of prosecutorial
misconduct is barred where the misconduct is so egregious that.., it clearly denied a defendant of his
or her right to a fair trial." Id- at 1249.
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to the trial judge and the New Mexico Supreme Court, if the defendant had
chosen to move for a mistrial, his motion should have been granted. The
rationale for the Kennedy rule is that defendants should not be allowed to
sandbag the trial court by awaiting the outcome of the first proceeding,
hoping for a not guilty verdict, and then seek to bar a second proceeding
under double jeopardy on the ground that the prosecutorial misconduct
tainted the conviction. Breit thus makes double jeopardy a facet of every
appeal in which a defendant can allege that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct. Moreover, the New Mexico Supreme Court should have
considered the negligence of the trial judge in failing to control the
prosecutor or declare a mistrial; all of the misconduct occurred in open court.
Indeed, the trial judge lamented her own failure to control the proceeding and
noted that she did not grant a mistrial because it "would have wreaked havoc
on the court's calendar and budget
' 396
In Jorn, the Supreme Court endorsed the concept that judicial negligence
in granting a mistrial could result in a double jeopardy violation because that
decision took away the defendant's right to have the jury he picked decide
his guilt. Breit overlooked both the defendant's decision not to move for a
mistrial and the trial judge's failure to declare a mistrial, which protected,
perhaps erroneously, the defendant's interest in having the first jury decide
his guilt 397 The detestable nature of the government's conduct in Breit was
similar to that in Sterba. The outrage of the courts, however, should not
affect the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The fact that a
prosecutor's conduct may be particularly appalling does not elevate the
misconduct to a double jeopardy violation unless a court is willing to find
that the government did not have sufficient evidence to convict the
defendant, and that therefore it must enter a verdict of acquittal. That finding,
not the court's judgment that a prosecutor engaged in deplorable conduct,
triggers the protections of the double jeopardy clause. The prosecutor's intent
396. Breit, 930 P.2d at 811.
397. The New Mexico Supreme Court may have relied on the state constitution's double jeopardy
protection to avoid having to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty
verdict. Under Lockhart v. Nelson, a court must consider improperly admitted evidence in determining
the validity of the first jury's decision, but that would not appear to include prejudicial arguments and
other forms of prosecutorial misconduct that are not evidence, even though they may affect the jury's
verdict. The Breit court avoided confronting the harder issue of whether there was sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty by making prosecutorial
misconduct the focal point of its analysis. If the court had to decide the case on the sufficiency of the
evidence, the burden of overturning the conviction would have fallen on the court and it could not shift
blame for dismissing a murder charge to the prosecutor. If the New Mexico Supreme Court was
concerned that the defendant might not be guilty, but was unable to conclude that no reasonable juror
could find the defendant guilty, then a retrial, not invocation of double jeopardy, was the proper
remedy for prosecutorial misconduct.
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or negligence should be irrelevant to the application of the double jeopardy
protection outside the limited scope described in Kennedy.
VI. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE PROBLEM OF REMEDY
Double jeopardy can be an attractive basis for policing prosecutors
because the resulting drastic remedy of dismissal is not, according to the
Supreme Court, open to any modification, so a court does not have to make
any hard decisions in craffing an appropriate remedy. In effect, a court can
blame the prosecutor and not have to defend the severity of the remedy,
which may let a guilty person go free, because its hands are tied by the
prosecutor's misconduct. If courts expand the double jeopardy protection
to encompass all types of prosecutorial misconduct, however, judicial inquiry
into the intent of the prosecutor may occur in any case in which a defendant
raises a plausible claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The state court
decisions extending double jeopardy beyond cases in which the defendant
successfully moved for a mistrial open a wide range of conduct to an inquiry
into prosecutorial intent Unlike the extension of double jeopardy to police
prosecutorial conduct at trial, the Kennedy rule makes it impossible to
sanction prosecutorial misconduct under the Double Jeopardy Clause unless
that action both causes a defendant to move for a mistrial and results in the
trial court granting the motion. If the prosecutorial misconduct does not come
to light until after trial, or if the trial judge erroneously denies the mistrial
motion, the only remedy under the Kennedy rule is to grant a new trial, which
is consistent with how the Court remedies other types of prosecutorial
misconduct
Given the severity of the remedy when a court both finds and sanctions
398. In State v. Lettice, 585 N.W.2d 171 (Wise. Ct. App. 1998), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal ofcharges on double jeopardy grounds because prosecutorial misconduct in filing
an unfounded criminal charge against the defense lawyer undermined the defense lawyer's ability to
defend the case. The court found a double jeopardy violation despite the defendant's failure to move
for a mistrial because the defendant was unaware of the effect of the prosecutor's misconduct until
after trial. See id. at 181. The court asserted that no reason existed for "differentiating prosecutorial
conduct motivated by a fear of an acquittal once the trial has started from a prosecutor's fear of the
same thing on the virtual eve of trial, who then undertakes a plan to undermine the scheduled trial
process." Id. at 179. The court overlooked one significant difference. Jeopardy had not attached at the
time of the prosecutor's misconduct, so the double jeopardy clause was not applicable to address the
claim. Taken to its logical extreme, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' position would mean that any
prosecutorial misconduct prior to trial could, if sufficiently egregious, trigger the double jeopardy
protection so long as the defendant was not aware of the misconduct until after conviction. That
approach would turn the Double Jeopardy Clause into a type of extended due process protection
resulting in automatic dismissal of the charges rather than some more limited relief tailored to address
the harm from the violation.
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prosecutorial misconduct, one should expect that defendants will push hard
to raise prosecutorial misconduct claims only on appeal if courts do not
require a successful mistrial motion as the procedural trigger for the double
jeopardy analysis. The result will be to expand judicial inquiry into why
prosecutors acted as they did, and their responses will determine whether a
court grants a new trial or prohibits a retrial and frees the defendant.,99
Expansion of the double jeopardy protection to serve as a means to police a
broad range of prosecutorial misconduct increases the incentive for the
government to respond to judicial inquiry into prosecutorial motives in a
manner that will justify its conduct in the prior proceeding because the
dismissal remedy is so severe, at least compared to the grant of a new trial.
The Kennedy rule reflects the Supreme Court's reluctance to permit judicial
inquiry into prosecutorial intent except in very limited circumstances.
Even determining what constitutes prosecutorial misconduct is difficult.
As the Court noted in Mabry v. Johnson,400 "[t]he Due Process Clause is not
a code of ethics for prosecutors; its concern is with the manner in which
persons are deprived of their liberty."40 The struggle to find some
demarcation between what is and is not permissible prosecutorial conduct
sometimes degenerates into judicial second-guessing. 4° The Supreme Court
399. See United States v. Catton, 130 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[It would be a great burden
on the courts if every reversal traceable to a prosecution-induced error at trial gave rise to a Kennedy-
style inquest on the prosecutor's motives.").
400. 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
401. Id.at 5l.
402. The characterization of the government's actions may be important if prosecutorial
misconduct can rise to the level of a double jeopardy violation, which bars any further proceedings
against the defendant. In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court held that "if the
prosecutor's remarks were 'invited,' and did no more than respond substantially in order to 'right the
scale,' such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction." Id. at 12-13. If statements that "right
the scale," while improper standing alone, did not violate the defendant's due process rights, then they
could not be labeled as prosecutorial misconduct but just an excess of the adversary system all must
live with. In Darden v. Waintwight, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), the prosecutor's closing argument, which the
Court said "deserves the condemnation it has received from every court to review it," included, among
other things, calling the perpetrator an "animal," and indicating that only the death penalty would keep
the defendant from committing similar acts in the future. Id. at 180 & nn. 9-12. While deploring the
prosecutor's statements, the Court agreed with the lower courts that "the prosecutorial argument, in the
context of the facts and circumstances of this case, did not render petitioner's trial unfair-i.e., that it
was not constitutional error." Id. at 183 n.15. The Darden Court did not find the prosecutor's
comments harmless; indeed, the prosecutor intended the inflammatory comments to be harmful, and
they probably contributed to the guilty verdict. Rather, the Court emphasized the fact that "[m]uch of
the objectionable content was invited by or was responsive to the opening summation of the defense."
Id. at 182. In United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988) the Court adapted its "invited response"
doctrine to analyze a Fifth Amendment privilege claim based on the prosecutor's improper comment
on the defendant's failure to testify. In his closing argument, defense counsel contended that the
government had not given the defendant an opportunity to explain his actions. See Id. at 27. In rebuttal,
the prosecutor argued that the defendant "could have taken the stand and explained it to you, anything
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stated in Smith v. Phillips4 that "the touchstone of due process analysis in
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the
culpability of the prosecutor.' " Courts seeking to extend the Double
Jeopardy Clause really are responding to the broader problem of finding an
effective means to punish prosecutorial misconduct. There is no direct
constitutional remedy to eliminate the effect of prosecutorial misconduct if it
did not affect the fairness of a defendant's trial, and courts have not
formulated an adequate deterrent similar to the exclusionary rule, which at
least purports to rectify investigatory violations. If the sole, or even primary,
purpose of granting relief is to send a message to the government, then in
some cases the court gives a benefit to the defendant although he is guilty of
the underlying offense. Yet, focusing only on the harmfulness of the conduct
can mean that improper actions will be noticed but not otherwise dealt with
by the judicial system in the proceeding in which they occur. In most cases
involving prosecutorial misconduct, there is no vehicle in the original
proceeding to redress the government's action when it had no direct impact
he wants to." Id. at 28. Although it was a direct comment on the defendant's failure to testify, the
Court held that the prosecutor's statement "did not in the light of the comments by defense counsel
infringe upon respondent's Fifth Amendment rights." Id. at 31. The Court was not determining
whether the comment was harmless, but rather the threshold issue of whether the prosecutor's
statement even rose to the level of a constitutional violation.
Whether the prosecutor's comments violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment right should not
depend on the subjective intent of the prosecutor in making the comment, but on the effect of the
statement on the fairness of the trial. In United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1997), the
Fifth Circuit stated that a "prosecutor's remarks constitute impermissible comment on a defendant's
right not to testify, if the prosecutor's manifest intent was to comment on the defendant's silence or if
the character of the remark was such that the jury would naturally and necessarily construe it as a
comment on the defendant's silence." Id. at 396. While the latter proposition, regarding the effect on
the jury, is unassailable, the court's reference to the prosecutor's "manifest intent" was misguided.
Whether or not a prosecutor intends to bring the defendant's silence before a jury is irrelevant to
determining, first, whether in fact the statement referred to the defendant's failure to testify, and
second, whether that reference prejudiced the defendant by rendering the proceeding unfair. A wholly
innocent reference to a defendant's silence is as much of a Fifth Amendment violation as a calculated
effort to call the jury's attention to the fact that a defendant did not testify. Similarly, a prosecutor who
endeavors to subtly raise the defendant's silence, but was too subtle to make the point with sufficient
clarity to prejudice the defendant, has not violated the Fifth Amendment regardless of the presence of
an improper intent.
The Supreme Court's invited response analysis for reviewing prosecutorial statements at trial
means that the conduct of one advocate in response to the zealous representation of an opponent can
fall within the parameters of acceptable advocacy. If these responsive comments do not constitute
prosecutorial misconduct, then no matter how much courts might castigate the government for its
conduct, the improper comments cannot serve as the sole basis of a due process or double jeopardy
violation. Prosecutorial intent should be irrelevant to determining whether the defendant's rights were
violated by misconduct occurring during trial. The prosecutor's entire focus as an advocate at trial is to
secure a conviction, so prosecutorial intent to prejudice a defendant is axiomatic.
403. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
404. Id. at 219.
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on the fairness of the process.
The question of remedy in prosecutorial misconduct cases is further
complicated by the almost complete unavailability of civil redress against a
prosecutor.405 In Imbler v. Pachtman,4"6 the Supreme Court held that
prosecutors were absolutely immune for their actions that were "intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."4°7 The Court
noted that effective checks on the prosecutor aside from civil liability
included possible criminal prosecution for willful acts and professional
discipline.4 °8
While most prosecutorial acts are absolutely immune, certain conduct
may subject the prosecutor to civil liability. In divining the line between the
prosecutor's role as an advocate and his role as an ordinary governmental
official, the Court held in Burns v. Reed 09 that a prosecutor giving legal
advice to the police received only qualified immunity, and, in Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons,41 refused to recognize absolute immunity for prosecutors who
allegedly made false statements at a press conference announcing the return
of an indictment. In Kalina v. Fletcher, its most recent decision on absolute
prosecutorial immunity,4" the Court held that a prosecutor could not be sued
over her preparation of a criminal information, motion for an arrest warrant,
and certification of probable cause, all of which allegedly were based on
false information.41
2
Imbler provides a good example of how the doctrine of absolute
immunity protects from civil liability even prosecutorial conduct that is
subject to constitutional constraint The plaintiff in Imbler alleged that the
405. See Anthony Meier, Note, Prosecutorial Immunity: Can § 1983 Provide an Effective
Deterrent to Prosecutorial Misconduct?, 30 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1167, 1168 (1998) ("Victims of
prosecutorial abuse often lack options for redressing the wrongs done to them. They can seek criminal
punishment or professional discipline of the prosecutor, or bring a civil suit. However, the
wrongdoer's fellow prosecutors and the local bar are not likely to provide an adequate remedy.").
406. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
407. Id. at 430. The Court based its analysis on the contrast between the prosecutor's role as an
advocate for the state, which is protected by absolute immunity, and those prosecutorial activities
related to the investigative or administrative role that would not necessarily be protected by absolute
immunity. Id. at 430-31.
408. Id. at 429. Unlike prosecutors, the police and other executive officers receive only qualified
immunity for their actions, which means that they are protected from civil liability "insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
409. 500 U.S. 478 (1991).
410. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
411. 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997).
412. Ka at 509. The prosecutor's personal testimony regarding the veracity of the certification,
however, meant she was only protected by qualified immunity because the prosecutor no longer acted
as an advocate for the government, but as a complaining witness. Id.
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prosecutor wrongfully commenced the case, knowingly introduced false
testimony at trial, and withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense, all
violations of the plaintiffs constitutional rights in the criminal proceeding.
413
Even though the prosecutor may have acted improperly, the Imbler Court
imposed an absolute bar on bringing a civil action based on constitutional
violations that occur during a judicial proceeding. As the Court noted in
Kalina, its decisions since Imbler "have confirmed the importance to the
judicial process of protecting the prosecutor when serving as an advocate in
judicial proceedings. ' '414 While Imbler has been criticized, and recent cases
have cut back somewhat the prosecutor's absolute immunity, the core
protection remains largely intact by shielding the vast majority of
prosecutorial conduct from subsequent civil claims, even for those wrongful
acts done intentionally.4 15 The only avenue available for most defendants,
therefore, is to claim that the government violated their rights in pursuing the
case, and to seek a direct remedy in the criminal prosecution.416
413. 424U.S. at415-16.
414. 118 S. Ct. 502, 507. The Court noted that absolute immunity protected the prosecutor's
actions as an advocate for most of what she did:
[F]or her drafting of the certification, her determination that the evidence was sufficiently strong to
justify a probable-cause finding, her decision to file charges, and her presentation of the
information and the motion to the court. Each of those matters involved the exercise of
professional judgment; indeed, even the selection of the particular facts to include in the
certification to provide the evidentiary support for the finding of probable cause required the
exercise of the judgment of the advocate.
Id. at 509-10. What it did not cover was her testimony regarding the truth of the facts contained in the
certification, "[n]o matter how brief or succinct it may be." Id. at 510.
415. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 ("We have not retreated ... from the principle that acts
undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation ofjudicial proceedings or for trial, and which
occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute
immunity.").
416. Congress recently adopted a provision known as the Hyde Amendment that permits
defendants acquitted in federal prosecutions to sue for their attorneys fees and other litigation expenses
"where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith."
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, § 617, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A) (1994). The Conference
Report for the section states that a grand jury finding of probable cause does not insulate the
government from an award under the provision. H.R. REP. No. 105-405 (1997). On the other hand,
one of the first decisions construing the provision pointed out that "acquittal alone does not
automatically entitle [a plaintiff] to compensation under the statutory scheme. The Court is required to
look beyond the fact that the defendant prevailed, and determine whether the Government acted
reasonably in its decision to prosecute." United States v. Troisi, 13 F. Supp.2d 595, 597 (N.D. W. Va.
1998). While the Hyde Amendment does not make the individual prosecutor liable, it will provide
defendants found not guilty with an avenue to challenge the government's decision to pursue charges,
and any prosecutorial misconduct during the course of trial may be relevant evidence to a finding that
the government pursued its case in bad fiith.
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
A. Are Due Process and Double Jeopardy Interchangeable?
Some courts have tried to avoid the problem of prescribing an acceptable
remedy for prosecutorial misconduct by analogizing it to conduct that
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Double jeopardy does not weigh the
defendant's guilt for the underlying offense, or yield a remedy less than a
complete prohibition on a second proceeding by the same sovereign. Even if
the Double Jeopardy Clause cannot be stretched to cover a particular type of
prosecutorial misconduct, that has not foreclosed defendants from requesting
a remedy identical to one granted for a violation of that constitutional
protection: the dismissal of the indictment and a prohibition on further
prosecution. Can the fact of prosecutorial misconduct alone trigger dismissal
of a case and bar future proceedings against the defendant for the underlying
conduct, a result similar to a double jeopardy violation, without having to
meet the requirements of that provision?
For some due process violations caused by prosecutorial misconduct, the
Supreme Court has mentioned dismissal of the case as a potential remedy,
although it has never had to discuss the rationale for such a result. For
example, it is certainly possible that if the government intentionally
destroyed evidence that it knows would have been probative of the
defendant's innocence, then dismissal of the indictment would be the likely
remedy under Trombetta and Youngblood. That remedy, however, would be
contingent on a showing of substantial prejudice, without which there would
be no constitutional violation. When a defendant has not been prejudiced
specifically by the prosecutorial misconduct, or if a second trial could be
conducted fairly, it is not clear why a court should order dismissal of the
charges based solely on the prosecutor's misconduct that prohibits any
determination of guilt for the charge, regardless of the defendant's actual
culpability. Relief that is not responsive to the direct prejudice arising from a
violation, or that can be granted regardless of the ability to cure a defect by
ordering a second proceeding, appears to furnish a windfall to defendants
without any real gain to the criminal justice system. 17
417. See Kades, supra note 10, at 1490 (defining "windfalls" as gains "independent of work,
planning, or other productive activities that society wishes to reward."). Professor Amar characterizes
the remedy of dismissal with prejudice as a type of exclusionary rule, "but one designed to protect
innocence." Amar, supra note 237, at 672. He criticizes applying the dismissal remedy outside the
context of those violations in which the defendant's ability to prove his innocence is seriously
jeopardized, arguing that in other contexts dismissing a case with prejudice is an "upside-down
exclusion" and that "[p]recisely because this [remedy] seems so perverse, as nonlawyers intuit, it's
convenient and comforting for lawyers to tell themselves that the Constitution compels this, and that
there is no other way." Id. at 674-75.
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The Supreme Court recognized that the remedy for a double jeopardy
violation may give a defendant an unearned benefit, but was willing to
tolerate that result in order to vindicate the underlying policies of the
constitutional protection. For a vindictive prosecution claim, the remedy
granted is identical to that for a double jeopardy violation, although courts
have not considered why that remedy is appropriate if the defendant has not
been prejudiced in the conduct of the criminal proceeding. Much like a
defendant making a double jeopardy claim, a defendant alleging that he was
subjected to vindictive prosecution does not dispute his guilt in raising the
claim, yet seeks to have the charges dismissed and further prosecution
barred. His challenge concerns the process of choosing the particular
defendant or the decision to file increased charges after his assertion of a
right, not the factual basis for the prosecution418 The relief ordered in the two
successful Supreme Court vindictive prosecution cases was reversal of the
conviction and dismissal of the higher charge, to which the presumption of
vindictiveness applied.41 9 Barring the higher charges in a vindictive
prosecution case is appealing because they were the product of a
constitutional violation, triggered by the presumption of vindictiveness
regardless of whether there was any actual vindictiveness.
The Court's opinions in the cases successfully asserting improper
vindictiveness imply that due process and double jeopardy are
interchangeable, or at least not materially different In North Carolina v.
Pearce,42° the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the
increased sentence imposed after a successful appeal violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause, holding that the reversal of the first conviction "wiped
clean" the slate and permitted imposition of a penalty after the second trial.421
The Court found that due process limited the judge's discretion to impose the
higher sentence, but that result was much less restrictive than the absolute bar
to a higher sentence that double jeopardy would have required. Blacidedge v.
418. In Armstrong, the Court noted that "[a] selective prosecution claim is not a defense on the
merits to the criminal charge itselt but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the
charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,463. The
same holds true of a vindictive prosecution claim because the argument is that the government violated
the Due Process Clause, not that the defendant is innocent of the greater crime.
419. The cases to which I refer are Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984) and Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Although the cases did not address whether the government could
prosecute on the original charges without violating the defendant's due process rights, this would
appear to be permissible.
420. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
421. l at 721 ("A new trial may result in an acquittal. But if it does result in a conviction, we
cannot say that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy of its own weight restricts the
imposition of an otherwise lawful single punishment for the offense in question.").
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Perry, which adopted Pearce's prophylactic rule for prosecutors seeking
increased charges after a successful appeal, similarly rejected double
jeopardy as the basis for the restriction on improper vindictiveness, relying
instead on the Due Process Clause to supply the constitutional basis for the
decision. Nevertheless, Blacldedge's application of the due process
protection had the same effect as if the Court had found a double jeopardy
violation.
The Court's flat rule that an appearance of vindictiveness protected the
defendant from increased charges for the same offense forced the
government to live with its initial charging decision, much as double
jeopardy limits the prosecution to the result of the first proceeding in which
jeopardy attached. Indeed, it is questionable whether the Court saw any
difference between due process and double jeopardy in Thigpen v.
Roberts,422 in which it applied Blackledge to reverse a conviction after a
second trial on more serious charges. The defendant sought a trial de novo in
the circuit court after a guilty verdict in a justice of the peace court for
misdemeanors arising from a fatal accident, and the government then
indicted him on felony manslaughter charges.423 The Fifth Circuit reversed
the second conviction on double jeopardy grounds and barred prosecution on
the higher charges.424 The Supreme Court reached the same result, but
affirmed the lower court decision under Blackledge's due process analysis
rather than applying the double jeopardy protection to bar the second
prosecution for the same offense.425 Thigpen insinuated that the lower court's
decision was a "right result but wrong analysis," although the Court never
discussed why the remedy for a due process violation should be identical to
the relief for double jeopardy.
There is an important distinction between due process and double
jeopardy claims, at least from a procedural point of view. In Abney v. United
States, 6 the Court recognized the right of a defendant to pursue an
interlocutory appeal of a denial of a double jeopardy claim because "if a
criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to double jeopardy and thereby enjoy
the full protection of the Clause, his double jeopardy challenge to the
422. 468 U.S. 27 (1984).
423. Id. at 30-31. The Court noted that the Mississippi two-tier trial court system at issue in
Roberts was "essentially identical" to the North Carolina scheme at issue in both Pearce and
Blacdedge. Id. at 30.
424. 693 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1982), a]f'd468 U.S. 27 (1984).
425. Thigpen, 468 U.S. at 30. Justice Rehnquist dissented, noting that the Court's grant of
certiorari was to review the double jeopardy issue and assailing the majority's alternative analysis as
an "unexampled bit of procedural footwork." Id. at 33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
426. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
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indictment must be reviewable before that subsequent exposure occurs.' 27
For a vindictive prosecution claim, however, the Court rejected an
interlocutory appeal despite the apparent similarity after Thigpen between
due process and double jeopardy. In United States v. Hollywood Motor Car
Company,428 the Court held that only those constitutional protections that
incorporate a right not to be tried, such as double jeopardy, can be appealed
prior to a conviction, while rights that permit a remedy involving dismissal of
charges can be vindicated after a trial and therefore cannot be appealed prior
to trial.429 The Court found that denial of the defendant's vindictive
prosecution claim, which involved due process but not double jeopardy,
could not be appealed before trial on the merits because "[t]he right asserted.
.. is simply not one that must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at
all. , 4
30
Rather than being interchangeable, due process appears to be a type of
fall-back position to a double jeopardy claim, available to a defendant who
cannot meet the requirements of double jeopardy but who can show that the
prosecutor acted improperly. By postponing appellate review and requiring a
defendant to go to trial despite the possibility of vindictiveness before that
proceeding, Hollywood Motor Car makes prejudice to the defendant from the
misconduct a key component of the analysis; otherwise, why delay deciding
whether actions taken before trial violated a defendant's constitutional right
not to be charged with those crimes? Prosecutorial misconduct, standing
alone, would not empower a court to dismiss an indictment unless the
misconduct had a direct impact on the propriety of the underlying charges or
the fairness of the criminal proceeding. Therefore, due process and double
jeopardy are fundamentally different despite instances in which the remedy is
identical. Although the defendant in Hollywood Motor Car advanced a
plausible due process claim that the increased charges were constitutionally
impermissible, the Court rejected an interlocutory appeal so as not to delay a
trial on otherwise valid charges, regardless of whether they were the product
of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
After Hollywood Motor Car, the only instance in which prosecutorial
misconduct that violates due process should result in dismissal of an
427. Id. at 662.
428. 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (per curiam).
429. Id at 269 ("This holding reflects the crucial distinction between a right not to be tried and a
right whose remedy requires the dismissal of charges. The former necessarily falls into the category of
rights that can be enjoyed only if vindicated prior to trial. The latter does not"). In addition to double
jeopardy, the Court in Hollywood Motor Car noted that the right to reasonable bail and the immunity
conferred under the Speech and Debate Clause are subject to interlocutory appeals. Id. at 265-66.
430. Id. at 270.
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indictment and a bar on further proceedings before trial is when, but for the
prosecutorial misconduct, there would have been no probable cause to charge
the defendant. In that circumstance, the real problem is the insufficiency of
the evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct is secondary to the lack of
credible evidence to charge the defendant Prosecutorial misconduct may
explain why a court dismissed the case, but such a finding, without reference
to any prejudice to the defendant from the misconduct, should not result in
dismissal of the charges. If the prosecutorial misconduct did not violate any
other right of the defendant, and if there was probable cause to indict, then
after Hollywood Motor Car it is not clear why dismissal of the indictment
would be appropriate to redress prosecutorial misconduct if the relief would
prevent the government from trying the defendant on otherwise valid
charges. A due process violation caused by prosecutorial misconduct is not a
violation of a right not to be tried, unlike a double jeopardy violation, so any
assessment of whether there was a violation should incorporate consideration
of prejudice to the defendant. Hollywood Motor Car effectively limits, at
least before trial, the remedy of dismissal of the indictment and prohibition of
further proceedings to violations of the Double Jeopardy Clause, unless
prosecutorial misconduct made the criminal charges invalid.
If prosecutorial misconduct should not prevent a defendant from being
tried unless the charges were unsupported by probable cause, what rationale
supports the dismissal of charges in vindictive prosecution cases? In such
cases, the government's evidence is generally sufficient to prove the
elements of the accused's crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and indeed,
defendants generally do not contest the validity of the proof when raising a
constitutional claim. The rationale for dismissing such charges appears to be
the link between the government's improper motivation and the filing of
charges that prosecutors and investigators should not be permitted to give
vent to retaliatory intentions. A remedy may then appear to have some
deterrent value in discouraging prosecutors from acting in response to the
defendant's legitimate assertion of rights.431
431. In seeking higher charges on retrial, the prosecutor stands to lose only the added punishment
the new or increased charges would bring, so prosecutors may feel that they can risk seeking the added
counts, hoping that they can convince the judge not to apply a presumption of vindictiveness. In
United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242 (D.C. Cir.), affden bane sub nom. Bartlett v. Bowen, 824 F.2d
1240 (1987), the D.C. Circuit made this point in affirming the dismissal of all charges due to
prosecutorial vindictiveness after the government dropped the added counts because otherwise "the
prosecutor will have nothing to lose by acting vindictively ... [and] the government's position, if
accepted, would remove the deterrent effect of the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness." Id. at
1249. Dismissing all charges, and not just those tainted by vindictiveness, would certainly have a
deterrent effect on prosecutors, but does this remedy relate to the violation at issue? The logic of
Meyer would be compelling if the remedy served to keep prosecutors from acting with a retaliatory
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This returns us to the question of why courts should dismiss charges when
a defendant presumably can still receive a fair trial. The reason simply may
be that no other remedy is available to correct a due process violation. Unlike
violations that invoke the exclusionary rule, prosecutorial misconduct usually
does not taint any evidence, so the remedy of exclusion is unavailable to
permit a trial on the charges while providing real relief from the violation.
43 2
The Supreme Court did not discuss any rationale for dismissing the increased
charges in BlacIdedge v. Perry and merely substituted due process for double
jeopardy in Thigpen v. Roberts as the basis for granting relief from the higher
charges.
While dismissing charges and barring reprosecution has a visceral appeal
because it removes the "taint" of prosecutorial misconduct in vindictive
prosecution cases, it is not clear that a court should grant the same relief for a
selective prosecution violation. In Armstrong, the Court stated in a footnote
that "[w]e have never determined whether dismissal of the indictment, or
some other sanction, is the proper remedy if a court determines that a
defendant has been the victim of prosecution on the basis of his race. iA
33
Although earlier selective prosecution cases dismissed charges against
deendants 4 34 the lower courts never discussed the appropriateness of the
motivation because freeing the defendant from all charges imposes a substantial cost on society that
prosecutors would not care to see happen. For that remedy to really work, however, a judicial finding
of the prosecutor's actual motive in responding to the defendant's assertion of a right would be
necessary. Permitting this remedy when there is only a presumption of vindictiveness may not provide
any actual deterrence if the prosecutor did not have the intent that the remedy seeks to thwart. The
presumption can operate even in the absence of actual vindictiveness because the Supreme Court has
made inquiry into the prosecutor's actual intent irrelevant. Allowing the dismissal of all charges has a
more direct deterrent effect when there is proof of actual vindictiveness, but should not necessarily be
the remedy when the court finds only that a presumption of vindictiveness applies.
432. The proposition that the exclusionary rule should be the primary remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations has been criticized, in part because it is not an effective deterrent to
investigatory misconduct. See Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. Cr.
REv. 49, 56 (calling the exclusionary rule "an exceptionally crude deterrent device. It is not merely
crude; to the extent obeyed, it systematically over deters, because it imposes social costs that are
greatly disproportionate to the actual harm to lawful interests from unreasonable searches and
seizures."). My point is that, regardless of the desirability of the exclusionary rule, it does provide a
uniform remedy for violations of constitutional rights in the investigatory stage of a case.
433. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 n.2 (1996). The district court dismissed the
indictment before trial, so there had been no determination of guilt or innocence before the dismissal.
See Karlan, supra note 299, at 2004 ("his footnote captures the ambivalence of the Court in trying to
articulate remedies for equal protection violations in the criminal procedure context.").
434. See United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (reversing conviction); United
States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1972) (reversing conviction); United States v. Robinson,
311 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (dismissing indictment before trial). In United States v. Falk, 479
F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (on banc), the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for a hearing to determine
whether the government's motivation in charging the defendant was improper-this hearing would
give the defendant the opportunity to question the Assistant United States Attorney. Id. at 623. None of
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remedy.435 Unlike a vindictive prosecution, dismissing the charges in a
selective prosecution case also should preempt any prosecution by the same
sovereign.436 While the remedy is quite similar to that available under the
Double Jeopardy Clause, a dismissal of charges can mean that the defendant
will never be prosecuted because the selective prosecution claim is one that
will arise before trial.
Dismissing all charges without the possibility of reindictinent imposes an
enormous cost on society. The problem in a selective prosecution case is
finding a remedy, short of outright dismissal, that will address the underlying
constitutional violation. Equal protection is one of the sacred principles of
American society, and its violation calls for a strong response. One can argue
that a remedy to deter prosecutors from acting on illicit racial or sexual biases
is the only means of advancing the Equal Protection Clause. Unlike a
vindictive prosecution, where society arguably wants a measure of retaliation
but not a motive that is too suspect, there is no basis for permitting
discrimination of any type. But dismissing all charges for an impermissible
selective prosecution to deter prosecutorial misconduct encounters the same
problem as a Batson violation: the court imposes a remedy without regard to
any harm done to the defendant. Perhaps the systemic harm in such a case
justifies such a result, but dismissing charges with prejudice is hard to defend
when potentially guilty defendants are freed from any possibility of
conviction because of governmental actions that were largely irrelevant to the
criminality of the underlying conduct and will not affect the fairness of a
trial.
While a Batson violation requires only a new trial even though those
harmed were the broad group of potential jurors and not necessarily the
defendant, dismissal for selective prosecution is a draconian remedy that
the cases that found a constitutional violation in the selection of the defendant for prosecution
discussed whether the government could refile the charges after further review, or whether a different
sovereign could bring a prosecution for the same conduct.
435. See Clymer, supra note 140, at 736 ("If a less draconian remedy [than dismissal] was
available, courts might be more willing to review charging decisions."). Consonant with his proposed
rationality review of federal charges when there are parallel state provisions available, Professor
Clymer advocates remedying violations of equal protection in the decision to pursue a federal
prosecution by granting defendants the same procedural and sentencing rights that a defendant in the
state system would receive. Id. at 737.
436. I limit the effect of the remedy to the same sovereign because under double jeopardy
principles a different sovereign, such as another state or the federal government, could pursue identical
charges in its own criminal justice system without violating the defendant's double jeopardy rights.
See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (successive prosecutions for same kidnapping and murder
by different states did not violate double jeopardy). It is not clear, however, whether a case brought by
a different sovereign after a finding of selective prosecution would be subject to the same assertion of
an equal protection violation.
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bestows on a defendant a windfall regardless of that person's guilt. Given the
almost insurmountable hurdles to establishing a selective prosecution claim
erected by Armstrong, perhaps the Supreme Court would require dismissal of
the charges because evidence of improper bias would have to be so
compelling for a successful claim. As a practical matter, dismissal may be the
only remedy, but as a matter of constitutional law, it is hard to justify
permitting that result for a defendant who disputes the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, not his culpability.
B. Sanctioning Prosecutors Directly
Ordering a particular form of relief, such as dismissal of an indictment,
may be a practical necessity in a selective prosecution case, because there
appears to be no reasonable alternative for such a serious constitutional
violation. Dismissal of charges, however, should not be available simply to
deter prosecutorial misconduct. Courts should not rely on granting a
particular defendant relief to serve as a check on future prosecutorial actions
in other cases except to the extent necessary to vindicate a specific
constitutional protection breached by the prosecutorial misconduct. If a
court's goal is to send a message to prosecutors, the message should not be
communicated by granting a defendant relief without consideration of the
harm that the misconduct caused to the defendant. The constitutional
protections belong to individuals, not to courts for use as a means to police
the conduct of prosecutors. While deterrence of misconduct may be an
appealing rationale for dismissing a case, no constitutional basis exists for
employing a remedy to address an institutional problem that did not result in
an unfair proceeding or an unsupported verdict.43
7
437. In the absence of a specific constitutional violation, the Supreme Court has admonished
lower courts that dismissing an indictment under the supervisory power of the judiciary is
inappropriate if the purpose is only to chastise prosecutors and not to correct a harm to the defendant.
See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506-07 (1983). Professor Steele asserts that prosecutorial
misconduct is "pervasive," yet notes that "no practical way has yet been found to measure the
frequency of prosecutorial misconduct, except to rely upon impressions gained from the volume of
appellate opinions and the language contained therein as to the frequency of such misconduct." Steele,
supra note 10, at 970. Professor Jonakait claims that prosecutorial misconduct is rampant and in large
part hidden because prosecutors act "unconsciously" in committing violations. See Randolph J.
Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRiM. L. BULL. 550, 562-63 (1987). See also Rona
Feinburg, Note, The Second Circuit Reacts to Prosecutorial Misconduct: United States v. Modica, 49
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1245, 1245 n.1 (1983) (prosecutorial misconduct continues to "plague" the
Second Circuit). There are not a large number of reported cases in which prosecutorial misconduct that
did not violate a specific constitutional protection has been raised successfully, by which I mean the
court granted some remedy and not just that it admonished the prosecutor or applied the label
"prosecutorial misconduct" without taking additional action. An argument that such misconduct is
rampant must rely on the assumption that a great deal of improper action goes undiscovered. In order
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What remedies are available to curb prosecutorial misconduct? For
actions that take place in court, the trial judge has a number of alternatives
available, from a simple admonishment to the imposition of a contempt
citation upon the prosecutor.4 38 Appellate courts that conclude prosecutorial
misconduct tainted the lower court proceeding, even if it did not harm the
defendant sufficiently to overturn the conviction, can sanction the prosecutor
and inform the appropriate disciplinary authorities that the prosecutor acted
inappropriately. As members of the bar, government attorneys are subject to
disciplinary proceedings for misconduct that violates ethical rules of the
profession. In United States v. Wilson,439 the Eleventh Circuit noted that trial
courts do have some avenues to police prosecutorial misconduct: "(1)
to assert that prosecutorial misconduct is of such a degree that courts must stretch the constitutional
remedies to deter it, one must assume that because prosecutors do not want their transgressions
exposed, their wide-ranging discretion must also allow them to successfully hide many instances of
misconduct. The solution then flows from the assumption, that restricting prosecutorial discretion and
granting relief to defendants to deter future misconduct will eliminate actions assumed to be taking
place. Absent proof that more misconduct takes place than judges can detect, the rationale for limiting
prosecutorial discretion and granting relief without regard to harm to the defendant loses much of its
force.
It is easy to justify calling for increased judicial intervention, whether through the Due Process
Clause or courts' supervisory powers, by asserting that there must be more misconduct taking place
than has been publicly disclosed. There is another assumption that leads to a different conclusion, one
which is as unprovable as the one that posits widespread abuse based on the prosecutor's ability to
misuse the authority of the office. This different assumption is that the vast majority of "hidden"
prosecutorial misconduct, by which I mean misconduct that may be shielded from exposure by the
discretionary authority of the prosecutor's office, does eventually come to light. The basis for this
assumption is that prosecutors and investigatory agents are basically honest, which may account for
their choice of a career in law enforcement, and that they take seriously their obligation to uphold the
law, even if in certain instances they abuse their authority. Based on that assumption, one can infer that
attempts to keep information about prosecutorial misconduct secret are doomed to failure in most
cases because there is such strong personal and institutional pressure to act honestly. If this assumption
is correct, then there would be relatively few instances of prosecutorial misconduct that are not
eventually exposed.
There are cases in which serious prosecutorial misconduct has been exposed. For example, in
Illinois, three former prosecutors and four police officers were indicted for fabricating evidence used
to convict two defendants who were sentenced to death. See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecuting
Prosecutors, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 20, 1996, at 1. Sometimes, the very prosecutor accused of acting
improperly discloses the misconduct. In United States v. Horn, 811 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.H. 1992), the
court found that the lead prosecutor had committed serious misconduct in failing to seal documents
that disclosed defense counsel's work product. Despite requests from the defense lawyers and the
court's instructions not to review the documents, the lead prosecutor had the documents copied and
shown to a government witness. Id. at 741-44. The conduct came to light primarily through the lead
prosecutor's own disclosure regarding the continued use of the documents; there was no attempt to
cover up the improper use. Id. at 748-750.
438. In Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982 (1997), the Supreme Court reiterated its position
regarding the authority of trial judges to cite an attorney for contempt, noting that "[w]here misconduct
occurs in open court, the affront to the court's dignity is more widely observed, justifying summary
vindication." Id. at 988.
439. 149 F.3d 1298(11th Cir. 1998).
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contempt citations; (2) fines; (3) reprimands; (4) suspension from the court's
bar, (5) removal or disqualification from office; and (6) recommendations to
bar associations to take disciplinary action.""A4
0
As to the last option, however, commentators point out that the
professional disciplinary system has proved inadequate in addressing
prosecutorial misconduct"'4 Some have proposed changes to improve the
disciplinary system to address prosecutorial misconduct outside of the
particular case in which it arose. For example, Professor Meares made an
innovative proposal that would offer financial incentives for prosecutors to
structure their decisions and courtroom tactics to avoid misconduct and
exercise their discretion so as not to overcharge cases." 2 Others have argued
that the ethical rules should more specifically address the role of the
prosecutor as both a minister of justice and zealous advocate on behalf of a
client" 3 Recently, Congress adopted a provision that subjects all federal
440. Id. at 1304. The circuit court noted that "we want to make clear that improper remarks and
conduct in the future, especially if persistent, ought to result in direct sanctions against an offending
prosecutor individually." Id
441. See Meares, supra note 1, at 899 ("The practical reality is that few prosecutors are ever
disciplined by these regulatory entities."); Reiss, supra note 26, at 1432 ("[Flor the most part, ethical
guidelines are too general, too infrequently revised, and too rarely refined through actual application to
serve as the primary vehicles for delineating the constraints on prosecutorial activity."); Steele, supra
note 437, at 966 ("[B]ar grievance committees have paid scant attention to prosecutorial ethicality, and
consequently, prosecutors may have developed a sense of insulation from the ethical standards of other
lawyers.'); Zacharias, supra note 37, at 105 ("In trying to maintain the bar's professionalism,
discipliners naturally prefer to focus their limited resources on attorney misconduct driven by personal
self-interest or greed.").
442. Meares, supra note 1, at 901-02 ("Financial incentives could motivate prosecutors to behave
ethically. The hypothesis is simple: Rewarding prosecutors for behaving ethically will motivate them
to do so."). One potential weakness in Professor Meares' proposal is that appellate courts would have
to monitor prosecutorial performance to provide a basis for the financial rewards, a task that they may
be loath to accept.
443. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 927 (1996) ("New provisions are
necessary to assist the federal attorney in conforming her conduct to ethical standards and to further
the ends of truth-seeking in the investigation and the administration of justice."); Roberta K. Flowers,
What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63
Mo. L. REv. 699, 737 (1998) ("An ethical rule delineating the Appearance of Impropriety Standard
would allow courts to sanction, and disciplinary bodies to punish, prosecutorial conduct which appears
to be improper."); Zacharias, supra note 37, at 50 (offering a framework that "rulemakers can use to
develop more specific, coherent ethical rules" for prosecutorial conduct at trial); Paul M. Secunda,
Note, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of Sentencing Uniformity: Guiding the Discretion of Federal
Prosecutors Through the Use of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 AM. CRiM. L. REV.
1267, 1290 (1997) (proposing a new model rule to require prosecutors to disclose all information
relevant to sentencing of the defendant and "not to make [the] number of convictions or severity of
sentences the index of her effectiveness."); cf. Fisher, supra note 37, at 256 ("But if competent
prosecution demands the integration of personal values and professional skills, then prosecution
agencies must encourage prosecutors to reunite their personal and professional selves, which many
learned to separate as students.... A suitable program would involve recruitment, training, and
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prosecutors to the ethical rules of each state in which the attorney acts on
behalf of the federal government
4 4
Whether or not the system of professional discipline can control
prosecutorial misconduct adequately, the goal of deterring such misconduct
is best addressed outside the confines of a particular criminal prosecution. As
Professor Meares' proposal makes clear, policing the actions of prosecutors
must be done in ways in which the effect of misconduct is visited directly on
the malefactor. Constitutional remedies are il-suited for changing the
behavior of prosecutors because the consequences of granting relief are felt
only indirectly by the individual prosecutor. In those cases in which a
defendant cannot show any direct harm from the misconduct, only society
pays the price when courts grant remedies which make a conviction harder, if
not impossible, to achieve. On the other hand, a disciplinary proceeding need
not consider harm to the defendant, but look only at the broader issue of the
integrity of the judicial system and the need to uphold the rule of law. If a
message needs to be sent to a prosecutor, it must be transmitted directly and
not by the incidental means of granting relief to a defendant.
Judges sometimes protest that they are powerless to combat prosecutorial
misconduct if they cannot order the dismissal of charges, regardless of the
constitutional basis of that authority. Yet, when faced with prosecutorial
misconduct, some judges shy away from "naming names" and making it
clear that a particular prosecutor has violated the norms of a government
attorney. 45 For example, in United States v. Kojayan,4" the Ninth Circuit
found extensive and continuing prosecutorial misconduct, including
misrepresentations to the trial court by the Assistant United States Attorney.
After reversing the conviction, the circuit court remanded the case to the trial
court to consider whether to dismiss the indictment due to the severity of the
prosecutorial misconduct447 Yet, while the slip opinion reported the
prosecutor's name, the final version does not state who the miscreant was,
nor mention whether the court planned to refer the matter to disciplinary
reinforcement.").
444. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (1998). Congress adopted the provision, called the McDade Act, Pub. L.
105-277, § 801, in October, 1998, and the provision became effective on April 19, 1999. The law
overturns Department of Justice rules that exempted federal prosecutors from certain provisions of
state ethical rules concerning contacts with persons represented by counsel. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.2
(1998).
445. See Steele, supra note 10, at 977-78 ("Since reversing cases is such a dysfunctional way to
impose sanctions for unethical conduct, one cannot help but wonder why appellate courts, with their
inherent power over discipline, have not structured more formidable and sanction-specific remedies.").
446. 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993).
447. Id. at 1325.
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authorities.448 Why withhold the identity of a prosecutor the court found had
essentially lied to the trial judge and to the defense counsel and then tried to
cover up the misconduct?
All one takes from Kojayan is the impression that the defendants, who
may well be guilty of the crime, might see all charges dismissed while the
prosecutor who provoked such a result remains anonymous to the general
public and, perhaps, will be able to engage in misconduct in future cases that
could jeopardize otherwise meritorious prosecutions. The Supreme Court
noted in Imbler v. Pachtman that among the remedies available to control
prosecutorial misconduct is publicly naming the prosecutor who acted
improperly in a judicial opinion. Naming the prosecutor is such a simple tool,
yet the court in Koayan retreated from it, for no apparent reason and despite
misconduct that might trigger a remedy that punishes society by permitting a
guilty person to go free so the courts can send a message to a United States
Attorney's Office about how it should handle cases in the future.449
CONCLUSION
Prosecutorial misconduct is a serious problem whenever it occurs,
regardless of its frequency, and courts cannot shirk their duty to police it On
the other hand, as the Supreme Court has made clear, judges may not
exercise a chancellor's foot veto over the government by deciding how to
investigate a case, what charges to file, or what evidence to introduce to
prove the defendant's guilt. Within that delicate balance is the temptation to
make prosecutorial intent the focal point of judicial review, punishing those
prosecutors who act with bad intent While a tempting source of evidence,
inquiry into the actual motives of the prosecutor causes more harm thangood.450
448. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHiCS 473
(5th ed. 1998) ("In the original version of Kojayan, Judge Kozinski printed the name of the trial
assistant in the body of the opinion. Then he amended the opinion to eliminate the name.").
449. In United States v. Horn, 811 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.H. 1992), the District Court found that the
prosecutor engaged in grave misconduct by violating a defendant's work product privilege and then
using the information after the court instructed her not to. Id. at 742-43. The opinion, however, noted
at the outset that it had "been revised to eliminate the name of the lead prosecutor." Id. at 741 n.I.
Given the apparent seriousness of the violation, the trial court's unexplained decision not to name the
prosecutor seems to blunt the effect of its findings.
450. See Reiss, supra note 26, at 1434. As Professor Reiss has noted:
[E]ven if the prosecutor's disclaimer of any improper intent is entirely truthful, which will often be
the case, a defendant on the losing end of a motion will be reluctant to accept it as such. From a
defkidant's standpoin, a ruling that turns on accepting the prosecutor's professed "good"
intentions at her word loses much of its legitimacy.
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Combining the serious effect of governmental malfeasance with the
limited judicial review of the prosecutor's discretion does not necessarily
mean that a significant body of prosecutorial misconduct must take place
undetected by the courts. Simply because prosecutors can abuse their
authority does not mean that they must be abusing it Moreover, it is
misleading to rely on the recurrent use of the term "prosecutorial
misconduct" as evidence of its widespread nature.4" That label comprehends
a wide variety of conduct that may or may not involve a violation of a
criminal defendant's rights. The breadth of prosecutorial discretion makes it
difficult for courts to police the conduct of prosecutors, so that in most cases
the judiciary must take a hands-off approach to monitoring prosecutors'
decisions. To the extent that courts do review prosecutorial conduct, such
courts are better served by not asking prosecutors why they chose a particular
course of action. In large part, the Supreme Court has made judicial inquiry
into prosecutors' motives off-limits, not because it is unimportant, but
because the inquiry itself can be damaging and is unlikely to produce any
useful information upon which a court can act. Prosecutorial discretion
should not be a license to abuse the rights of suspects and defendants, but
451. Professor Alschuler's article on prosecutorial misconduct has been cited frequently for its
assertion that "commentators who have examined the problem of prosecutorial misconduct have
almost universally bemoaned its frequency. Moreover, even a brief glance at the digests of appellate
decisions, especially in the state courts, indicates that courtroom misconduct by prosecutors provides
one of the most frequent contentions of criminal defendants on appeal." Albert W. Alschuler,
Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 631 (1972). The ease
with which a party can assert a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, and the willingness of appellate
courts to assume the prosecutor's actions constitute misconduct as a prelude to the more important
issue of whether the violation prejudiced the defendant, means that repeated judicial use of the term is
not particularly strong evidence that misconduct does in fact take place to any significant degree.
Some commentators contend that prosecutorial misconduct occurs with great frequency, but offer
no empirical support for the proposition beyond a claim that instances in which is has taken place
signal a much greater problem that exists beyond the purview of the courts. For example, Professor
Jonakait charged that misconduct by prosecutors is "rampant," lonakait, supra note 437, at 562, and
Professor Steele declared that "flagrant misconduct by prosecutors appears to be increasing." Steele,
supra note 10, at 966. Similarly, in discussing Brady violations by prosecutors, Professor Weeks
declared that "tflor every one of these cases, we have every reason to suspect that there are many more
in which the prosecutor's refusal to disclose exculpatory evidence was never discovered by the
defendant or his attorney." Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement
of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REv. 833, 869
(1997). These articles call on courts and legislatures to impose greater restraints on prosecutors based
on the presumed degree ofprosecutorial misconduct that remains undetected. Professor Green pointed
out the flaw in this type of analysis: one cannot automatically infer widespread instances of
prosecutorial misconduct from the motive and opportunity to engage in such actions. See Bruce A.
Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 126, 127 (1988); see
also Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little
Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 70 (1995) ("[C)riics exaggerate the prevalence and
seriousness ofprosecutorial misconduct.").
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policing the conduct of prosecutors is a complex task that requires courts to
remain sensitive to the discretion the system vests in the government's
representatives to investigate and prosecute crime. Asking prosecutors to
respond to judicial inquiry, or, if you will, asking them to lie, about their
motives undermines the integrity of the judicial system as much as any other
prosecutorial act Granting relief to a defendant just to send a message to
prosecutors works a similar harm by twisting the Constitution.

